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TWO LINES OF POLICY ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78 pp 3-16

[Article by M. I. Kulichenko]

[Text] Since the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, there have been two clearly defined and opposite tendencies in the resolution of basic issues in social progress, including national development and inter-ethnic relations. Deliberate interference in the free national development of people (including the prevailing nationality in any particular multinational country) and the constant violation of the equality of nations and the guaranteed rights of national minorities have been and remain a characteristic feature of interethnic relations in the capitalist world, despite all of the demagogic noise over "human rights." Since the first days of its existence, the nation of socialism has countered the effects of the old world--the world of national oppression, national squabbling and national isolation--with a consistently implemented policy aimed at the truly free national development of peoples, egalitarian and voluntary interrelations of every type, and the international unity of workers of all nationalities.

In all of the fundamental issues of social development, including the national question, the two opposing tendencies in world development can be most clearly traced through the example of the largest multinational states--the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The United States is one of the largest multinational countries. Its population includes 24.9 million blacks and more than 10 million Spanish-speaking inhabitants, including 6.3 million citizens of Mexican origin and 1.6 million Puerto Ricans, as well as many immigrants from other Latin American countries, who are accounting for a constantly increasing percentage of the population.¹

From its very beginnings, capitalism in the United States gave rise not only to the oppression and exploitation of national minorities, but also to their progressive integration in a single American nationality. Above all, this was true of the millions of immigrants who streamed into the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This was also largely true of the black Americans, who acquired the language and many elements of the culture and customs of the Anglo-Saxon majority relatively quickly due to the intermingling of the races. The native Indian population, however, was virtually

untouched by these processes. The bourgeoisie even cultivated a thirst for the merciless destruction of the Indians in many segments of the working class. At one time the territory now occupied by the United States was the home of more than 10 million Indians. Now less than 1 million remain.² This is the consequence of the policy of genocide, the impetus for which was provided by the thirst for profits and the desire to seize the Indians' land and natural resources.

The enslaved ethnic minorities have never accepted their lot. As their liberation struggle escalated, reaching its highest point in the mid-1960's, U.S. ruling circles were forced to make substantial concessions to the civil rights activists. These concessions were compulsory and were the cause of outbreaks of racism. Since the end of the 1960's there has been a tendency to nullify earlier concessions for the purpose of preserving one of the major sources of profit and means of corrupting the minds of the white majority.

The situation did not change for the better with the coming of the Carter Administration, which, incidentally, won the votes of most of the voting members of national minorities.

The national minorities in the United States are suffering the effects of double oppression--class and national. Racism, which has essentially become the norm in public and political life, has turned out to be a particularly subtle means of the oppression and exploitation of the working public and their prolonged division on national grounds.

Racism is rooted in monopolistic capital's direct interest in using it as a means of increasing profits and keeping the foundations of its supremacy unshakeable. On the basis of official statistics which set the size of the black population at 24.9 million³ (this figure is actually understated, and the true number exceeds 25 million), Marxist economists have calculated that its losses in just 1 year as a result of unequal status and harsh exploitation are equal to tens of billions of dollars. Besides this, the losses of other national minorities--Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Indians and emigrants from the Asian countries--also total tens of billions of dollars. This is one of the covert but real reasons for the deliberate cultivation of racism by reactionary forces. Naturally, we cannot forget that another equally important reason for the persistent preservation and spread of racism in the United States is the need to instill the spirit of chauvinism in the white population for the purpose of dividing the white and black workers and weakening their joint struggle against monopolistic capital.

Historically, racism in the United States took form as one of the major means of enslaving and exploiting blacks. The hopes of some nationalist leaders of the Negro movement for the origination of "black capitalism" turned out to be groundless: Only a few thousand blacks have been able to make their way into the capitalist milieu, and there is reason to estimate that only 3.2 percent of the total black population can be included in the petty bourgeoisie. In terms of their social status, 96 percent of the blacks belonged to the

working class at the beginning of the 1970's, and 20.1 percent of these were unskilled workers (not counting workers in agriculture) and 52.5 percent were domestic servants.⁴ While accounting for slightly under 12 percent of the nation's total population, blacks represented 20.6 percent of all workers engaged in physical labor and 23.9 percent of all workers in the service sphere.⁵

One of the chief forms of racial discrimination in the United States involves the frustration of the national minorities' right to work. Even according to the official, obviously understated data cited by President Carter in his January 1978 "State of the Union" Message to Congress, the unemployment rate among adult Americans of the national minority groups is 11 percent. According to the same data, whereas the unemployment rate for all young Americans is 17 percent, it is 40 percent among Negro youths (or 52 percent according to the data of Negro organizations, including a rate of 86 percent in New York). Far from all Americans, the message said, have been guaranteed the basic right to work; there are "barriers restricting the opportunities for women, blacks, citizens of Latin American origin and the members of other national minorities."⁶

One of the chief signs of racial discrimination is unequal pay for the same jobs performed by whites. Even according to official statistics, the average income of the Negro family is equal to only 59 percent of the white family's income, and the figure is even lower--54 percent--in the calculations of economists. The Negro family is generally larger than the white family, which means that the standard of living of the black population is considerably lower than that of the whites. According to official data, 35 percent of all blacks have an income below the official "poverty level," but if we also count those who are "at the poverty level," it turns out that half of the black population is living in poverty. While 9.9 percent of all white families throughout the nation have an income lower than the official poverty level, the figure is 29.3 percent in the case of Chicano families and 33 percent for Puerto Ricans.

The situation of the national minorities is largely due to discrimination in education and employment training. Even according to official data, whites have an average of 12.3 years of education, blacks have 10.6 years, Chicanos have 9 and Puerto Ricans have 8.7.

The problem of actual racial segregation in the American schools is still one of the most crucial in this nation. It is true that the situation was somewhat alleviated by Supreme Court decisions in the 1950's and 1960's, but the problem is still far from solved. In many states, racists still disrupt combined classes of white and black children. L. Hall, head of the school desegregation program of the Southern Regional Council, once remarked that "America is stubbornly refusing to grant all children equal opportunities in the area of education."

Acquiring a higher education is an equally complex problem in the life of the national minorities of the United States. Naturally, their lower level of general education has an effect on this, seriously complicating their enrollment in colleges and universities. There are also discriminatory loopholes which have been created by state authorities to limit the access of national minorities to a higher education. For example, the Supreme Court of the State of California pronounced a positive program, which was in existence until recently and which envisaged the admission of 16 blacks, Chicanos, Indians and Asians to a university school of medicine, "unconstitutional."⁷

Although some progress has been made during the last 10-15 years, the advancement of black Americans to elected positions does not correspond at all to their proportional share in the U.S. population. Blacks hold less than 1 percent of all elected positions. In the seven Southern states where black Americans make up 27 percent of the population, only one black has been elected to Congress (out of 57 representatives).⁸

One of the most horrible crimes of American racism is the cruel and essentially planned oppression of the country's native inhabitants--the Indians. At one time, the colonizers concluded treaties with the chiefs of 200 Indian tribes, according to which they were forced into the depths of the nation, to the worst areas. Now they are even being forced out of these areas. Existing treaties are not being taken into account. The colonizers are disrupting the ways of Indian tribal life. The average family income here is only one-third as high as the nationwide figure, and 70 percent of the Indians are suffering from malnutrition. The unemployment rate here is ten times as high as the average. The average life expectancy of the Indians is 44 years (for the nation as a whole it is 71 years) and the infant mortality rate is three times as high as for whites.

The policy of the authorities in regard to the native inhabitants of America, according to Clyde Bellicurt, national coordinator of the American Indian Movement, consists in attempts to take away their cultural, religious and political freedoms. For this reason, he declared, we consider all Indians to be political prisoners of this society, regardless of whether they are at liberty or in prison. It is no wonder that a conference of representatives of 74 Indian tribes in December 1977 resolved to organize an active protest movement against the increasing oppression and racial discrimination.

When the situation of the Indian populations of North and South America was discussed by the United Nations last fall in Geneva, one of the leaders of the Indian movement from San Francisco declared: "In general, we are not only asking for land. We want our human dignity returned to us, we want to pick up the pieces of our permanent culture and preserve them. The hope of this will make it possible for us to be reborn and to feel like human beings."

Each year there is more discrimination against the populations of the so-called "internal colonies"--the Puerto Rican population of almost 2 million and the Hawaiian population of almost 1 million. The standard of living of

the native inhabitants of these territories is falling while the rate of unemployment rises. In Puerto Rico the army of unemployed sometimes represents 40 percent of the able-bodied population.

One of the characteristic features of racist domination in the United States is growing anti-Semitism. Semitism is flourishing in this nation where 5.8 million Jews live and where the Zionist movement is so strong, having firm roots in the sphere of monopolistic capital and encompassing many links of the civil service as well. As early as 1975, speakers at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the United States of America said that the Jews in this nation were being "subjected to discrimination in employment, housing, education, leisure recreation and other areas of life. Synagogues and other Jewish establishments are being desecrated and vandalized."⁹

Although the U.S. authorities have expended tremendous efforts and resources to support international Zionism and reactionary circles in Israel in their struggle against the Arabs in the Middle East, they are taking no action against those who sow anti-Semitism and discriminate against the Jews in their own country.

While the national minorities in the United States were enduring the cruelties of national oppression and every possible form of racial discrimination they never reconciled themselves to their lot. This situation changed somewhat as a result of a mass movement by the minorities. The laws on school desegregation and on equal rights and opportunities in employment were of great significance. The doors of polling booths, cafes, restaurants and so forth were opened wider for the colored minorities. But the rate of speed with which the effects of racism are being overcome and existing programs of desegregation are being carried out cannot be called anything other than a snail's pace. The dream of equality and free development, of carrying out the other lofty ideals for which generations of the best people in America fought, is still a beautiful but impossible dream today.

In December 1977 President J. Carter met with the heads of Negro organizations. Calling the situation of the Negro population a tragic one, they said that blacks are still the victims of discrimination in literally every sphere of life.

It is indicative that the American Themis is closing her eyes and ears to the persecution of fighters for the civil rights of the ethnic minorities. The names of such fighters against racism as Benjamin Chavis, Assata Shakur, George Merritt, Elmer Pratt, Delbert Tibbs and many others are now known throughout the world; legal experts proved the absurdity of the charges brought against them long ago, but the authorities are still holding them behind bars.

It is no wonder that American journalist and politician Claude Lightfoot said in his recent work, "Human Rights U.S. Style," that the United States appears to be a "malicious violator of human rights."¹⁰

The triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution, as the most dramatic coup in mankind's history and the major event of the 20th century, marked the beginning of fundamental changes in all areas of social life, including the national development of peoples and their interrelations. As a result of the consistent implementation of Lenin's national policy, the Soviet nation was the first in history to resolve the national question and guarantee unprecedented and previously impossible successes in the all-round development and gradual but constant convergence of nationalities and ethnic groups.

From the first steps that were taken to implement the national policy of the communist party and the Soviet State, particularly the publication of the famous "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, "tremendous concern for the interests of different nationalities"¹¹ has been characteristic of this policy. In this great cause, nothing has been treated as a minor affair; the party has attached great significance to everything--from returning the Osman Koran to the Moslems and national relics to the people of the Ukraine to granting the Polish and Finnish people complete independence.

Lenin's instructions regarding the need for a particularly careful approach in guaranteeing the free national development of each nationality was of fundamental significance, as the nation was not merely multinational but, in addition, the peoples inhabiting it were on the most varied levels of development and some were still living under the conditions of a decaying ancestral order. Tsarism had done everything possible to prevent the oppressed peoples from taking even the slightest steps toward progress.

A high-level official representing the tsarist authorities in the territory now occupied by Kazakhstan wrote the following to the military governor in Orenburg: "I am not entertaining any exaggerated philanthropic dreams about educating the Kirgiz people (meaning the Kazakh people--M. K.) and setting them on the level occupied by the European peoples. I hope with all my heart that the Kirgiz people will always be nomadic shepherds and that they will never sow or know anything not only about science but also about crafts."¹² Tsarism consistently fulfilled the wishes of its loyal subject: Prior to the October Revolution only 42 books and brochures had been published in the Kazakh language and only 22 of the local inhabitants had acquired a higher education. The reasons for this line of policy were essentially the same that are now motivating U.S. monopolistic capital in its oppression of many national minorities.

One guardian of tsarist ways wrote the following with horror at the end of the 19th century: "Establish a written form of the language, give it some literary polish, set forth the rules of its grammar and teach it in the schools and you will thereby (Oh, horrors!) establish and develop the particular nationality."¹³

All of this is now a thing of the past. The life of peoples and their mutual understanding have changed dramatically under the conditions of socialism.

The political foundations of the freedom of peoples were secured above all by the overthrow of the exploiting classes and the institution of power by the workers in the form of the soviet they had created. The communist party has resolutely supported the public desire to create various national governments. On the eve of the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution V. I. Lenin proudly said: "We have given all of the non-Russian nationalities their own republics or autonomous oblasts."¹⁴ There are now 53 national state structures in our country, established by 57 nationalities and ethnic groups (out of a total of 120 nationalities), representing almost 98 percent of the nation's population.

In accordance with the principles of socialist democracy, all of the nationalities living in a particular republic, autonomous oblast or district have equal rights with the nationality creating the particular governmental system. Soviet legislation envisages not only the protection of these rights, stipulating that the desires of the non-native population must be taken into account, but also daily concern for the satisfaction of their specific national needs.

During all the years of Soviet rule, the nation has untiringly perfected the union and other forms of national state systems. This is still a policy planning goal, even though, as Chairman of the Constitutional Commission L. I. Brezhnev said in his report on the draft of the Constitution of the USSR at the May (1977) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the basic features of the USSR's federal structure have proved to be completely effective. Improvement is now mainly taking the form of deeper democratism, the involvement of an increasing number of workers in the management of state affairs and the encouragement of greater sociopolitical activity on the part of the workers.

One of the most vivid indicators of Soviet democratism and participation by workers of all nationalities in the resolution of fundamental problems in national life was the nationwide discussion of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR. It lasted for almost 4 months and involved more than 140 million persons--that is, four-fifths of the adult population. The Soviet people discussed the Basic Law of their life with interest and in a business-like manner, submitting around 400,000 suggestions concerning amendments to individual articles and proposing new ones.

Discussions of this kind provide broader opportunities for direct participation by the workers in the management of public affairs and permit their collective experience and knowledge to be taken into account. In particular, this is quite important in the case of nationwide discussions of plans for the further development of the nation. More than 90 million people took part in the discussion of the current five-year plan for this kind of development, and more than 1 million suggestions were submitted.

The national composition of the population is carefully taken into account in deputy elections. The deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet now represent 61 nationalities, 72 are represented in the supreme soviets of the union autonomous republics and more than 100 nationalities are represented in local soviets. The multinational nature of all central and local levels of the

power structure can be judged, in particular, by the fact that deputies of 39 nationalities were elected to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the figures for other republics were 18 for the Uzbek SSR, 14 for the Kirgiz SSR, 10 for the Tadzhik SSR, 8 each for the Moldavian and Lithuanian SSR's and so forth.

A comparison of the ethnic composition of the national population to that of the members of soviets of people's deputies is indicative. For example, according to the latest census, Russians accounted for 53.37 percent of the national population and 46 percent of the soviet deputies; the respective figures for other nationalities were 16.86 and 22.56 for Ukrainians, 3.75 and 3.73 for Belorussians, 3.81 and 3.39 for Uzbeks, 2.19 and 2.82 for Kazakhs, 1.34 and 1.74 for Georgians, 1.81 and 2.12 for Azerbaydzhani, 1.1 and 1.12 for Lithuanians, 1.12 and 1.23 for Moldavians, 0.59 and 0.85 for Latvians, 0.60 and 0.78 for the Kirgiz people, 0.88 and 0.82 for Tadzhiks, 1.42 and 1.47 for Armenians, 0.63 and 0.78 for the Turkmen people and 0.47 and 0.47 for the Estonians.

Local soviets, of which there are more than 50,000 (with over 2 million deputies), have played an increasingly important role in recent years. An aktiv of 31 million has developed around them. They investigate matters concerning the state of economic management, trade, the everyday life of the population, residential construction, municipal improvements, public education, culture, public health, social security, the observance of socialist laws, the preservation of state and public order, planning and financial-budgeting activity and compliance with electors' mandates. Incidentally, the implementation of electors' mandates is considered to be a particularly important matter in the Soviet nation. This is envisaged in the new Constitution of the USSR (Article 102), and it was noted when the constitution was adopted that more than 700,000 mandates had been carried out throughout the nation during the preceding 2 years.

President J. Carter admitted in his January (1978) State of the Union Message: "For some citizens, life in our country has begun to resemble life in a foreign country, where the authorities are so obscure and so remote that we frequently have to deal with them through special intermediaries."¹⁵ The Soviet people do not need intermediaries of this kind: Their envoys consistently perform their duties. All of the deputies are accountable to the electors. In their work, the deputies make extensive use of the right of inquiry--the most important constitutional form of control over the work of soviet executive committees, economic agencies, cultural institutions and individual administrators.

A graphic illustration of the role played by the soviets of people's deputies can be seen in their constant concern for youth. All of the soviets, from the highest to the lowest levels, have special standing commissions on the affairs of youth, which perform their work energetically.

The Constitution of the USSR guarantees real freedom of national development. "Citizens of the USSR of different races and nationalities have equal rights," Article 36 of the Constitution of the USSR states. "The exercise of these rights is guaranteed by a policy of all-round development and convergence of all of the nationalities and ethnic groups of the USSR, the indoctrination of citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism and the possibility of using native languages and the languages of other peoples of the USSR."¹⁶ The same article states that any direct or indirect restriction of these rights, the creation of direct or indirect advantages for citizens on the basis of race or nationality, and the propagation of racial or national exclusivity, hatred or contempt are punishable by law.

It must be said that there are other guarantees of the free national development of peoples: the existence of various types of national state systems; their preservation even in those cases when the native nationality accounts for less than half of the population; the active enlistment of the services of members of all nationalities to resolve fundamental questions of the Soviet State's national policy on the highest levels of authority. Constant concern for the interests of different nationalities is the responsibility, in particular, of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities, and the numerical representation of small ethnic groups in this organ is higher than the percentage accounted for by them in the population. For example, 13 autonomous republics with a population of less than 1 million each and a total population of 7.84 million--that is, slightly over 3 percent of the national population--now have 143 deputies in the Council of Nationalities, representing more than 19 percent of its total membership.

Under capital conditions, the national government is not only of great significance in the future of a particular nationality, but it is also virtually the only means of preserving its freedom and independence. Under the conditions of socialism, which has been constructed in the multinational Soviet nation, the national state system of each nationality is supplemented by the union government, established by all of the nationalities and ethnic groups inhabiting the nation. As personified in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is expected to supplement the national state systems and give different peoples all of the assistance they require to guarantee the all-round development of their economy and culture.

The socioeconomic foundations of the freedom of the Soviet peoples were laid with the elimination of the exploiting classes, the cancellation of private ownership of the means of production and the establishment of public ownership of these means. The advantages of the socialist system of economic management and the fact that our multinational state is a union permitted the speedy eradication of the actual inequality of nationalities and ethnic groups and provided for the general equalization of their levels of economic development and material well-being.

The rates of economic development also changed considerably, which, in turn, accelerated the national development of different ethnic groups. This was a result of the transformation of social relations. Under the conditions of

the socialist order, the economies of the USSR and all of the union republics making it up are developing rapidly. This is particularly characteristic of mature socialism. The total industrial product of the USSR in 1977 was 145 times as great as in 1913; the growth of the RSFSR product was the same. In the case of a few republics, however, this indicator was much higher, including 188 for the Belorussian SSR, 226 for the Kazakh SSR, 257 for the Moldavian SSR, 307 for the Armenian SSR and 317 for the Kirgiz SSR.

The potential for economic development in the Soviet republics, predetermined by the socialist order, is greatly supplemented by the fact that this development is taking place in a multinational nation and in its unified national economic complex. For example, whereas the bourgeoisie in Latvia was unable to attain the 1913 level in industrial production during its 20 years of rule after the efforts of international imperialism temporarily suppressed the Soviet regime in this nation, the volume grew 40-fold during the 1940-1977 period despite the considerable destruction of the war years. In Soviet Estonia this indicator was 43 times as high at the end of the same period, and in Soviet Lithuania it was 52 times as high.

The accelerated nature of the national development of many ethnic groups in the unified Soviet multinational state can also be illustrated with more recent examples. It is being accomplished through the partial redistribution of total national income in favor of the republics which, according to general opinion, have a greater need for this--either on the strength of underdevelopment for one reason or another or in connection with the development of new sources of natural resources or the construction of large national economic projects in the interest of all peoples.

The success of the national development of the Soviet peoples depends largely on the growth rate of national income and the income of each of the union and autonomous republics. This growth depends on general economic development and, due to differences in the development of industry and agriculture in various republics, is also uneven. Whereas, for example, national income rose by 91 percent during the last decade, the figure was even higher for 6 of the 15 republics--98 percent for the Kazakh SSR, 108 percent for Lithuania, 129 percent for Belorussia and 131 percent for Armenia.

Data on the distribution of public wealth and national income produced by the workers in the United States and the USSR are quite indicative. In the United States, 34.6 million families with property valued at up to 10,000 dollars represent 60 percent of the population but possess only 7.5 percent of national wealth. At the same time, 3.9 million families with property worth more than 50,000 dollars account for 7 percent of the population and control 57 percent of national wealth. Finally, 200,000 families with property worth more than 500,000 account for only 0.3 percent of the population and possess 22 percent of all national wealth. There is no point in even discussing the distribution of national income: It is mainly distributed in accordance with available capital.

The situation is completely the opposite in the Soviet nation, where there are no sharp differences in the financial status of citizens. The means of production, land, natural resources and almost the entire national product are public property.

IN 1976, 73.7 percent of national income in the USSR was used for consumption, and the rest was used for accumulation and other expenditures. Wages account for 74.5 percent of the total income of industrial workers' families, while the rest consists of pensions, stipends, grants and other payments and benefits from public consumption funds, including free education, medical treatment, etc.

Consequently, the material well-being of workers in the USSR does not depend much on wages alone, which are paid to each worker and which do not depend on nationality, sex or age in the USSR. Besides this, almost the entire population is provided with living space at state expense. For example, residential buildings with an area of 584 million square meters have been built in the Ukrainian SSR during the years of Soviet rule. The scales of residential construction in the republic are constantly growing--in 1976 workers were provided with 364,000 apartments--that is, 1,000 housewarmings are celebrated each day.

When social relations were being transformed and the economic life of peoples was developing on the new basis, the social-class structure of nationalities and ethnic groups changed dramatically. During the years of socialist development, the working class and intelligentsia have become larger in all Soviet nationalities and they have even been created anew in many; there have been qualitative changes in the peasantry.

The rapid growth of the working class of all republics in general and the working class of different nationalities in particular has been of the greatest significance for the progress of these peoples. This growth was quite substantial even before the war and it is still going on. At present the proportion of ethnic members of the working class in relation to the percentage of native inhabitants in the population is more than 70 percent in the Ukraine, 60 percent in Moldavia, 47 percent in Georgia and 36 percent in Uzbekistan. The significance of this lies in the fact that the working class represents the chief creator of national values while simultaneously safeguarding the truly internationalist foundations of all national life.

Fundamental changes have also taken place in rural life in all republics during the years of Soviet rule. The number of persons employed in agricultural production has decreased significantly, now totaling slightly more than 27 million. Their levels of education and qualifications have risen immeasurably. The number of persons with a higher and secondary (partial or complete) education has risen rapidly since the eradication of illiteracy during the pre-war period. While in 1939 only 18 out of every thousand kolkhoz farmers had a higher or secondary education, the figure had already risen to 226 by 1959, 393 in 1970 and 562 in 1977. For the sake of comparison,

the respective indicators in industry were 84, 396, 586 and 732. The qualifications of agricultural workers are constantly rising: By the end of 1975, 5.14 percent of them were specialists in all fields and 18.12 percent were machine operators. Each year there is improvement in the housing conditions, culture and everyday life of rural workers. Independent rural libraries alone had 561.2 million copies of books and magazines and 44.6 million registered readers in 1976.

There were 104,400 rural cultural clubs and centers, reading rooms and kolkhoz clubs.

The multinational kolkhoz peasantry of the USSR as a whole has become a new, socialist class during the years of Soviet rule, successfully building a life for itself and confidently advancing toward the heights of social progress along with the working class and the intelligentsia.

The formation of the intelligentsia is important in describing the development of the Soviet peoples under the conditions of socialism. Prior to the October Revolution, many nationalities did not have an intelligentsia at all. The nationwide intelligentsia began taking shape before the war and consisted of around 37 million individuals at the beginning of 1977, having increased more than 12-fold in size over a period of 40 years. The number of specialists with a higher and secondary education alone was 9.5 times as high in 1975 as in 1941 throughout the nation, 9.2 times as high in the RSFSR, 8.6 times in the Ukrainian SSR, 9.2 times in the Belorussian SSR, 16.5 times in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics, 7.5 times in the Transcaucasian republics, 10.6 times in the Baltic republics and 17 times in Moldavia.

Data on the ethnic composition of the VUZ student body between the 1960/61 and 1974/75 academic years are indicative. For the nationalities with their own union republics, the increase was 1.98-fold, and for those with autonomous republics it was 2.6-fold. For many nationalities the indicator was much higher: It ranged from 2.5-fold to 3-fold for the Uzbek, Kazakh, Moldavian, Kirgiz, Tadzhik, Balkar, Bashkir, Buryat, Ingush, Kabardian, Mari and Mordvin peoples, the ethnic groups of Dagestan and the Tatars; it exceeded 3-fold for the Azerbaydzhani, Kalmyks and Chechens.

At this time of widespread scientific and technical revolution, the quantitative and qualitative growth of the scientific community is an important indicator of the development of the Soviet peoples. Between 1965 and 1975 the number of scientific personnel had increased by 84.1 percent throughout the nation, including an increase of 88.6 percent in the Tadzhik SSR, 89.6 percent in the Uzbek SSR, 91.1 percent in the Moldavian SSR, 91.9 percent in the Kirgiz SSR, 95.3 percent in the Lithuanian SSR, 100 percent in Latvia and 110 percent in Belorussia.

The spiritual bases for the freedom of the Soviet peoples consist primarily in the fact that the establishment of the Marxist-Leninist outlook and its internationalist essence have radically transformed the consciousness of

workers of all nationalities. Enmity and hatred between peoples have been ended forever and the social-class bases of nationalism and chauvinism have been liquidated. A popular culture, socialist in content, internationalist in nature and aims and national in form, has evolved.

Genuine culture, V. I. Lenin taught us, is guaranteed by the complete freedom and complete equality of peoples. This has been confirmed by the entire course of development of the Soviet nationalities and ethnic groups.

Special articles in the Constitution of the USSR grant all citizens the right to an education and to the use of cultural achievements. Articles 45 and 46 not only declare these rights, but also speak of how they are guaranteed and actually safeguarded. Dozens of nationalities and ethnic groups have received this right for the first time in their history under the conditions of socialism--for the first time, they have their own written language and are creating their own music and literature, opera and ballet, sculpture and painting. As the mature socialist society gains strength, the national culture of these peoples is rising to an even higher level. With each year the working masses not only increase their "consumption" of culture but also take a more active part in its development.

The constant improvement of the general educational system and the constant increase in printed materials represent an important indicator of the developmental level of Soviet nationalities and ethnic groups.

By the end of 1975, classes in the Soviet school were being taught in 52 languages. Besides this, in each republic, in addition to the language of the native population, other local languages are also used widely in the schools. In the Georgian SSR, for example, school classes are taught in six languages; classes in 71.6 percent of all day schools are taught in Georgian, Russian is spoken in 7 percent of the schools, Armenian in 5.5 percent, Azerbaydzhani in 4.4 percent, Osetian in 2.4 percent and Abkhaz in 1.5 percent. In addition to this, there were schools in which classes were taught in two (5.7 percent), three (1.7 percent) or four or more (0.1 percent) languages.

The press and other mass media constitute a clear indicator of the success in the national development of Soviet peoples. At present, magazines in our nation are published in 44 Soviet languages, newspapers are published in 56 languages and radio and television programs are transmitted in 67. Besides this, theatrical plays are presented in 47 languages (prior to the October Revolution the figure was 9) and there are 76 literatures (there were 13 before the revolution), 2 of which--the literatures of the Vepsy and the Dolgans--were born in the 1970's.

Only a few decades ago, very few people knew of the existence of the Kirgiz, Avar, Balkar, Chukotian, Nivkhy and many other peoples. Now the names of Kirgiz writer Chingiz Aymatov, Balkarian poet Kaysyn Kuliyev, Chukotian

writer Yuriy Rytkeu, Nivkhy writer Vladimir Sangi and many others are famous throughout the world. In the United States, incidentally, theatergoers had the chance of seeing Ch. Aytmatov's play "The Ascent of Fujiyama."

In 1976, books and brochures in the Soviet nation were published in 60 Soviet languages (in 89 over all the years of Soviet rule) and 50 foreign languages (including Esperanto). The total number of books published in the nation was 35.7 percent higher in 1976 than in 1965.

While displaying constant concern for the development of national languages and the expansion of their public functions, the Soviet State is simultaneously attaching great significance to the constant augmentation of the role played by the Russian language, voluntarily chosen by all of the peoples of the USSR as the chief language of inter-national communication. It has played a significant role in the national development of every ethnic group, in the enrichment of their culture, in the training of personnel and in the assimilation of the achievements of other peoples and the entire world culture.

One noteworthy phenomenon, characteristic of the present stage in the development of our society, has been the rapid development of national cultures, accompanied by the reinforcement of their international foundations and inter-relationship within the context of the single multinational Soviet culture. The common features of their socialist content have been reinforced. All of these processes are clearly and constantly being manifested in Soviet reality. Science and higher and secondary education are developing successfully in all republics. More and more significant works, revealing the characteristics of the contemporary Soviet individual, are being produced by the national literature and art of each ethnic group.

The level of professional art among the Soviet peoples can be judged, for example, by the fact that the membership of the Union of Composers, uniting musicians of 47 nationalities, includes 631 Russians, 315 Jews, 158 Armenians, 133 Ukrainians, 107 Georgians, 71 Estonians, 71 Azerbaydzhani, 69 Lithuanians, 51 Latvians, 44 Uzbeks, 33 Tatars, 30 Kazakhs, 18 Belorussians, 15 Tadzhiks, 14 Turkmens, 12 Kirgiz, 11 Bashkirs, 11 Moldavians, 11 Chuvash, 8 Germans, 8 Osetians, 6 Buryats, 5 Kabardians, 4 Abkhaz and from 1 to 4 representatives of another 23 nationalities. This is particularly important, as music is one of the chief art forms, in which the distinctive national features of peoples are manifested and developed to the highest degree.

The development of professional and amateur art is thoroughly encouraged in the USSR, Article 27 of the Soviet Constitution states. Virtually each ethnic group, large or small, has its favorite theaters and song and dance troupes, which are also known throughout the nation. Nationwide fame has come, for example, to such renowned groups as the Pyatnitskiy Academic Russian Folk Choir, the Ukrainian Virskiy Dance Troupe, the "Samotsvety," "Pesnyary," "Orero," "Fluyerash" troupes and others. The final round of the All-Russian Festival of Song and Dance Troupes took place at the beginning of 1978; more

than 20 professional groups from the RSFSR demonstrated their art here. These included groups with such widespread renown in our nation and abroad as the Koryak National Mengo troupe, the Kantele group from Karelia, the Rus' troupe from Vladimir, the Buryat Baykal troupe and the Sayany group from Tuva. Groups from the Tatar ASSR, Dagestan, North Osetia, the Udmurt and Chuvash ASSR's and others also performed in the festival.

Hundreds of thousands of Americans, incidentally, have become acquainted with many of the achievements of the Soviet people's national cultures. In the summer of 1977 a festival of Soviet arts was held in the United States, in reference to which the NEW YORK TIMES wrote that "the amazingly varied festival program depicts a wide panorama of folk art in the Soviet Union--exceptionally appealing and exciting." Among the groups whose performances won general recognition, the newspaper listed the unique Mengo troupe of the Koryaks, which had produced, according to the paper, "a very strong impression," a Kamuzist troupe from Kirgiziya, performers from Tadzhikistan and others. In its review of the festival, the Michigan OAKLAND PRESS wrote that this was a "grand spectacle," making it possible to "take a look into the spiritual world of the Soviet individual and learn something about the rich heritage of a distant nation only known about through books and newspapers by most people. Never before had dances been more perfect, costumes more beautiful or songs and singers more inspiring."

One of the most noteworthy signs of the development of the national cultures has been popular amateur art. Soviet reality has given the workers unlimited opportunities to reveal and truly develop their talents. More than 25 million persons in the USSR now take part in some kind of amateur artistic pursuit. Amateur groups do not copy professional groups; they supplement them. The basis for the existence and activity of these groups consists not only in the mass desire of the workers to become involved in cultural life, but also the public need for this unique form taken by the national cultures.

Socialism solicitously concerns itself with protecting the progressive achievements of the national development of peoples in the past and the enrichment of these achievements in the present. For example, in the Ukraine alone, 47,400 different historical objects of cultural value have been put under state guard. The Institute of Literature and Language of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences has painstakingly collected and solicitously guarded more than 1 million Latvian folk songs, 36,000 folk tales, 75,000 folk proverbs, 450,000 riddles and around 30,000 folk tunes. "The state," the Basic Law of the USSR says, "concerns itself with the protection, augmentation and extensive use of items of spiritual value for the moral and aesthetic education of the Soviet people and the elevation of their cultural standards."¹⁷

One lie that is sometimes spread in the West alleges that the leveling of national cultures and the attempt to denigrate or even to totally eliminate national factors in social development are characteristic of socialism. We can only be amazed by the ignorance of those who spread this lie. Everyone knows of Lenin's statement that there are no people without national characteristics and that "we would never be able to build a socialist society"

without thorough consideration for these characteristics.¹⁸ And it would be absurd to think that the great leap taken by absolutely all of the nationalities and ethnic groups in the USSR, particularly the small ones, from underdevelopment to progress could have taken place without the rapid elevation of the national consciousness and national feelings, including national pride for past achievements and for contributions to the treasure house of world civilization. The fact that the nature of socialism, its corresponding human outlook, the common goals and interests of peoples and their concerted effort in the creation of a new society placed national consciousness and national feelings on a qualitatively new, internationalist basis is quite another matter.

Socialism has made radical changes in the everyday life, customs, traditions and beliefs of the Soviet nationalities and ethnic groups. In particular, the number of religious people in the nation has decreased. In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR (Article 52), however, Soviet people of all nationalities have the right to profess any religion, and many of them exercise this right. There are now more than 20,000 different religious associations in the USSR, religious literature is published, 18 higher and secondary parochial institutions are functioning, religious items are produced and monasteries are in existence. This was apparent to all who attended the world conference of "Religious Activists for Lasting Peace, Disarmament and Just Relations Between Peoples" in the summer of 1977. The conference was attended by representatives of almost all existing religions from 107 countries.

Some additional words must be said about a few aspects of the development of so-called national minorities in our nation. It is important to note that this term, which is accurate in general when used in reference to the quantitative composition of the population in the nation or in separate republics, is virtually no longer used in our nation. The fact is that in the past it always had another meaning as well--the oppressed and underprivileged part of the population. It is true that some Sovietologists in the West who distort the true essence of national relations in the USSR are not only still making constant use of this term themselves, but are also ascribing it to the Soviet State. This is particularly true of descriptions of the situation of Jews in the USSR. International Zionism in general and American and Israeli reactionaries in particular, are trying in every way possible to distort the essence of the Soviet State's Leninist national policy in regard to the Jewish population. Naturally, this has nothing in common with reality and is totally refuted by it.

According to the 1970 census, there were 2,151,000 Jews in the USSR at that time--that is, less than 1 percent of the total population. Nonetheless, the number of Jewish students in VUZ's at the beginning of the 1970's was twice as high as in Israel. During the 1974/75 academic year there were more than 350 Jewish students in Soviet VUZ's per 10,000 Jews, although the nationwide indicator was only 188. Jews make up 6.1 percent of the entire scientific community, 5.2 percent of the art world, 6.5 percent in literature and the press, 3.4 percent in the medical community and 6.7 percent of all lawyers.

These data expose the false motives of all those who accuse the Soviet Government of "oppressing" the Jews, of "persecuting" them and so forth.

As we know, between the first years after the war and the end of 1975, part of the Jewish population of the USSR--around 5 percent of the total--fell prey to Zionist propaganda and emigrated. After experiencing all of the delights of "Western democracy" and realizing the true nature of the "free world" through their own personal experience, thousands and thousands of emigres began to petition the Soviet Government for permission to return to the USSR. At the end of 1976 around 300 of them sent a letter to the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Soviet Embassy in Italy, in which they wrote: "We deny the false and far-fetched statements of Western propagandists in reference to the existence of anti-Semitism and the oppression of Jews in the USSR.... We must firmly state that Zionism is not bringing joy and happiness to the world, but only separation and misery, tears and grief."¹⁹ Another Jewish group of former Soviet citizens announced the following in protest against international Zionism's latest attempts to accuse the Soviet Government of "discrimination" against the Jews at the end of 1977: "In the USSR, we exercise all of the human rights which could only be granted by a truly democratic state, and we have learned from personal experience what the celebrated Western democracy in the capitalist world actually means."²⁰

The Soviet people resolutely refute the lies of the ideologists of worldwide reaction.

Everything depends on the nature of the social order: Capitalism brings the national minorities more intensive oppression and exploitation. Socialism provides unprecedented opportunities for national development, renovating every side of human life and guaranteeing the creation of new things of cultural value. Soviet reality has conclusively proved that socialism has literally resurrected small and large ethnic groups, giving them a "second wind."

These are the general outlines of the two worlds, the two opposing lines of policy and the two results of different ways of dealing with the national question.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977," Washington, 1977, pp 27, 30-31.
2. Ibid., p 33.
3. Ibid., p 27.
4. V. Perlo, "Economics of Racism U.S.A. Roots of Black Inequality," New York, 1975, pp 21-71.

5. "Look Homeward Jimmy Carter: The State of Human Rights, U.S.A.," New York, October 1977.
6. PRAVDA, 21 January 1978.
7. See S. Chervonnaya's article entitled "The Supreme Court and Civil Rights" in issue No 4 for 1978.
8. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 2 June 1975, p H4707.
9. Quoted in PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTZIALISMA, No 3, 1977, p 83.
10. C. Lightfoot, "Human Rights U.S. Style," New York, 1977.
11. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 240.
12. S. Baishev, "Velikiye sotsialisticheskiye preobrazovaniya v Kazakhstane" [Great Socialist Reforms in Kazakhstan], Alma-Ata, 1950, p 7.
13. ZHURNAL MINISTERSTVA NARODNOGO PROSVESHCHENIYA, No 2, 1887, p 37.
14. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 44, p 146.
15. PRAVDA, 29 January 1978.
16. "The Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Moscow, 1977, p 17.
17. Ibid., p 13.
18. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 38, p 184.
19. IZVESTIYA, 9 December 1976.
20. Ibid., 6 January 1978.

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'THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD' DEBATE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 17-26

[Article by V. V. Larionov]

[Text] The question of the "nuclear threshold"¹ is the subject of increasingly frequent lively debates and arguments in political and military circles in the United States and other NATO countries. This is not a new issue. It appears that it has now attracted a great deal of attention in connection with the Pentagon's plans to begin the series production of neutron weapons and their deployment in Europe. The fact is that, according to the unanimous opinion of experts, the neutron bomb² will complicate the problem of the "nuclear threshold" even more and give it new shades of meaning.

The debates going on today concern many of the political and strategic aspects of this problem. If they are looked at as a group, however, it is impossible not to notice that they focus on two cardinal issues: on whether the production of new models of "tactical nuclear weapons" and their deployment in Western Europe as a means of frightening any potential enemy--that is, the nations of the Warsaw Pact--are justified from the standpoint of the United States and its allies; and on the hypothetical consequences the West can expect if the "nuclear threshold" is crossed.

On This Side of the "Nuclear Threshold"

The origination of the idea of the "nuclear threshold" was a kind of reaction on the part of the military and political leaders of the United States and NATO to the loss of the American atomic monopoly and to the recognition of the fact that the unrestricted use of nuclear weapons (which was emphasized in the doctrine of "massive retaliation") could be nothing other than suicide for the United States in view of the changes in the Soviet-American strategic balance.

We know that the question of the "nuclear threshold" did not come up at all during the period when the doctrine of "massive retaliation" was in effect, as the United States, putting its trust in nuclear superiority, did not plan

on any other type of war in Europe than all-out nuclear warfare. The loss of this superiority has given rise, since the second half of the 1950's, to a feverish search for a "rational" strategy which would exclude the possibility of retaliatory strikes on U.S. territory and simultaneously increase the "utility" value of American military strength in general and its nuclear potential in particular, especially in Europe.

The following chronological milestones in this process can be singled out.

In 1957, J. F. Dulles, spurred on by the criticism of his proclaimed doctrine of "massive retaliation," officially recognized the theory of "limited nuclear warfare."³

At the end of the 1950's the United States first situated nuclear ammunition for tactical missiles in Europe.

In 1961 the Kennedy Administration officially adopted the doctrine of "flexible response" and the theory of "graduated nuclear retaliation."

In 1962, Secretary of Defense R. McNamara proposed the theory of "counterforce,"⁴ which was supposed to regulate nuclear exchanges with a potential enemy.

In 1965 H. Kahn's book, "On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios," was published in the United States and England; here the idea of the "nuclear threshold" as the moment of transition to the use of nuclear weapons (the 21st rung of the escalation ladder) was formulated as a theory.⁵

In 1966, at the December session of the NATO Council in Brussels, the idea of "graduated" and gradual response was adopted by all members of the bloc. Representatives of the European countries were admitted to the new "nuclear planning group." At this session the United States reaffirmed its consent to a lowering of the "nuclear threshold."

In 1975 a report by Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger to the Congress set forth a new variant of the idea of "counterforce" and, besides this, substantiated the United States' ability to take the initiative in the selective use of "mini-nuclear" weapons in Europe.⁶

In 1978, Secretary of Defense H. Brown reaffirmed the special priority of weapons systems in Europe.

To this list of "steps" which contributed to the actual formation of the "nuclear threshold" in its current form, we should add that, at this same time, U.S. and NATO military and political circles were persistently searching for the most convenient moment and the "optimal" means of instituting the use of nuclear weapons; the views of the United States and the Western European powers on this issue did not always coincide. And this is understandable, since the Pentagon was working primarily in the interest of the

American military-industrial complex and not in the interest of its allies in Europe. In line with this, the "nuclear threshold" was sometimes lowered and sometimes raised, but in either case, leading circles in the United States never rejected and are not now rejecting the unrestricted use of nuclear weapons as the decisive means of achieving their ends in a world war.

It is no coincidence that they are still attaching primary importance to the development of strategic nuclear forces with the simultaneous buildup of operational and tactical nuclear weapons in theaters of war. At the end of 1976 the American nuclear arsenal in Europe consisted of over 7,000 nuclear warheads and 2,000 means of their delivery.⁷ The total explosive potential of the European "nuclear magazine" is equal to approximately 460 million tons of TNT--that is, around 2 tons for each inhabitant of the European countries that are the United States' allies.⁸ During discussions of the prospects for deploying American neutron weapons in Europe, some experts stated that the replacement of some of the "old" nuclear warheads not stored in Europe with neutron warheads would supposedly reduce the total explosive equivalent of the American nuclear arsenal. But even if the entire matter were actually reduced to this kind of "simple replacement," the use of this "replacement" arsenal would unavoidably increase the loss of human lives in Europe--an issue quite easily evaded by these Western experts.

For all of these years, the United States' official line and practical steps in regard to nuclear policy in Europe have not been aimed at finding alternatives to the possible nuclear conflict, but at the "rationalization" of means of conducting nuclear warfare, the more efficient use of the American nuclear arsenal and the establishment of more favorable conditions for the United States with the limited use of nuclear weapons in Europe. They have tried to convince the American and Western European public that this line has many advantages, alleging in particular that the preservation of the "nuclear threshold" will serve as a warning to a potential enemy (that is, the Warsaw Pact nations)" and will supposedly stabilize the situation.

The arguments in favor of the preservation and buildup of American "tactical nuclear weapons" in Europe also include references to concern about the non-proliferation of these weapons, the connection between the regional European balance and the global strategic balance of the great powers, and the need to compensate for the Warsaw Pact nations' alleged superiority in conventional weapons.

It must be said that there are enough defenders of the official course of Washington's nuclear policy in non-government circles in the United States. They have put forth additional arguments in its favor. For example, one of the heads of the notorious "Committee on the Present Danger,"⁹ former Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense P. Nitze, wrote in 1977 that, in view of the fact that the United States has had to constantly support the forces of its allies overseas and American nuclear technology permits the production of more accurate, although less powerful, missiles, a "counter-strike" must be relied upon in nuclear conflicts in Europe.¹⁰

Another interesting aspect of P. Nitze's reasoning is his understandable regrets about the imbalance which supposedly took shape between the nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States as a result of the different avenues taken by these nations in the development of missile technology. The United States, he says, set out from the very beginning to produce less powerful but more accurate missiles and warheads, while the Soviet Union developed missiles capable of transporting a bigger payload. Since this situation can no longer be rectified, the United States has no other alternative but to emphasize the destruction of target points--that is, military facilities in the theater of war--in its strategy.

Those who object to the maintenance or perfection of American "tactical nuclear weapons" in Europe, if we consider the aspect of the problem confined to this side of the "nuclear threshold," quite reasonably point out the fact that the deployment of these weapons in Europe and their further miniaturization will essentially signify an attempt to eradicate the clearly defined boundaries and political and psychological barriers separating conventional war from nuclear war.¹¹

Consequently, there is no basis for even discussing any kind of stabilization of the European situation. To the contrary, the eradication of the boundaries separating conventional arms from nuclear weapons and, consequently, nuclear war from conventional war is contrary to the very idea of restraint and undermines stability.

As for the American Administration's constant statements about the unequal conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, even many Western researchers have pointed out the deliberately incorrect methods used by the Pentagon and the CIA to calculate the balance of power.¹² The balance of power in Europe is calculated as, on one side, only the forces officially included in the NATO framework and, on the other, all of the national armed forces of the Warsaw Pact nations. Last year alone, NATO ground forces in Europe increased by 6 percent, new types of guided missiles were imported from overseas, and the United States sold its European allies new systems of TOW antitank guided jet-propelled missiles and infrared and laser range-finders. The armies of the Western European countries are being re-equipped with new tanks, aircraft, antiaircraft complexes and other equipment. An extensive program of large-scale military exercises has been planned and is being carried out.

"In contrast to the NATO countries," L. I. Brezhnev said, "we stopped building up our armed forces in Central Europe long ago and do not intend--and I wish to emphasize this as strongly as possible--do not intend to add a single soldier or a single tank to these forces in the future."¹³

Therefore, objective calculations refute all of the arguments about the need to "compensate" for the unfavorable balance of conventional forces in Europe for NATO by means of tactical nuclear weapons.

Some of the factors motivating the current U.S. Administration in the expansion and modernization of nuclear potential in Europe were quite shrewdly noted by Alan Wolfe in his article "Carter's New Defense Budget," published in THE NATION. The administration's complaints about the United States' weakness, he writes, are quite understandable, since, "in the subtle game of nuclear strategy, it is never advisable to play up one's own strong elements, as this would eliminate any reason for the further production of weapons."¹⁴ And, we must add, for new defense spending!

It is obvious, however, that there are also motivating factors of another type, which are now associated in Washington with, according to the President's national security adviser Z. Brzezinski, the beginning of "the most constructive creative process" in the United States "since Truman." The "emulation of the Truman Administration is no coincidence, as this administration was marked by such milestones in U.S. foreign and military policy as the declaration of the "Truman Doctrine" and "Marshall Plan" and the creation of NATO, which reinforced American imperialism's dominant position in Western Europe during the first years after the war. It would seem that references to those times still affect the formation of the United States' position on questions of European policy and its nuclear aspects. The fact that these were the years of the beginning of the cold war, the armed intervention in Korea and a high degree of international tension is evidently not being taken into account. In any case, nuclear aspects are now being given the highest priority in Washington's European policy. Judging by all indications, however, this is not so much a matter of greater concern for Western Europe and for the reinforcement of NATO in general as of primary emphasis on the power instruments of this policy and the achievement of nuclear superiority--that is, on the very thing relied upon by President Truman.

If we take a backward glance at U.S. policy at the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's, however, it is quite clear that it did not produce the desired results. American imperialism was unable at that time to force the sociopolitical ways it preferred on other people from a "position of strength." This kind of forceful approach to world politics is even more misleading today. The days of the American atomic monopoly are gone forever. The Soviet Union has had a great deal of success in strengthening its own defense might. The entire system of international relations has undergone substantial changes.

The United States' desire for military superiority to the USSR by means of earlier technological "undertakings" and initiatives in the production of new models of weapons (in particular, this is the plan behind the neutron bomb) is no more than a delusion. Past experience is quite indicative in this respect. During the 1940's, U.S. politicians and military experts underestimated the Soviet Union's capability of mastering the "secret" of the atomic bomb and the technology of its production.¹⁵ They made the same kind of gross miscalculations in their predictions concerning the capabilities of Soviet missile and space technology: the launching of the first artificial earth satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 was a complete surprise to them.

The list of examples could be continued. Today, however, it does not take an expert to see that the prolonged holding of a monopoly on the technology for the production of any particular weapon is a myth which cannot be relied upon in policy or strategy. "Our nation's economy, science and technology," said Marshall of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR secretary of defense, in his report on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, "are capable of ensuring the creation of any weapon on which our enemies would like to rely."¹⁶

It would be difficult to believe that all of this was not taken into account when U.S. nuclear policy in regard to Europe was taking shape. But things can be taken into account in different ways. It is possible to know history fairly well and still self-sufficiently close one's eyes to its lessons in the expectation of the more skillful use of old methods. But it is also possible to lean toward new factors which were not present in the previous situation and therefore did not play a role in the total strategic balance of power. It would seem that the United States' official declarations and practical steps aimed at the reinforcement, buildup and modernization of its nuclear potential in Western Europe, just as the tendency to lower the "nuclear threshold," are primarily a result of the current Soviet-American strategic balance which ensures mutual restraint in regard to so-called central warfare.

Judging by all indications, this is also the reason for the attempts being made by the United States and NATO circles to guarantee nuclear superiority for themselves "on the tactical level." They feel that the lowering of the "nuclear threshold" aids in this--if not in the direct and physical sense, then at least in the psychological sense.

There is also reason for another assumption. The development of new models of "tactical nuclear weapons" (particularly if the work on them begins before the enemy has commenced this kind of work)¹⁷ conveys the impression of a stronger position--even if it is an illusory and temporary one. These "pocket trump cards" (they can be displayed or hidden in the pocket from time to time; the main thing is to let the opponent know that they exist) have been assigned an extremely important role in U.S. foreign policy strategy. Here, however, no consideration is given to the fact that these illusory calculations are creating an extremely dangerous situation in Europe. There is no guarantee that the imagined superiority in any system of weapons will not push U.S. and NATO militaristic circles into nuclear ventures. This provocative element in the plans for the modernization of the American nuclear arsenal in Europe should obviously not be underestimated by anyone, including the Western European states.

Every unbiased person must realize that the desire of U.S. ruling circles to make their nuclear arsenal in Europe a more effective and more "usable" instrument of policy by lowering the "nuclear threshold" can lead to nuclear catastrophe. The danger would be even greater if neutron weapons were to be deployed there. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, "this weapon increases the danger of nuclear war."¹⁸

Mass protest by the most varied public circles against the plans to produce the neutron bomb and deploy it in Western Europe forced the Carter Administration to begin maneuvering. It appears to have no objection to postponing the production of the neutron bomb, but only temporarily and only within the framework of a "comprehensive agreement" on arms control, and this would have to be the kind of agreement that would signify a departure from the principle of equivalent and equal security in the talks on the limitation of strategical offensive arms.

It is quite apparent that Washington's position signifies that the United States is still unable to abandon its attempts to force its own terms in international relations, including relations with the Soviet Union, where the futility of this course was proved long ago. In essence, the United States is trying to use the possibility of the deployment of neutron weapons in Europe as a bargaining counter in the discussions concerning the prevention of world nuclear war. But this issue, as they said, has already gone beyond "bargaining." Cardinal measures are needed in this area. The U.S. President's recent statement about the postponement of the final decision on the production of the neutron bomb was, at best, a half-hearted measure. Taking this statement into consideration, however, the Soviet Union, L. I. Brezhnev said, will not begin the production of a neutron weapon if the United States refrains from doing this.¹⁹

What Lies Behind the "Nuclear Threshold"?

Through the ages, military strategy has been based on the principles of the commensurability of military strength with the tasks it must carry out in emergency situations. In the abovementioned article in THE NATION, Alan Wolfe writes that a White House-requisitioned study of military strategy and correlation of forces (PRM-10) calls tactical nuclear weapons the basis of U.S. military strength in Europe. The threshold of their utilization would depend on the situation, but as Wolfe states, these weapons, according to the authors of PRM-10, "must be suitable for use": "An airplane that will not fly because it is missing a part is worthless in an emergency"²⁰--these words were pronounced by a representative of the Pentagon and were spoken, we must assume, for the purpose of leaving no doubts about the United States' intentions to use nuclear weapons.

The American military elite's logic has never been a secret. The problem has always consisted only in the hypothetical consequences of crossing the "nuclear threshold" in Europe, which no one is capable of predicting precisely. It is indicative, however, that any predictions made by strategic planning agencies in the Pentagon (frequently with the aid of civilian strategic analysts of a certain type), despite all of their unreliability, can serve as the basis for making extremely dangerous decisions.

Let us return to H. Kahn's book. What is the basis of his theory of nuclear escalation?

H. Kahn maintained that crossing the "nuclear threshold" would not mean that all was lost; it would still be possible to control the course of events: first a demonstrative nuclear strike, then selective (spot) nuclear strikes, local nuclear warfare between troops on the battlefield, a "counter-strike" against the missile installations of the enemy and a nuclear volley against vitally important centers (a "countervalue strike"). In proposing an entire "ladder" of steps in the nuclear conflict, he maintained that, before climbing to each new level, opponents could look around, calculate the risks and control their actions. In this way, the probability of uncontrolled "spasmodic" warfare allegedly became minimal. The sides, according to Kahn, could always come to a mutual agreement.

In essence, this was the same line of reasoning adhered to by McNamara and Schlesinger, who stated that the dangerous expansion of the conflict could prevent and settle disputes with the aid of diplomacy even after the nuclear war had begun.

There is reason to believe that the main features of McNamara's and Schlesinger's ideas about the use of nuclear weapons in Europe have been taken over by the current American Administration. This is conclusively attested to by a statement by Secretary of Defense H. Brown: "Any use of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers," he said in his report on the defense budget for the 1979 fiscal year, "against one another, regardless of whether they are tactical or strategic; will involve great risks, but /not the unconditional/ [in boldface] (emphasis ours--V. L.) escalation of this conflict to the point of the extensive exchange of thermonuclear strikes."²¹

There is no need to point out the fact that the past and present strategy of the United States is abundant in defensive phrases and explanations of the "necessity" for U.S. and NATO armed forces to begin the use of tactical nuclear weapons "in response to the offensive" of the superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. This refrain is not a new one either.

In 1967, plans for "sequential reaction" to conflicts in Europe were discussed at a session of the NATO Council. The opinion was expressed in official bloc circles that war between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could involve three stages: The first would be the initiation of military operations by NATO armed forces without the use of nuclear weapons; the second would be the transfer to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defeat the enemy's troops on the battlefield; the third would be the use of strategic nuclear weapons.

As reported in the Western press, participants in the session were shown a confidential expert prediction of the possible losses of the civilian population in the NATO countries in the event of nuclear war. Precise data on this prediction are unavailable, but some idea of the probable consequences of the "limited" use of tactical nuclear weapons can be gained from these examples.

In 1955 the NATO command conducted military exercises called "Carte Blanche" in Central Europe. Within 48 hours, 335 tactical nuclear warheads were used hypothetically, 268 of which "blasted" the territory of the FRG and GDR. As a result of these strikes, 1.5-1.7 million people were "killed" (not counting losses from radiation) and 3.5 million were "wounded." For the sake of comparison, during World War II as a whole, 780,000 people were killed and wounded as a result of the bombing of German territory by English and American aviation.²²

In the 1960's the U.S. Department of Defense studied the possibilities for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and concluded that, in the event of extremely limited use even under the most favorable conditions, the number of persons killed could range from 2 million to 20 million. If the strikes were aimed at cities--that is, if the matter progressed to the point of a "countervalue" strike--the number of the deaths could reach 100 million.²³

It is unimaginable that U.S. strategy has not taken these consequences of the use of tactical nuclear weapons into account. And if these consequences were not regarded as obstacles to the adoption of these strategic theories and their related weapons systems, it would be difficult to find any other reason for this than the fact that the Pentagon does not attach any great significance to the aftereffects of "tactical nuclear warfare" on the territory of its European allies as long as U.S. territory remains outside the nuclear sphere of influence.

It is true that a great deal has been said, as we have already pointed out, about the possibility of stopping on the lowest level of conflict. More far-sighted Western researchers, however, have stressed that this would be a delusion at best. The United States, they say, has assumed the moral right to cross the "nuclear threshold" first, but expects the enemy subjected to this attack to observe the U.S.-enforced "rules of the game."

But what is the point of talking about "rules" that limit the losses of the opponent unleashing the nuclear war? As H. York writes, "NATO's plans for the defense of Western Europe are built on the horrifying bluff...that some political and military leaders in Western Europe are prepared to destroy the continent in order to save it."²⁴

What changes will the modernization of NATO's European nuclear arsenal make in this respect?

Several Western researchers feel that the replacement of some models of nuclear warheads with new ones with a "neutron effect" blast can restrict the zone of destruction exclusively to the battlefield. In other words, war is depicted as a series of consecutive field battles like the battles of the Napoleonic era, but with the use of fundamentally new weapons. This theory was set forth in greatest detail in R. Schrefler's speech at the Stockholm conference on tactical nuclear weapons in 1976.²⁵ The author essentially suggests the development of new nuclear warheads (up to 1 kiloton) and new means of delivery

with a range of no more than 100 kilometers and the sharp restriction of "nuclear weapons of admissible war" (new tactical) and "nuclear weapons for the containment of war" (strategic).

What does this mean? The development of a new arsenal of weapons of mass destruction to annihilate fighting troops in "contact" combat on the battlefield will necessitate a new round of the arms race. This is also the point of departure of the arms manufacturers who have offered to produce the neutron bomb.

General A. Haig, supreme allied commander of the European NATO forces, has substantiated the need to produce this bomb with the argument that, if a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive systems is concluded, nuclear weapons in Europe will be the only factor involved in NATO's superiority to the Warsaw Pact nations. It is completely obvious that this statement adds grist to the mill of the military-industrial companies producing tactical nuclear weapons and ready to produce neutron weapons. It has long been known that arms manufacturers, like a flock of sparrows, are capable of quickly flying from an area of exhausted revenues to a new area promising abundant profits.

If we approach the matter from a purely military standpoint, the neutron warheads, or, as they are hypocritically called, the "clean" components of the total set of combat equipment in the theater of war, simply cannot be seen as some kind of autonomous entity used separately from "dirty" nuclear warheads (some American military experts are now talking about the "neutron-nuclear threshold!"). This has been indirectly alluded to by U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, when he was discussing the programs for the reinforcement of NATO and spoke of the military integration, standardization and interchangeability of NATO forces and weapons, making up the backbone of this military bloc. So that the armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance will be "capable of effectively waging war," he says, the United States will work toward combining all of the components of their military strength. Consequently, this may involve the use of the entire component of nuclear weapons, which will be established in the European theater for the purpose of waging offensive warfare. But this kind of warfare is virtually equivalent to world nuclear war with all of its horrifying consequences.

In August 1945, U.S. President H. Truman unhesitatingly, as his biographers testify, ordered that the first models of atomic weapons be used against the civilian population of Japan. These were only two atomic bombs with a force of less than 20 kilotons. Nuclear charges of this force are now called "tactical battlefield weapons" in the United States. The tragedy of the Japanese people as a result of the first time in history that the "nuclear threshold" was crossed is well known to everyone. It is not difficult to understand what the European people might expect if this fatal frontier is crossed once again. The topic that is now so cold bloodedly and "hypothetically" discussed in military and political circles in the United States and some of the NATO countries could result in an incomparably more frightful tragedy for many millions of Europeans.

The real security of the Western Europeans and Americans will not be achieved through the lowering and erosion of the "nuclear threshold" or through the substantiation of the permissibility and, sometimes (with tactical provisions), expediency of so-called limited nuclear war, but through the unconditional condemnation and prohibition of this kind of warfare and through the curbing of the arms race, which has overwhelmed the world and is taking in increasingly threatening forms.

All people and most governments realize that the danger of war must be diminished even more and the buildup of arms must be stopped. This is also attested to by the fact that, for the first time in history, a session of the UN General Assembly was convened specifically to discuss arms limitation and disarmament. At the same time, there are still obstacles to the resolution of this problem, and new obstacles continue to arise; the nature of these can be judged, in particular, from the debates now going on in the United States and Western Europe over the problem of the "nuclear threshold," or, more precisely, the problem of nuclear weapons.

As for the Soviet Union, its principled position is well known. Since the first days of its existence, the USSR has untiringly and consistently campaigned for universal and total disarmament. "Diminishing the threat of a new world war and the mass destruction of people with the aid of nuclear weapons--this is the central focus of our struggle for peace at present," declared General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress. "We cannot, we do not have the right to forget," the head of the Soviet State stressed, "that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons still hangs over the world, causing people to worry about their future. It is understandable that the elimination of this threat calls for concerted effort by all nuclear states. But each of them can and must make its own contribution. For its part, the Soviet Union quite definitely states that we are against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances and aggressive acts against our nation or its allies on the part of other nuclear powers can force us to resort to this extreme means of self-defense. The Soviet Union is doing and will continue to do everything possible to prevent atomic war and to ensure that people do not become the victims of atomic strikes--neither the first strike nor subsequent strikes. This is our firm line and we will act in accordance with it."²⁶

The Soviet Union, which suffered more than any other nation from World War II, wants the peace in Europe to never be violated again and hopes that it will become a continent of lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation forever, and it has done and is doing more than any other state for this purpose. The USSR's new and important initiatives regarding disarmament, submitted to the UN General Assembly at the Special Session, are aimed at safeguarding peace and security on the European continent and the rest of our planet.

FOOTNOTES

1. In American military terminology the "nuclear threshold" is defined as the moment of the transition from the use of conventional weapons to the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict that has begun in a theater of war.
2. For a discussion of the tactical and technical properties of the neutron weapon, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1978, p 45--Editor's note.
3. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1957, p 31.
4. This statement was first made by R. McNamara on 16 June 1962.
5. H. Kahn's book represents only a general and declassified part of an extensive study conducted by the Hudson Institute at the request of the Pentagon.
6. "Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger. Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976," Washington, 1975.
7. "Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy," Center for Defense Information, New York, 1976 (see the translation in SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1977, p 58).
8. We must remember that the question is not limited merely to the inclusion of neutron warheads in NATO's European nuclear arsenal. In addition to this, the Americans are actively working on several other types of tactical nuclear weapons, including so-called "convertible" nuclear charges, nuclear warheads with a variable equivalent, "clean" nuclear bombs with reduced radioactivity, miniature charges (less than 50 tons) and others.
9. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1978, p 40--Editor's note.
10. FOREIGN POLICY, No 25, Winter 1976/77, p 206.
11. In connection with this we must note that American General A. Haig, supreme allied commander of the European NATO forces, said that "in terms of its characteristics, the neutron weapon does not differ from other types of weapons from the moral standpoint," thereby stressing that it eradicates the line separating conventional warheads from nuclear ones.
12. See, for example, A. Enthoven, "U.S. Forces in Europe. How Many? Doing What?" FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No 3, 1975, pp 513-532.

13. PRAVDA, 26 April 1978.
14. THE NATION, 18 February 1978.
15. A memorandum issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter on 23 January 1946 said: "Any great power starting from zero...will be able to attain this goal (to create an atom bomb--V. L.) within 5-7 years if it has outside help...or within 15-20 years without this kind of assistance" (FRUS, 1946, vol 1., pp 742-743). It is a well-known fact that the Soviet Union learned the "secret" of the atom bomb within a year after this statement was made--that is, in 1947--and created its own nuclear weapon without anyone's assistance in 1949.
16. PRAVDA, 23 February 1978.
17. Although the Soviet Union has frequently been ahead of the United States in a number of peaceful areas of science and technology, the United States has been the first to begin all new rounds in the arms race during the entire postwar period. As G. Kistiakowsky, former U.S. President's adviser on science and technology, writes: "Throughout the history of the race for nuclear arms, the United States has been the first to introduce the majority of technical innovations and new weapons systems, with the exception of a few defensive systems to which the Soviet Union has traditionally assigned a much larger part of its military efforts" (THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 27 November 1977).
18. PRAVDA, 8 April 1978.
19. Ibid., 26 April 1978.
20. THE NATION, 18 February 1978.
21. "Secretary of Defense H. Brown. Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1979," Washington, 1978, p 5.
22. THE DEFENSE MONITOR, No 2, 1975, p 3.
23. A. Enthoven and K. Smith, "How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969," New York, 1971, p 128.
24. H. York, "The Nuclear 'Balance of Terror' in Europe," BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Chicago, 1976, vol 32, No 5, p 10.
25. R. Schrefler, "New Nuclear Force," Stockholm, 1976, pp 38-55.
26. PRAVDA, 26 April 1978.

THE MONOPOLIES AND WASHINGTON

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 27-37

[First installment of article by Val. Zorin]

[Text] Late in the fall of 1977, newspapers in the large financial and industrial centers of Texas--Dallas and Houston--sounded the alarm. Their lead articles resembled war reports. "President Carter Declares War on Texas," "Washington's Campaign Against the Oil Industry" and "The Plot in Washington"--mile-high headlines announced. The threatening tone of the local press and television reminded the author of this article, who was in Dallas at that time, just as the Americans themselves, of the fall of 1963, when the Texas newspapers openly threatened J. Kennedy. At that time a prominent role in the conflict between the financial bigwigs of Texas and the President was played by the White House's intention to bring the claims of the Texas oilmen in line with the interests of other monopolistic groups. This time the flow of abuse was evoked by the administration's attempt to slightly limit the appetites of the oil companies, which were threatening to bury the major legislative initiative of the Democratic Administration--its energy program.

Conflicts of this kind constantly arise in U.S. political life. Bourgeois propaganda strives to make use of these to prove the government's independence of powerful monopolistic groups and to refute the well-known and time-tested premise of Marxist-Leninist science that capitalist governments act in the interests of the ruling class. There is nothing further from the truth than statements about these governments' "independence" of the monopolies.

Much would be incomprehensible in the political life of modern America if consideration were not given to the all-encompassing, multifaceted and decisive influence of the leading monopolistic associations on federal policy or the fierce struggle between these associations for the final word regarding the composition and policy of the administration and its staff.

Regional Financial Groups

In recent decades, the processes of the concentration and centralization of production and capital in the United States have been extremely intensive and have led to the further monopolization of the economy by a small group of the largest corporations and banks. This has been the basis for the increasingly close intermingling of the interests of banking and industrial capital, the augmentation of their ties and interdependence, and their active merger. In this way, financial capital and the financial oligarchy acquired new and more rapid development.¹ This was accompanied by the growth of their basic link and chief organizational form--the financial-oligarchical group, created for the struggle for broader control over the economy and for spheres of influence. These groups have combined all forms of concentration and centralization in one entity and, in turn, have stimulated concentration processes.

Although the postwar development of imperialism did not change the socio-economic basis or essence of the financial groups, it has caused noticeable changes in their appearance and organizational structure. In addition to groups with a precise structure and a holding company at the head, groups have now appeared and are developing in which there is no single administrative center and a certain degree of coordination is accomplished through unification around large banks or investment companies, the reinvestment of capital, personal alliances and so forth. The branch "universalization" of the majority of financial groups has also occurred, taking the place of their previous, relatively narrow specialization. For example, the Rockefeller group, which was primarily involved in the petroleum industry prior to the war, now also controls many engineering, military-industrial, transport, food and finance companies. The Morgan group has kept its monopolistic positions in the steel industry and in the banking sphere but has also become deeply involved in power engineering, the electrical equipment industry and other branches.

This process accelerates the monopolization of the economy and simultaneously complicates the development and reinforcement of new financial groups, which are based primarily in the new and latest branches. For this reason, the major role in the U.S. economy is still being played by a few dozen financial groups. Despite the relative stability of the chief financial monopolies, however, their nature is changing. Many of them are no longer based on old oligarchical families, but on alliances of financial magnates who are related not only by blood but also by every possible type of business connection. Some groups of monopolists are related by common business interests in a particular region. This has intensified the interlapping of financial groups and the development of old and new regional financial-oligarchical groups, has activated the processes of their internationalization and has promoted the creation of international associations and merger with the bourgeois state.

Regional groups of American financial capital are a phenomenon characteristic of the postwar period. Although various monopolistic groups have retained an important role, there has been a tendency toward their unification in larger formations, and the specific features of economic development in the United States have given rise to the creation of these large alliances of monopolies on the regional level. In this article reference will primarily be made to regional associations of American monopolies, which are playing an important role in the economic and political life of the United States.

One exceedingly important factor contributing to the establishment and reinforcement of a number of new regional monopolistic groups in the United States was the accelerated postwar economic development of once underdeveloped regions. The effects of the law of the uneven development of capitalism in its monopolistic stage, discovered by V. I. Lenin, were apparent in this process. "The uniform development of individual enterprises, trusts, branches of industry and countries cannot take place under capitalist conditions,"² he said. V. I. Lenin wrote about the underdeveloped American West and the backward slave-owning South. Today, due to a number of specific circumstances of an economic, political, geographic and even demographic nature, both the West and the South are developing more rapidly than industrial and financial centers in the Northeast. During the last several decades, new economic regions and new monopolistic groups with complex relations with the old ones have come into being here.

The monopolistic concentration of production, the uneven development of capitalist countries and individual regions and branches, and changes in the balance of power constitute the economic basis of the competitive struggle between monopolists. V. I. Lenin stressed that competition would not only fail to abate in the imperialist era, but, on the contrary, it would become even more fierce and unyielding since it would be competition between powerful monopolistic associations rather than the competition of a multitude of separate firms, that monopoly would dramatically intensify the competitive struggle of individual trusts, banks and financial groups and that "the monopolies growing out of free competition would not put an end to it, but would exist on a plane above it and alongside it, thereby giving rise to a number of particularly acute and severe contradictions, differences of opinion and conflicts."³

This process has been particularly intensive in postwar America. While the Northeastern banks and corporations, frequently called the "Wall Street group" of monopolies, virtually dominated the American economy prior to World War II, new groups appeared on the scene during the war and, in particular, after the war, challenging the old Wall Street dynasties. These were primarily bankers and industrialists in California, the Midwest and the South. This has led to a situation in which the Wall Street corporations and banks, on one side, are energetically penetrating new regions in an attempt to gain some advantage from their rapid development, while the new monopolies, on the other side, strive to defend and expand their own positions and become self-sufficient and independent.

For many years, the old family financial groups of the Morgans, Rockefellers, du Ponts, Mellons, Lehmans, Browns and Kuhn-Loebs competed fiercely with one another in the struggle for economic and political influence. This struggle is still going on. But the pressure exerted by representatives of "new money," who are demanding their own share of riches and power, has not removed the old contradictions but has led to the definite consolidation of the groups making up the "Northeastern establishment," based on common economic and political interests. At the same time, the much greater role played by the bourgeois state in the economy has caused the young American business groups to wage an active and somewhat successful campaign for influence in the government, meeting with fierce opposition from the united forces of the Wall Street monopolies.

In the 1950's an analysis of the structure and activity of the largest American monopolistic groups gave Soviet researchers and American Marxist scholars reason to divide them into several large associations on the basis of regional characteristics. The chief associations of the postwar period are the Northeastern (Wall Street), Midwestern, Californian and Southern groups. A complex of factors, deeply rooted in the distinctive features of the development of U.S. economic regions, has made this kind of division completely sound and indicative of the actual state of affairs.

Naturally, no scheme can match up to reality. And the proposed division of American monopolies does not and cannot take in the entire range of their activities. Many facts can be cited which either partially or totally will not fit into this kind of scheme. The diversification of production, the centralization of capital, the creation of conglomerates and the monopolization of the economy--all of these processes constantly disrupt the precise nature of the boundaries separating monopolistic groups. "The lines separating one capitalist group from another," notes V. Perlo, "cannot be as definite as those separating individual corporations, which represent specific legal units. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish approximately between individual empires and the financial principalities under their jurisdiction.... The boundaries have not been set precisely. There are constant maneuvers to gain a stronger position and a covert struggle for control in various corporations, which sometimes results in a shift of control--either overt or covert--as a result of a peaceful agreement or a financial war, by means of litigation in the courts and competition by their representatives. Old alliances grow weaker and new ones spring up. New centers of power are emerging, while some old centers are declining or being absorbed by larger groups."⁴ In addition, there is a great variety of economic ties and cooperation between corporations in various regional associations, the interconnection of their capital and the overlapping of their interests.

All of this, however, does not contradict or refute the fact that powerful associations of monopolistic capital, associated with particular regions of the nation and competing with one another, have come into being in the United States in recent decades, are now operating and are having the most substantial influence on economic and political life in the nation. It also

appears that the specific scheme for dividing U.S. monopolies into regional associations, which was once suggested and is outlined above, has proved to be quite sound, based as it is on large quantities of facts, and makes it possible to understand and explain much in economic life, in the competitive struggle of the monopolies and in the political processes taking place in the United States today.

At this point we should recall that the power structure of the modern bourgeois state is, in essence and by the very nature of its functions and objectives, a kind of executive committee of the dominant class. Moreover, as the process of the concentration and centralization of production and capital progresses, this structure is guided more and more not simply by the interests of the bourgeoisie of any particular nation, but by the interests of a small and constantly decreasing group of the largest powerful monopolies and their associations.

One of the central tasks carried out daily by the government of the imperialist states consists in the search for some kind of "common denominator" in the interests of competing monopolistic groups and in the elaboration of a political course which will correspond to certain specific interests and simultaneously reflect the more common goals and objectives of the entire ruling class as a whole. The activities of the capitalist governments, including the American Government, provide examples of the way in which these activities can run counter to certain specific demands and claims on the part of individual monopolies and their groups, even the extremely influential ones. Nonetheless, in all cases without exception, the government of the bourgeois state is guided primarily by the common interests of the monopolistic bourgeoisie in its own nation.

The representatives of each regional association pursue goals that are common to American monopolistic capital as a whole but simultaneously have specific interests, for which purpose they strive to make maximum use of the machinery of state and to influence its political course. The mechanism of this influence is extremely complex and diverse. A ramified system of communications between big business and the machinery of state, the elements of which are not always visible to "outsiders," has been developing for decades.

This system includes the "personal alliance" between the government and financial and industrial circles, the delegation of direct representatives of business or its agents to governmental agencies, and systematic rotation between the federal power structure and the boards of firms, in which members of the board move into government and, conversely, persons who have occupied high-level positions in Washington later become members of bank and corporation boards of directors. Extensive use is made of the financing of election campaigns by monopolistic associations in connection with presidential or other elections, which establishes relations of dependence between heads of the business community and members of the administration, senators, congressmen, governors and mayors. Conferences are organized for business and administration leaders, where the necessary decisions and recommendations are

worked out. There has been great development in the lobby system, in which pressure groups operating in Washington on a permanent basis exert pressure on agencies and legislators for the purpose of pushing through certain decisions favoring the forces behind these groups. Business associations display energetic and extensive activity, exerting various forms of pressure on representatives of the government. The activities of exclusive clubs for the business elite, which represent a significant though not always visible part of the political process, are less publicized but equally important.

All of these and various other ways in which the monopolies and their groups influence the government and the machinery of state occupy their own position in the complex and well-adjusted mechanism whose gears are the prime movers of the wheel of state. But all of them are intended to work in the common interests of monopolistic capital and the specific interests of its various groups.

The Monopolies and the "Watergate Affair"

The balance of power at the top of the American "business Olympus" is constantly changing. V. I. Lenin noted that the particular division of spheres of influence in the capitalist world existing at any given moment "does not exclude the possibility of re-division, if the relationship between forces--as a result of uneven development, war, crashes and so forth--change."⁵ This re-division of spheres of influence does not only take place in the economy, but, as an unavoidable consequence of this, in the area of politics as well, leading to constant modification of the influence of each particular monopolistic group on the government. And this gives rise to serious conflicts, which sometimes grow into severe political crises.

In this connection, the "Watergate affair" is particularly instructive. As we know, this affair ended with the dismissal of President R. Nixon and profound upheavals in the power structure of the American Government. The political outlines of the Watergate affair are fairly well known, but much less is known about some of the underlying causes of this episode, particularly those connected with the struggle for power among influential monopolistic groups. Nonetheless, the story of how R. Nixon was banished from the White House could probably provide a clearer view of the forms taken by this exceedingly fierce struggle and the methods by which some semblance of political equilibrium was achieved between these groups.

In themselves, the facts connected with the Watergate scandal are not in any way extraordinary for American political life. The history of the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations abounds with events which differ little from those which led to the acute domestic political crisis of 1973 and 1974. The "Sherman Adams affair," the "Bobby Baker affair" and a number of other scandals in the 1960's violated the standards of bourgeois law and legality and political ethics and morals just as much. Nonetheless, not one of these events caused any serious upheavals in Washington. This alone suggests that the dimensions taken on by the Watergate affair were due to causes which went far beyond the boundaries of the events directly leading up to this most severe domestic political crisis in U.S. history.

First of all, it should be stressed that the Watergate scandal broke out soon after the political upheavals related to the failure of Washington's Vietnamese venture, which seriously undermined the prestige of the government and gave rise to attempts by large segments of the American public to guard the nation against the consequences of the excessive prerogatives of the presidency. This tense atmosphere provided the soil in which this fairly ordinary political scandal grew into a severe political crisis.

There were also other extremely important factors contributing to this. The Watergate affair took place against the background of a phenomenon called the "constitutional crisis" in American political literature. It arose long before the professional burglars connected with the heads of the Republican election campaign broke into the Democratic headquarters of Washington's Watergate Hotel in the summer of 1972. The "constitutional crisis" referred to in America was the growing conflict between the legislative and executive branches of the government at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's. The U.S. Constitution, written 200 years ago, does not contain enough precise statements limiting the spheres of congressional and presidential authority. Since the beginning of the 1930's, there has been a rapid and steady process by which power has been concentrated not even in the executive branch, but in the hands of the president personally, with a corresponding reduction in congressional prerogatives. Some American authors feel that the start of this conflict dates back to the 1920's or, more precisely, to the time when W. Wilson was President. The majority, however, associate its development with F. Roosevelt's activity, attempting to blame this on his "authoritarian" ways. Even after Roosevelt, however, regardless of whether the man in the White House was a strong or weak politician, the process by which power was concentrated in the hands of the president developed with exceptional speed and led to a situation in which the U.S. president was eventually invested with the kind of total authority which virtually no other head of any large modern capitalist state has.

The objective basis of this process is the growth of state-monopolistic tendencies in the development of capitalism, the need for increasing intervention by the bourgeois state in the economic sphere and the maximum centralization of authority. For a long time, the existing state of affairs gave rise to no significant objections, neither from congressional leaders nor from influential business organizations, the mass media or bourgeois ideologists. The conflict came into being at the end of the 1960's, when increasingly loud statements were heard in Washington in regard to serious violations of the constitution and the need to limit presidential authority and restore Congress' rights.

There could be various explanations for these changes which took place and are taking place in American political life. For his part, the author feels, without, naturally, assuming that he has a monopoly on the truth, that the main reason for these changes, in addition to temporary and secondary factors, was the growing intensity of the struggle between leading monopolistic associations, which was based on the re-division of spheres of influence among groups of monopolists. The absolute supremacy of the Wall Street banks

was replaced by a situation in which important positions in the U.S. economy were occupied not only by the old, Northeastern dynasties, but also by "young money," the new financial-oligarchical groups with the Midwest, California and the South as their major regions of activity.

The new associations displayed a tendency toward an increase in their abundant "greed for power" and a desire to force their way into key government posts. One result of this process was the fact that, after the assassination of a representative of the Northeastern establishment J. Kennedy (November 1963, Texas), a politician with most of his ties in the banking houses of Texas rather than on Wall Street came to the White House for the first time. President L. Johnson was succeeded by a protege of the California bankers, R. Nixon, who began his career in the depths of the largest bank in the capitalist world, San Francisco's Bank of America, which was crowding the Rockefeller and Morgan banks.

This state of affairs, in our opinion, created a new situation and forced the heads of the leading monopolistic associations to reassess the prerogatives and limits of presidential authority. The considerable advantages for the monopolistic groups associated with him implied considerable inconveniences and certain dangers for the rest of the groups, as the President, as experience has shown, is generally most closely connected with only a few groups rather than with all of them. In contrast to this, Congress is a body in which the alignment of forces is much more balanced and each group can block the bills that would be inconvenient for it, and in which a course can be worked out in the interests of all the leading monopolistic associations rather than just one of them. Representatives of all associations agreed on this, as it was obvious to them that the existing state of affairs was such that even those of them who held a privileged position today could be crowded out of it tomorrow by others taking the fore.

These circumstances served as the basis for the increased criticism of the "absolutism" of presidential authority at the beginning of the 1970's and for the demands that this authority be limited and redistributed with the assignment of a greater role to Congress.

It seems indisputable that the personality of Nixon was a secondary issue in the Watergate affair, while the main objective was the limitation of presidential prerogatives and the expansion of the authority of Congress--that is, of a body in which not one, but all of the powerful monopolistic associations had sufficient influence and in which, consequently, it would be more difficult to implement a course benefiting any particular group "in favor."

The fact that this was precisely the matter is attested to by the events of the period after Watergate. Taking advantage of the ensuing political chaos and the weak position of President G. Ford, an "appointed" and not elected President, the forces behind the Watergate affair passed a number of statutes which substantially limited the powers of the head of the executive branch. In particular ("post-Vietnam" feelings played a part here), the President's

right to make individual decisions concerning the commencement of American military operations overseas was restricted, some of his prerogatives in domestic policy were limited and so forth. If it had not been for the atmosphere created by the Watergate affair, it would have been much more difficult to accomplish these undertakings and they would have required more time and a more intense political struggle.

Now the U.S. President has less power than he did before Watergate. Besides this, it should be stressed that this process has not been completed and that the second half of the 1970's has been marked by a fierce struggle between the President and Congress in which the executive branch is striving to regain its strength while the legislative branch is quite successfully defending and even augmenting what it has already gained. Therefore, the chief objective of Watergate's organizers--this immense domestic political operation--has been attained. The process by which power is concentrated in the hands of one man has been stopped and the new distribution of authority between the President and Congress has become a fact.

This does not mean that there has been a radical change in the existing system. This is only a slight adjustment in which all leading groups and associations of American monopolies have an interest and which correspond to the new correlation of forces among them.

The underlying motive for the Watergate affair demonstrates, in our opinion, both the extent of the influence exerted by monopolistic associations on politics and the complexity of the political mechanism which makes it possible to establish the required equilibrium between the interests of these associations by adapting the machinery of state to these interests.

Naturally, the inglorious removal of the 37th President of the United States from the political arena, which was due to a number of causes, of which the one set forth above may have been the most important, does not signify in any sense that the Nixon Administration had escaped the control of the monopolistic bourgeoisie and acted against its interests. Nothing of the kind occurred. Moreover, the very makeup of the Nixon Administration guaranteed that the wishes of the leading monopolistic associations would be fulfilled and reflected the alignment of their forces during the period of its activity.

"Personal Alliance"

Considering the discussion above, as well as the fact that "personal alliance" is one of the major means providing the monopolistic bourgeoisie with efficient levers of power, let us examine the composition and ties of the Washington administrations of the last decade, beginning with Nixon's.

The former President began his career as a protege of the Bank of America--the financial center of the California regional association of monopolies. After his discharge from the Navy in 1945, the young California lawyer used his father's connections to get a job in this bank, where he was for some

time the personal secretary of its founder and president, Amadeo Giannini. In 1946, relying on the generous financial support of the heads of the bank, Nixon conducted a successful campaign and gained a seat in Congress from one of the electoral districts in California. His subsequent election to the Senate and then to the vice-presidency in the Eisenhower Administration was primarily a result of the gamble taken on him by California bankers and their generous financial and political support.

Nixon's defeat in the presidential election when he ran against J. Kennedy in 1960 convinced the ambitious man that he would have to expand his ties in the highest circles of the business community, without limiting himself to the support of his patrons from California, if he wished to win this post. Nixon's move to New York and his activity as a partner in the large Wall Street law firm "Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander and Mitchell," one of the largest law firms in the United States, were assessed by some as the former vice-president's departure from the political arena. But this was a hasty judgment.

Prominent American businessman and public figure, billionaire Cyrus Eaton, once said that there are half a dozen law firms in New York that employ people with a great deal of energy who like to lead government agencies around by the nose, like to represent large corporations and like to control the finances of these large corporations; this is a genuine fellowship. This huge law firms control the biggest of the big cases. The clients of Nixon's firm included the banking houses of the Morgans, Rockefellers and Lehmans. Making use of his new contacts, Nixon joined the boards of several of Wall Street's leading insurance and banking corporations. In New York he maintained his close contacts with the California magnates but also considerably expanded his political base by becoming "the man" of the Wall Street bankers as well. This provided him with the necessary support when he returned to the political arena in 1968 as a candidate for the highest position in government. The composition of the Nixon Administration attested to its extremely close ties with leading monopolistic associations. The Northeastern groups were represented here first by Secretary of State Rogers and then by H. Kissinger, who had been closely connected with the Rockefeller family throughout his entire career, as well as Attorney General Mitchell, Nixon's former partner in his law firm, and Secretary of Transportation Volpe.

The interests of financial and industrial circles in the Midwest were expressed by Secretary of Defence M. Laird, prominent Chicago banker and Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development G. Romney and Secretary of Labor G. Shultz. Melvin Laird, whose family were the richest lumber industrialists in Wisconsin, had extensive and varied ties with businessmen in the Midwest and was a personal friend of Nixon and the then Vice-President G. Ford. The very fact that the top position in the Pentagon was offered to a person connected with Chicago bankers and the post of secretary of the treasury was offered to one of these bankers attests to the growing influence of this regional association of monopolies.

The interests of the California group were represented by, in addition to Nixon himself, Secretary of Commerce M. Stans, as well as R. Finch, who was first secretary of health, education, and social welfare and then a counsellor to the President. Prior to his appointment as the head of the Department of Commerce, an extremely important position from the standpoint of the business world, Stans was the president of the Western Bank Corporation and the vice chairman of United California Bank--financial institutions closely connected with such leading California corporations as Lockheed, Litton Industries and McDonnell Douglas. Finch also occupied seats on the boards of several large banks and industrial firms in this state.

Another important position for the California businessmen was the post of deputy secretary of defense, occupied by David Packard--co-owner of the defense electronics firm Hewlett-Packard. Packard's particular influence in the Nixon Administration was related to the special powers he was granted in the Pentagon by presidential order, particularly the supervision of the distribution of defense orders among corporations, and to his enormous personal fortune, which made Packard one of the 30 richest Americans.

For one of the leaders of the California group of businessmen, the president of the huge Litton Industries conglomerate, Roy Ash, Nixon created the special post of his adviser on executive organization. The duties assigned to Ash gave him power and made him one of the most influential figures in the Nixon Administration during Nixon's first 4-year term.

In this way, influence was redistributed among the leading financial groups. While the prevailing influence in the Johnson Administration was noticeably that of the Texas oilmen and bankers, whose protege Johnson himself was to no small degree, in the new administration they were severely crowded by the bloc of Northeastern and Californian businessmen, as well as representatives of the Midwest. At first the Texans did not occupy a single important position in the Nixon Administration, confining themselves to secondary roles in departments and agencies. Later, however, they were able to move ahead, taking the important post of secretary of the treasury away from the emissary of the Chicago bankers and replacing him with a representative of the Dallas and Houston bankers--J. Connally, renowned millionaire and political favorite of the South.

Nixon's political failure and the disintegration of his administration were accompanied by another redistribution of influence. Although G. Ford, who became the head of the administration, was not part of the nation's financial elite, he had been closely connected with the leaders of the Northeastern regional monopolistic association throughout his career. The beginning of his career was bound up with the support of a friend of the Nixon family, former Republican senator from Michigan Arthur Vandenberg--an extremely prominent figure in the 1930's and 1940's. As one of the most influential representatives of the Chicago bankers in Washington, A. Vandenberg insured the political career of his protege and his election and re-election to Congress. This support led to a situation in which G. Ford--a politician

who was, according to Republican party leaders, a completely ordinary man-- was elected Republican leader in the House of Representatives in 1965. This played an important role in his further destiny.

The interests of Midwestern bankers and industrialists were represented in the Ford Administration by the same Laird, who had exchanged his post as head of the Pentagon for a position as special adviser to the President, and W. Scranton. Laird's long friendship with Ford and their close personal and political ties ensured that he would retain his influence in the new administration, despite his departure from the Department of Defense.

As for Scranton, who was one of the closest Washington officials to the head of state during the Ford Administration, this was not only a representative of the Midwestern financial elite, but also a member of this elite. His family had played an important role in the nation's business community for many years. The headquarters of the Scrantons' steel plants is in a city with the same name--Scranton (Pennsylvania). This family's control over steel companies, coal mines and railroads not only gave it influence in the business world but also represented a basis for political activity by the head of the family. In the mid-1960's he was regarded as one of the most promising Republican Party candidates for the presidency. After meeting with opposition from representatives of other monopolistic associations, he had to give up his ambitious plans, but he retained a great deal of influence in the top levels of the party, and he used this influence when he was part of the Ford Administration.

The interests of the Wall Street association were represented primarily by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, one of the five brothers heading the famed financial empire, as well as the political minion of this family-- Secretary of State Kissinger. The interests of the Texans were still being represented by J. Connally, who had abandoned the Democrats and become a leading figure in the Republican Party.

During G. Ford's stay in the White House, the struggle for positions in the government among representatives of the leading groups of monopolistic capital became more intense. The fact that his administration was regarded as a transitional one contributed to this process. Ford, who had not become President as a result of an election, but had inherited this post by virtue of his having been appointed vice-president at Nixon's decision, still had to prove his right to control the machinery of state. The forces behind him connected his re-election in 1976 with far-reaching plans and hopes of grasping hold of the important levers of state authority.

The Midwestern businessmen's rivals from the Northeastern establishment, however, did everything possible to regain the positions they had lost. From this standpoint, the struggle which went on during the presidential campaign of 1976 is of particular interest. In his attempt to establish himself in his position of authority, G. Ford relied on the support of Midwestern businessmen and influential Wall Street circles. The California bankers and industrialists, however, tried to oppose his candidacy with the former governor of

this state, R. Reagan, who challenged the President--the representative of his own party. It is obvious that this struggle was bound up, in particular, with the rivalry of various monopolistic groups backing up both of the candidates to the highest executive office.

I will remind my readers that, as a result of fierce political battles, Ford took advantage of the prerogatives inherent in the presidency and was able to triumph and win the nomination at the Republican convention in the summer of 1976. But the fierce skirmish which deepened the rift in the party was one of the significant reasons for his defeat in the election, as it diminished the strength of this candidate who could not win the unanimous support of the circles on which the Republican leadership rests.

The emergence onto the political scene of Southerner J. Carter, former governor of Georgia who had been able to win the support of influential Wall Street groups, was also largely connected with the struggle and rivalry of the powerful associations of monopolists. In the next issue we will discuss the circumstances of his arrival in the White House and the struggle preceding this and will analyze the forces with particular influence over his administration.

(To be continued)

FOOTNOTES

1. These matters were examined in detail, for example, in I. I. Dmitriyev's article, "The Growing Economic Supremacy of the Monopolies," and No 3 of our journal for 1976, and in the article by V. Usoskin, Ye. Khesin, V. Shenayev and Yu. Yudanov entitled "The Postwar Evolution of Financial Capital," published in No 5 of MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA for 1974.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 417.
3. Ibid., p 386.
4. MAINSTREAM, June 1957.
5. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., p 367.

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THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION
(HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES)

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[Conclusion of article by G.A. Trofimenko]

[Text] V

In noting the restoration of realism in the United States administration's approach to mutual relations with the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1970's, it should be stressed that, as in the 1930's, the turnabout in American policy occurred when a further shift in the correlation of forces in the world arena demanded that the United States pursue a more flexible policy and attach prime importance to the art of diplomacy and not the effrontery of force, and no matter how paradoxical it may seem, the implementation of this turnabout fell to the lot not of a liberal, a man with broad historical horizons like President J. Kennedy (he had felt the need for such a turnabout at a time when the United States ruling class as a whole still did not see the necessity), but to a convinced conservative anticommunist, R. Nixon.

Objective circumstances and objective long-term United States requirements proved to be stronger than ideological antipathies and past sentiments. Moreover, in terms of its form the very process of the reappraisal of American foreign policy was reminiscent of what happened during the period of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR by the F. Roosevelt administration, as at that time, the views of State Department anti-Soviets were simply rejected by the top leadership, and the center of gravity of decision-making in the field of Soviet policy shifted from the state department to the White House.

In embarking on the path of detente in the early 1970's the Republican administration carried out one maneuver which could now be described as a tactical mistake, but which the officials making the decision in Washington obviously regarded at the time as an extremely subtle ploy. It was a question of how to resolve the same old "Roosevelt dilemma": effecting a radical

turnabout in the direction of realism in foreign policy on the one hand, while on the other explaining the expediency of such a turnabout to conservatively-minded groupings within the ruling class, the broader mass of Americans raised in the chauvinist belief in the "global American mission" and the United States' "ineradicable superiority."

Of course, it would have been possible to have frankly told Americans that since the United States' role and weight in the world had declined, it had to moderate its foreign policy appetites (this is now acknowledged by H. Kissinger--for example, in a New York University speech). But in the late 1960's and early 1970's, this kind of argument obviously appeared unacceptable to the President and his chief foreign policy adviser. They had already been forced into a de facto admission of the justice of the antiwar movement and had had to agree to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. After this it was beyond their powers to acknowledge that not only the Vietnam policy (for which, as R. Nixon repeatedly stressed, the responsibility lay not with him but with J. Kennedy and L. Johnson) but the United States' entire long-term strategy was untenable. Fearful that they were not "coping" with American public opinion or the pressure from both right and left, they decided to orient themselves toward the support of conservative forces ("the silent majority," as R. Nixon called them) and to present--mainly for domestic consumption--the forced retreat in the face of new world realities as a kind of American success, an American offensive.

Yugoslav academician Leo Mates, a specialist in American policy, wrote in 1976: "Many journalists and politicians in the United States assessed these first steps (toward detente--G.T.) as the beginning of a new stage in international relations--the stage of the 'eventual' dominance of the American concept of what is and is not right--and thus as... a new stage of the 'Pax Americana.' This--maybe slightly exaggerated--is the essence of the numerous articles and statements which were published, including the suggestion of the possibility of the United States continuing to organize the world in accordance with its own concepts, the sole difference being that the Soviet Union would accept this or even cooperate."¹

This explanation of the detente policy "for internal consumption" possibly helped the White House to neutralize the opposition for a time: it was not a question of a retreat, they said, but of a United States foreign policy offensive. But at the same time the contradiction between the explanation of foreign policy for domestic consumption and the pragmatic consideration of new realities in its policy in the international arena could not fail to cause complications for the American leadership in pursuing the policy of detente.

As soon as the first difficulties in the detente process arose and as soon as the course of events in the world showed even the most obstinate in the United States that events were by no means developing in accordance with the Washington scenario, complaints were immediately leveled against the

White House: the Republican leadership, it was said, had virtually "misled" the public; it had promised "victory" but in practice had been compelled to agree to compromises with the USSR. The fact that during the period of the Watergate investigation the cornered President, striving to prevent the formation in the senate of a large enough majority to carry a vote of no confidence against him and remove him from office (through the so-called impeachment procedure) was doing everything possible to avoid provoking the hostility of rightist politicians, only contributed even more to strengthening the latter's position.

The Democratic administration which came to power in January 1977 inherited this psychological atmosphere, "cold war" cliches which had still not been removed from the public consciousness and which had been intensified by the influence exerted on United States foreign policy by the military-industrial complex were compounded by the demagoguery of rightist figures like senators H. Jackson and H. Baker, former governor of California R. Reagan or former navy secretary P. Nitze, journalist W. Buckley and W. Safire, retired military men like Generals M. Ridgeway and G. Keegan and Admiral E. Zumwalt, and politologists E. Rostow and R. Pipes, who argue that detente is a "one-way street," that is, a process from which only the Soviet Union derives all the benefits and all the pluses. Their detailed and sophisticated arguments against detente, falling on the fertile soil of American great-power chauvinism, are having a certain effect. They are undoubtedly exerting a substantial influence on foreign policy experience. The latter are inclined to heed the views of specialists with greater foreign policy experience without giving particular thought to the fact that this experience was gained exclusively in the field of the "cold war" and that people who have devoted their entire conscious life to winning this war find it very difficult late in life to adjust and begin to operate differently.

Noting this, G. Kennan, one of the very few representatives of the "Riga School," whose views have evolved substantially in the direction of realism in the postwar period, stated in a November 1977 lecture to the American Council on Foreign Relations: "In the last 25 years there has never been a time when this (rightist) opposition has not made itself felt. There has never been a time when American statesmen concerned to seek and develop a constructive middle way in relations with Russia have not felt their efforts impeded from this direction. These obstructions have been far from negligible in terms of their intensity or force. To a certain extent every (American) administration has feared this die-hard opposition, since it has the backing of the force of chauvinist rhetoric and also strict military logic. This opposition has the ability to level at any or all of its opponents accusations of being 'soft on communism'; and no matter how meaningless this phrase may be, it represents an awesome weapon in a society which unfortunately is very susceptible to the power of slogans."²

VI

It is well known that the relaxation of tension in both Soviet-American and international relations has led to the formulation and establishment of a number of fundamental principles governing states' foreign policy behavior as generally accepted norms of international law. The most generalized collection of these principles at this time is to be found in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by 35 heads of state and government, including the United States and the Soviet Union. These include sovereign equality; the nonuse of force or the threat of force; the inviolability of borders; the territorial integrity of states; the peaceful settlement of disputes; noninterference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic freedoms; cooperation; and the conscientious fulfillment of commitments stemming from generally accepted principles and norms of international law. These general principles of international law form the basis of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between states with different social systems. The Soviet Union not only fully accepted them in putting its signature to the Final Act, but was also the first of the world's states to enshrine them in its constitution: Article 29 of the USSR Constitution adopted 7 October 1977 enumerates them in full as the principles governing the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

At the same time it is impossible not to note that, due to the process in the field of Soviet-American detente in the 1970's, the treaty and legal basis of relations between the USSR and the United States is broader than this collection of principles. They have gone further in their mutual relations by formulating and adopting a number of provisions supplementing the fundamental principles. The two countries have thereby done a great deal of work, not only to stabilize their bilateral relations, but also to formulate and codify new principles of international law corresponding to the realities of the modern era. The Soviet-American documents signed in 1970-1974 enshrine the following commitments adopted by the world's two biggest states on a reciprocal basis, clarifying and developing the principles of peaceful coexistence in accordance with the specific situation with respect to Soviet-United States cooperation:

To build peace and cooperation on a firm and long-term basis;

To make efforts with a view to ensuring the speediest and full elimination of existing conflicts and preventing the outbreak of new ones;

To avoid military confrontations and display restraint in mutual relations;

To prevent the emergence of situations liable to cause a dangerous exacerbation of relations between them;

To renounce attempts to obtain one-sided advantages at the other side's expense;

To do everything possible to avert nuclear war;

To consult with each other in situations posing a risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict;

To take steps to prevent the accidental or unauthorized utilization of nuclear weapons;

To inform each other about incidents involving nuclear weapons;

To inform each other in advance of planned missile launchings if one side is conducting such launchings outside its national territory in the direction of the other side;

To make further efforts for disarmament, including for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and all types of weapons of mass destruction in general;

To implement bilateral measures in the field of strategic arms limitation on the basis of strict observance of the principle of equality and undiminished security;

To exchange information on a voluntary basis with a view to strengthening confidence in the fulfillment of adopted commitments;

To consult with each other in connection with changes in the strategic situation in the context of the influence of such changes on the provisions of Soviet-American agreements concluded on arms limitation;

To not provide other states with weapons systems exclusive to the two sides-- a principle stemming from Article 10 of the ARB Limitation Treaty;

To make efforts to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations.

These principles not only determine the framework and basis of political cooperation between the two sides, but also codify the rules of military detente to a certain initial extent, although a great deal more still needs to be done in this direction. Here it is important to stress that peaceful coexistence has become the norm for international relations only since and only insofar as the principles of peaceful coexistence have been officially recognized by the states participating in the international system and have become binding for the governments of the corresponding states.

You sometimes come across arguments of the following kind: The United States and the USSR have been coexisting in practice since 1917 and have done this for all these years without any kind of official codification of the "rules of detente," that is, the principles of peaceful coexistence, but this was the kind of "coexistence" whereby the legitimacy of the Soviet system was in fact called into question by the United States and other

Western states (even after diplomatic recognition). From the viewpoint of the bourgeois theory of international relations, right up until World War II the Soviet Union was an "outsider," a state outside an international system which the capitalist states regarded as "their own." Therefore, any behavior or, you could go further, any treachery was permissible vis-a-vis the USSR. If friendly, unprovocative behavior suited the Western countries' interests, this was considered the norm, but if a given country for some reason required to violate an accord with the Soviet Union or, moreover, commit an overtly unfriendly act toward the USSR, this kind of behavior was also justified as "legitimate" in Western "international law." In this connection we might cite such examples as the Entente powers' renunciation of their own peace proposals to Soviet Russia in February 1919, the "Curzon ultimatum" to the Soviet government in 1923, Britain's provocative severance of diplomatic relations with the USSR in May 1927, the French government's de facto sabotage of the Franco-Soviet Mutual Aid Treaty of 2 May 1935, the Anglo-French attempts to channel Hitler's aggression eastward by the Munich conspiracy of 30 September 1938 and Germany's treacherous attack on the USSR on 22 June 1941. Thus, the notorious "international law" practiced by the Western countries was in fact the "law" of the chosen "sovereigns of the world" who interpreted norms of international behavior as it suited them at any given moment.

At the time of the transition from "cold war" to detente, American theorists formulated a concept whereby it was now allegedly possible to have dealings with the USSR because it had "ceased to be" a revolutionary state refusing to play to "generally accepted rules" and had turned into a "state of the status quo," prepared to observe the "rules of the game" which it had previously rejected. In other words, the American theorists were condescendingly "conferring" on the Soviet Union the "legitimacy" which they had previously denied it. This apology for a theory became so entrenched in the United States that it became an outright catechism for American international affairs theorists acknowledging no vexed questions: and when rightists in the United States now launch their attacks on the principles of detente they also utilize this "theory," contending that R. Nixon and H. Kissinger had given assurances that the USSR "would play to the rules," whereas in fact "it isn't."

When faced with arguments of this kind it is always useful to ask: what rules are we talking about? What rules has the Soviet Union violated and what rules has it scrupulously observed?

If we are talking about the provisions enshrined in the Final Act and in the USSR's treaties and agreements with those Western states, including the United States, which are codifying the rules of detente, the accusation that the Soviet Union is violating them is unfounded. The Soviet Union did not make colossal efforts to establish the principles of peaceful coexistence as norms in international law merely to start violating them.

It is a different matter when some people in the United States still imply by the rules of detente the imperialist "rules of the game" which existed in the international--in practice and Western--system in which the Soviet Union was regarded as an "outsider" and numerous colonies were completely disregarded and not considered to be subject to international law. Formulated before the formation of the USSR and before the formation of the world socialist system, they were unilaterally advantageous to the capitalist states, and primarily to the major European metropolitan states. The "Eurocentrist" system created by them in the 18th and 19th centuries did not propose coexistence on an equal basis between states belonging to different social systems, but envisaged only equal "rules of the game" for the leading European capitalist powers.

Having arrived too late on the scene for the division of the world among the major imperialist states, the United States attempted to change these "international" rules, but in only one direction: to abolish the special "rules of the game" which each of the colonial powers had with respect to its own colonies and instead to establish "generally accepted rules of conduct" for the developed capitalist states vis-a-vis all the rest. These "rules" were based on the principle, "no privileges for anyone": all states compete for influence in the non-European world "on equal terms" --according to their strength and capital.³ This was the main United States innovation in "international law" and was embodied in a series of documents drawn up by the then (1898-1904) secretary of state, J. Hay, eventually dubbed the "Hay doctrine" or the "open-door doctrine."

Not the principle of the sovereign equality of states but the principle of the deliberate inequality of underdeveloped countries by comparison with the omnipotent capitalist plunderers, not the principle of noninterference in internal affairs, but the principle of the legality of interference so long as it is implemented on the basis of "equal" capitalist competition in the economic enslavement of weak states--those are the "great principles" introduced into "international law" by the American bourgeois state.

Of course, the young revolutionary state which emerged on Russia's territory in October 1917 could not fail to refute them.

VII

"And what are your peace terms?" (L. Eyr) [as transliterated], correspondent of America's THE WORLD, asked V.I. Lenin in February 1920. "It is not worth wasting time talking about this," V.I. Lenin replied. "The whole world knows that we are prepared to conclude peace on conditions whose justice cannot be disputed by even the most imperialist-minded capitalists.... But we have no intention of allowing ourselves to be strangled to death in the name of peace"/⁴ (my emphasis--G.T.).

Rejecting the capitalist "rules" whose adoption would have meant "death by strangulation" for the Soviet Republic, the republic in its turn put forward

principles of international communal life which it was really difficult for Western figures--who stated their wish to "make the world safe for democracy," as President W. Wilson put it--to undermine. One such fundamental principle was the principle of the territorial status quo. It was embodied in the Leninist formula of a world without annexations and reparations. Setting an example of its implementation, Soviet Russia renounced the unequal treaties concluded by the tsarist government.

The principle of the territorial status quo is quite apparent throughout the history of the Soviet State and it must be noted that it was primarily due to the USSR's efforts that the alterations of the map of Europe, accomplished during World War II by Hitler's Germany and its allies, were nullified. For a quarter of a century after this war, the Western powers did not wish to agree with the principle of the inviolability of territorial borders and, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it was precisely the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which strove--and are striving--for the unconditional recognition of this principle by all conference participants.

The Western states must recognize not only the principle of the inviolability of borders, but also the other principles of international relations which the Soviet Union had been promoting and defending since the triumph of Soviet rule, if the norms of intergovernmental relations are to become truly international--that is, acceptable to all: the socialist and capitalist states and the developing states still seeking their social orientation. And it is only after this has occurred, and no earlier, that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries can be expected to observe the corresponding rules. After all, what state will "play" by rules that are unequivocally to its detriment?

This is the current situation with the "rules of the game" and the problem of the territorial status quo in international relations.

But the term "status quo" is not only used in discussions of the territorial integrity of states; sometimes references to violations of the status quo imply a change in the social structure of a particular state. Judging by all indications, not one state now officially declares the inviolability of the social status quo, as this would contradict the doctrine of national sovereignty that is even formally present in bourgeois law. One of the 10 principles stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act frankly states: "On the strength of the principle of equality and the right of people to decide their own fate, all people will always have the right to determine, in complete freedom, whenever and however they wish, their own internal and external political status without outside intervention and accomplish their own political, economic, social and cultural development at their own discretion."⁵

It is also understandable that the rivalry between the two social systems, which is still going on at this time of detente, causes the capitalist and

socialist states to support and aid the social movements on the side of which their "system"--that is, class--sympathies lie.

Does this kind of support of social forces and movements in states belonging to a particular social system violate the rules of detente or not? It is obvious that the answer to this question can only be unequivocally negative: no established norms or principles of behavior in international relations, including the "rules of detente," prohibit any side from giving moral and material support to countries, forces and movements. For the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, this signifies, in particular, support for national liberation movements or, in other words, popular movements aimed at a change in the existing anti-popular social status quo in a particular country and the replacement of existing regimes with regimes which, in the terminology of the American Declaration of Independence, "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."

But the response of many American theoreticians, as we know, boils down to statements that the support rendered by the USSR and other socialist countries to a national liberation movement as, for example, the one in Africa, is a violation of the "rules of detente." At the same time, the support given by the United States to pro-American regimes and social forces "does not constitute any violation of detente."

This double measure or double standard is apparently not based on the belief that the willingness of states in the East and West to expand cooperation on the principles of peaceful coexistence is contrary to the principle of "systemwide" solidarity, but on the West's dissatisfaction with the fact that social changes in the world are, as a rule, not progressing in favor of capitalism or in favor of the United States. And this is not occurring as a result of the "Moscow plot," but as a result of the objective historical process which is causing the masses to aspire to national and social liberation.

It is understandable that the formation of anti-imperialist regimes in countries which used to be within the United States political and economic orbit does not gladden Washington politicians and theorists, just as the fact that the Soviet Union's potential for giving material support to progressive forces and movements has increased in the last decade does not gladden them either. They have been accustomed to regarding the sending abroad of advisers and equipment and the provision of material and technical support as virtually a monopoly of the United States or at least of the industrially developed Western States. But, the question arises, who sanctioned this American monopoly, when and by what "rules"?

Why is it "normal" when the United States trains tens of thousands of Latin American soldiers and instructs Ugandan helicopter pilots and Saudi Arabian pilots and when the number of American military advisers in Iran, near the borders of the Soviet Union, is nearly 30,000, yet not merely "abnormal" but "sinister" when Soviet weapons are sold to some country or Soviet

military specialists advise a government? Why is it perfectly "normal" when the American defense secretary talks about the training of special American mobile forces intended for interventions in areas a long way from the United States as though this were a matter of course, but "abnormal" and a "Soviet threat" when the Soviet leaders voice the Soviet Union's support for the right of every people to determine their fate themselves?

On what grounds do certain Washington figures arrogate to themselves the right to be world superarbiters on the issue of what is permitted and what is not?

VIII

It is well known what ballyhoo was kicked up in the United States at one time about the fact that the USSR continued under conditions of detente to give material and moral support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which formed a government after the expulsion of the Portuguese colonialists from the country. But unlike the United States, which secretly financed splittist movements in Angola, the Soviet Union did not conceal its principled position and sympathies. The threats which Washington then uttered against the USSR, including the threat to break off the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, are widely known, but what eventually happened?

It was not the Soviet policy, but the United States Policy which was condemned by the overwhelming majority of African countries. It was not the USSR but the United States which had to radically revise its African policy to take into account the "lessons of Angola." During his April 1976 official visit to Africa, Secretary of State H. Kissinger admitted virtually unambiguously that his trip was occasioned by Washington's desire to draw the proper conclusions from the "lesson of Angola" and to "lay the foundations of a new American policy vis-a-vis this continent." "We," Kissinger justified himself to Africans in a speech in the capital of Liberia, "did not oppose the accession to power of Frelimo--the Marxist movement in Mozambique.... We recognized the government of Mozambique immediately after independence and we bring no bitter feelings to our bilateral relations.... We can work with the MPLA in Angola in the same spirit as with Frelimo in Mozambique."⁶ In January 1977, A. Young, a representative of the new United States Democratic administration, told journalists that in his opinion the presence of Cuban servicemen in Angola had "stabilized the situation." President J. Carter supported A. Young, saying that he entirely agreed with his assessment.⁷

Consequently it was not a matter of a violation of the "rules of detente" by the Soviet Union, but of the United States finding itself isolated in Black Africa as a result of the shortsightedness of its African policy

dictated by the multinational corporations. Washington attempted to obscure the obvious failure of its policy line in this region by loudly accusing the Soviet Union of pursuing a policy of "new colonialism" in Africa. But is it not strange that the USSR was supposedly practicing the "new colonialism" but that it was the United States which had to change its policy and adapt it to the demands of the overwhelming majority of African countries? It appears that it is precisely the United States policy which was at variance with the interests of the majority of Black African independent states.

The same thing can also be said in regard to events in the Horn of Africa region at the end of 1977 and the beginning of 1978. Emotions regarding these events reached the same pitch in the United States press as they had in connection with Angola, and the proposed methods for a "solution" in no way differed from those put forward at the end of 1975: "ending detente" with the Soviet Union and "linking" the solution of the questions of strategic arms limitation with the demand that the USSR cease helping Ethiopia. However, the Soviet Union and its allies clearly and unambiguously supported with regard to events in the Horn of Africa the principle of the inviolability of borders, which is approved by the overwhelming majority of African states and which is enshrined in the OAU Charter, while the United States and its allies were de facto supporting the revision of borders implemented by Somalia with material support from them. Once again it appears that the "rules of the game" were interpreted flexibly in a spirit which suited the Western states. But when nothing came of the recarving of borders and when Somalia's armed intervention was rebuffed, the ballyhoo that the USSR "is violating detente" by helping Ethiopia to repel aggressive attack was kicked up once again (surely not in order to distract attention). These statements must be recognized as an overly free and one-sided interpretation of the aforementioned rules. Incidentally, at one time the United States officially assured Addis Ababa of its "constant interest in Ethiopia's security and opposition to any actions threatening its territorial integrity."⁸ However, Washington kept this solemn pledge only so long as Ethiopia's government pursued a pro-American policy. After the change of government in Addis Ababa the United States, as is evident, lost interest in Ethiopia's territorial integrity. Somalia's illegitimate territorial claims were nearer to its heart. This example illustrates once again that the demagogic accusations emanating from the United States that the Soviet Union has broken the "rules of detente" in connection with events in the Horn of Africa are actually evoked by Washington's irritation at the weakening of the United States' positions in that region as a result of the latest instance of the country supporting a cause regarded as unjust by most African countries.

The suggestion to the American public that the Soviet Union would renounce its principled support for the peoples struggling for their national liberation in "exchange" for the solution of some questions of

Soviet-American bilateral relations is the greatest deception perpetrated by American propagandists in the last few years. No one ever made such promises to the United States: in its turn no one in the USSR demanded pledges of that kind from the United States: however distressing it was for us to see the strengthening of capitalism's positions in Egypt, which did not take place without energetic efforts by the United States, and the survival of the Pinochet regime in Chile, which was also possible only with United States' aid, our country did not raise the question of "burying detente" in this connection, although it must be said openly that some of Washington's actions really violate the agreed theses. Take, for instance, the United States' de facto refusal to solve the Near East problem within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, although this is precisely the machinery for solving this problem which is envisaged by the UN resolutions and bilateral Soviet-American accords.

The Soviet Union's position on the issue of the correlation of detente and the class struggle is absolutely clear: "... Detente and peaceful coexistence relate to interstate relations. This means primarily that disputes and conflicts between countries must not be resolved through war, the use of force or the threat of force. Detente in no way rescinds and cannot rescind or alter the laws of the class struggle. No one can expect communists to tolerate capitalist exploitation under conditions of detente, or monopolists to become supporters of revolution."⁹

Opening another stage of the scientific debate on detente in the United States in the fall of 1976, Professor A. Ulam, one of the major American specialists on the USSR, noted: The Soviet leaders "have never depicted detente as a policy which means that the Soviet Union will refrain from strengthening its influence wherever it is safe and advantageous for it to do so (incidentally, nor have the American leaders ever done this with regard to United States policy--G.T.) and still less as a readiness to change the Soviet internal system so that it reflects the wishes of the NEW YORK TIMES editorial board, the AFL-CIO labor union leadership or various senators. From the Soviet viewpoint, detente meant a new stage in the /relationship/ with the United States, but this relationship did not mean an automatic commitment by the Soviet Union to pursue a policy which would be approved by Americans. Moscow has never meant detente as an ... alliance. It was intended to draw the general outlines within which the two powers would seek agreement."¹⁰

Thus it appears that the so-called "arguments" used by American "hawks" to prove the Soviet Union's "treachery" and imaginary failure to observe the "rules of detente" rebound on these figures themselves.

And if we are to talk of the USSR's position, it is precisely its scrupulous observance of these rules which results in the fact that, even under conditions where the USSR and the United States find themselves, so to speak, on different sides of the barricades in a particular

regional crisis, the Soviet Union continues to make the maximum effort to avoid a dangerous exacerbation of Soviet-American relations and to settle the conflict as speedily as possible--in such a way that the sides' legitimate interests are not infringed. The position adopted by the Soviet Union in connection with events in the Horn of Africa is graphic evidence of this. The USSR did everything possible to prevent armed conflict between the two neighboring African states, attempting to restrain Somalia's government from precipitate action. When the conflict nevertheless broke out and Somalia's aggression was eventually repelled, the USSR made every effort to contribute to a peaceful settlement between the sides on the basis of the principles of the inviolability of borders, noninterference in one another's internal affairs and the renunciation of the use of force--that is, precisely on the basis of the fundamental principles of detente.

Moreover, while the American "hawks" are waxing demagogic about the Soviet Union's imaginary violations of the "rules of detente," the USSR and the other socialist community countries are striving not only to observe the existing rules but also to expand them, in order to reduce still more strongly the likelihood of the emergence of global and regional conflicts and to strengthen world stability still more. As is well known, the Soviet Union submitted for the consideration of the last, 32d UN General Assembly Session a draft declaration on the deepening and consolidation of the relaxation of international tension, whose provisions further develop the principles of detente, as, for instance, the call to states to "strive to ensure that the development of the detente spirit is not impeded by considerations of bloc politics" and to "measure their actions vis-a-vis other states and in all regions of the globe against the requirements of detente."¹¹ A state which desires "expansionism," as some American press organs assert, alluding to the USSR, would scarcely submit for consideration by an international forum principles imposing additional restrictions on countries in their behavior in the international arena. Unfortunately these most important provisions were not incorporated in the final text of the declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly on 19 December 1977 --not through the fault of the Soviet Union.

The USSR's desire to deepen political detente and to supplement it with military detente is also eloquently evidenced by the proposals on practical ways to end the arms race which it submitted at the UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. These include measures such as ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons; ending production of and banning all other types of weapons of mass destruction; ending the creation of new types of conventional armaments of great destructive power; renunciation of the expansion of armies and the increase of conventional armaments on the part of powers which are permanent members of the UN Security Council and

also on the part of countries linked with them by military agreements. All these measures take into account the existing balance of forces and do not create one-sided advantages for anyone.

However, the American critics of detente "fail to notice" all these proposals. One gains the impression that their efforts amount not, as they assert, to "improving detente," transforming it from a one-way street to a street with two-way traffic and "retouching" particular conditions of the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments which is being elaborated, but quite simply to burying detente. They are essentially striving to recreate in the United States an anti-Soviet "consensus" on the basis of what has been called in the context of this article the "Riga axioms"--that is, the concepts and lines of cold war.

The aforementioned G. Kennan has rightly remarked that opposition to detente in the United States is evoked by no means by dissatisfaction with particular formulas in the American-Soviet agreements or with the "concessions" which the United States has supposedly made to the Soviet Union, but by something else: the representatives of the opposition would like to "discredit the very negotiating process"¹² with the USSR.

For more than 20 years following World War II, the representatives of the American ruling class, as demonstrated above, were prepared only for talks with the USSR which enshrined a "retreat" by the Soviet Union and agreement by it to the conditions unilaterally set by the United States. Detente in Soviet-American agreements, representing a turn by the United States toward peaceful relations with the USSR on the basis of the principles of equality, also meant a need to agree to a different type of talks: not with the aim of dictating terms to the other side, but with the aim of elaborating mutually acceptable compromises which would be based on a balance of the interests of the different states. But this principle is proving unacceptable to the militarist chauvinists in the American establishment who still cannot abandon their illusions of American omnipotence and the globalist great-power "American dream."

IX

The intensified activeness of American opponents of detente in the past year is alerting many people in academic circles and those figures in the American leadership who are interested in strengthening peace and the security of the United States itself on the basis of talks and mutually acceptable agreements. A new stage of the debate about detente is now developing in the United States. The characteristic feature of

it is the desire of many scientists and politicians to analyze from more or less realistic positions detente's prospects in a broader, global context and to rebuff those of its critics who would like to eliminate this process.

"Having (once) overestimated detente, let us not underestimate it now,"¹³ Professor S. Hoffman of Harvard University, one of the participants in this new debate, writes. In his opinion and in the opinion of other American political scientists, the most important task of United States foreign policy is to maintain a comprehensive political approach to international relations, including on the Soviet-American salient.

The danger to the cause of detente in the current period, many sober-minded Americans believe, lies in the fact that the rightwing opposition, with the connivance of the official United States leadership, has already succeeded to some extent in restoring among a considerable section of the American public many of the anti-Soviet cliches discarded in the first half of the 1970's. One of the main cliches of this type is the myth of the "growing Soviet military threat" to the United States and Western Europe. Juggling with various kinds of inflated figures fabricated by the Pentagon and the CIA about the size of the Soviet military budget and the scale of military building in the USSR, American "hawks" are attempting to prove that the USSR is striving "to achieve military supremacy over the United States." A mass of experts have appeared who are showering the broad American public and congressmen with mountains of almost incomprehensible figures which they juggle as they feel. Today they will be trying to prove that in 2-3 years the throw-weight of Soviet ICBM's will be 6-12 times the corresponding level for American missiles, whereas tomorrow it will be that the USSR is starting "antisatellite warfare" and the day after that they will invent something else for the benefit of the military-industrial complex.

"As so often in the past, powerful voices can again be heard in our country calling for the intensification of the cold war and the abandonment of efforts for the benefit of restraint--efforts which are depicted as allegedly promoting Moscow's aggressive intentions. Again we are being told that we must determine our actions... on the basis of imaginings fueled by fears of what the Soviets might do. Unfortunately, this has been our typical approach to decisions concerning the creation of a weapons systems and arms control since the end of World War II,"¹⁴ world-famous chemist, Harvard University professor and former presidential science aide, G. Kistiakowsky writes, urging the present United States leadership to abandon ossified cliches of thought and make sincere efforts to end the arms race and advance further along the path of peaceful coexistence.

Paranoid hysterics about "the growing Soviet threat," G. Kistiakowsky contends, conceal from view the most important factor: the USSR and the United States are currently in a state of strategic parity, and neither state has the capacity to inflict a "preemptive strike" on the other with impunity. Therefore, he writes, the same old "scenarios" of a surprise Soviet attack on the United States which are currently being publicized by American "prophets of doom" can only be described as "groundless nightmares," while the "prophets" spreading them, he points out, are the same figures who in the past attempted to intimidate Americans with threats of a United States "bomber gap" or "missile gap" and so forth, and composed memorandum SNB-68 and other scare predictions.

"Since the Soviets' main aim is virtual nuclear parity with the United States," Professor A. Ulam, who can in no way be suspected of pro-Soviet sympathies, states, "they must now feel as ready as anybody to prevent a further arms race."¹⁵

The objective of the new Soviet-United States strategic arms agreement is to seal in political and legal terms the existing strategic parity in order to lessen the motives on both sides for intensifying the competition in arms. It is precisely this objective, many Americans believe, which must become the basic consideration for the United States in its strategic arms limitation talks with the USSR.

"Either we advance boldly, confidently, and creatively toward the creation of new mutual relations with this country (the Soviet Union) in the military field," G. Kennan stresses, "or we confront ourselves and the whole of the rest of the civilized world with the terrifying dangers of a totally uncontrollable nuclear arms race--a process with no encouraging outcome and no conceivable outcome apart from the totally catastrophic."¹⁶

Prominent political figure C. Yost, former United States representative at the United Nations, stresses that the real danger for the United States stems not from imagined attempts by the Soviet Union to obtain military superiority, but from the likelihood that "A strategic arms limitation agreement will not be concluded or, if it is, will not be ratified by the Senate,"¹⁷ given the dominant mood there at this time.

The strategic approach to detente (in contrast to the ad hoc approach) also requires a corresponding assessment of the significance and role of Soviet-American relations in the general context of international relations and global United States policy, many American authors point out.

It is well known that soon after it came to power in January 1977 the Democratic administration began to popularize the "newfangled" concept of a "substantial shift of priorities" in American foreign policy. The thesis of the priority importance of improving relations between the United States and the USSR for the cause of universal peace was proclaimed "obsolete." This thesis was replaced by the concept that the United States must attach

primary importance to relations with the allies, while relations with the "potential enemy" must rank second or even third in the list of priorities. Even this banality (for it is clear that each side's relations with its allies are more intimate and stronger than with everybody else) was presented as a supreme theoretical discovery. But why, the question arises, must the one contradict the other, why must the strengthening of relations with allies (by both the United States and the Soviet Union) push into the background the task of further stabilizing bilateral United States-Soviet relations, the less than fully settled nature of which (particularly in the field of military rivalry) represents at the present stage the main threat to the peace and security of these countries themselves and their allies? As former State Department adviser H. Sonnenfeldt stressed recently, "despite its hopes, the new administration has discovered that it is strongly linked with the USSR and is evidently devoting as much if not more energy to these mutual relations as to any others.... In view of the all-pervasiveness of the interaction between the United States and the USSR in both the geographical and the functional respects, our policy toward the Soviet Union will in all likelihood remain the most active and wide-ranging of our foreign policy courses."¹⁸

It is another matter that certain American political scientists currently approach the problem of the place and role of the USSR in United States foreign policy from a somewhat different and more realistic angle. They point out that "obsession with the Soviet Union" was an essential condition for the United States during the "cold war" period. The policy at that time was dictated not by United States national security considerations, but by the demands of anti-communist ideology: all events in the world, irrespective of their significance or location, were seen by Washington exclusively in terms of United States-Soviet military confrontation. United States actions in the world arena were calculated "from the contrary premise": would a given action benefit or harm the Soviet Union? If it promised to harm the USSR it would be taken, despite the fact that, as it often transpired, the interests of the United States would also be harmed. The normalization of Soviet-American relations and the policy of detente helped the American leadership to see the obvious: not everything that is good for the USSR is bad for the United States and vice-versa: it was on the basis of precisely this approach that fields were found in which the two sides' interests coincide and in which they can cooperate, primarily in averting a global military catastrophe.

What certain Washington politicians are now proposing as a "change of foreign policy priorities" for the United States in practice signifies an aspiration on their part of return to a concentrated anti-Soviet foreign policy whose essence is that there must be no constructive American-Soviet mutual relations, instead these relations must be undermined: everything done by the United States in other areas of its foreign policy activity must have an anti-Soviet orientation and must tend to damage the USSR's positions and to make it "historically uninvolved in the great problems of our time," as one of Washington's current foreign policy ideologists put it.

As a counter to this, many thoughtful American theorists (like S. Hoffmann, G. Kennan, C. Brown and H. Sonnenfeldt) urge the abandonment of the previous anti-Soviet "obsession" and even a certain "cooling" of relations, by which they primarily mean the need to cool the raging passions of certain hotheads in the United States who are prepared to swing from the "extreme" of detente to the extreme of diehard anti-Sovietism. "The world today," R. Legvold, one of the directors of Columbia University's Russian Institute, writes, "is a world in which fewer and fewer of our problems are caused or can be solved by the Soviet Union with the exception of the ultimate problem of nuclear war."¹⁹ "Is it not absurd," G. Kennan asks with philosophical irony, "to expend so much of our energy opposing Russia in order to save a West undermined by confusion and a profound sense of internal disintegration? First show me an America which has coped successfully with the problems of crime, drug-addiction, declining educational standards, urban decay, pornography and decadence of various kinds, show me an America which has gotten itself together as it should do, and then I will tell you how we have to defend ourselves against the Russians. But the way things are going now, I can see little point in organizing ourselves to defend pornographic book-sellers in downtown Washington from the Russians."²⁰

The question of the nature of the international system which we have already examined in the historical aspect again arises in connection with the problems we have mentioned. It is astonishing that to this day certain American theorists and even responsible statesmen still harboring illusions of American omnipotence attempt to present as a "move in the direction of realism" the fact that in their theoretical models they have agreed to replace one-time American hegemonism with some collectivism in the form of Western "trilaterality." It is the "trilateral system" comprising the United States, Western Europe and Japan which is now being proclaimed as the epicenter of the modern world which other countries must either join (on terms dictated by the theorists of the "trilateral commission" of representatives of this grouping of countries created by D. Rockefeller "on the basis of an idea" from Z. Brzezinski) or be "ejected" by centrifugal forces to the "remote periphery" of world development. This entire "system" smacks of the American chauvinism of past years, not to mention the fact that the artificial idyllic schemes for a "world order" advanced in many "trilateral commission" documents in no way fit in with the real facts of the acute rivalry between the sides of the capitalist "triangle." One occasionally feels an involuntary desire to advise the "trilateral theorists" to first attempt to solve their own problems before proposing speculative schemes as universal concepts.

The main point is, however, that, no matter how much the members of the trilateral commission may wish to incorporate a particular country in the "world system" and exclude another--one which is not to their liking--as a punishment, a global system of international relations based on new, equal principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation already exists and operates, and it operates not "by courtesy" of the United States or its Western allies, but by virtue of the fact that there has been a radical

shift in the world balance of forces and the capitalist states now have to reckon with the role and importance of the world socialist system and take account of the positions and interests of the developing countries.

"The American-Soviet understandings reached during the three summit conferences in the early 1970's, the Helsinki Final Act and the numerous similar agreements between the USSR and different Western states such as France and the FRG probably went as far in formalizing the fundamental rules of competition as it is possible to go in documents elaborated through talks,"²¹ H. Sonnenfeldt observes, stressing in addition that these rules are essentially standards of behavior and aims: and their implementation depends on the will of the sides taking part in collaboration. It is precisely these documents, jointly elaborated by socialist and capitalist states and taking into account the interests of the developing countries too, which constitute the new, equal "rules of play" in the modern world which no one can alter unilaterally.

Realizing all this, the thoughtful American foreign policy theorists are striving to curb the current enemies of detente among foreign policy practitioners who are not so strong on theory. They are well aware that the latter have no great difficulty in declaring their refusal to follow the "rules of detente" elaborated through years of persistent efforts by states or in undermining existing bilateral understandings (as the 1972 trade agreement, for example, was undermined). But they rightly ask: What then? What do we do after that? What rules must the United States follow if that happens? The rules of cold war? But surely, a necessary condition of even an apparent hope of success in the cold war was American military and economic predominance in the world, and that no longer exists.

"In general nowadays the Soviet Union has an appreciably greater capacity than in the past for restricting our use of military strength and for influencing events on that plane," R. Legvold realistically observes. Proceeding from this fact, he appeals for the existing modus vivendi rules--the rules of peaceful coexistence--not to be undermined but for the quest in that direction to be pursued. "That quest," he writes, "ultimately represents the only hope we have of restoring the integrity of our approach to the restructured Soviet-American mutual relations."²²

Naturally, this quest must proceed in realistic categories, taking into account the fact that the two social systems exist in a complex relationship of historical antagonism and that neither is inclined to relinquish its positions unilaterally.

FOOTNOTES

1. MEĐUNARODNA POLITIKA, Belgrade, 5 February 1976, p 15.
2. G. Kennan, "A Current Assessment of Soviet-American Relations. Remarks at a Meeting of the Council of Foreign Relations, 22 November 1977," Washington, 1977, p 5.
3. True, the United States was devious here, assigning, through the "Monroe Doctrine," all Latin America to its own exclusive sphere of influence.
4. V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Vol 40 p 152.
5. PRAVDA, 2 August 1975.
6. H. Kissinger, "America and Africa," THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 31 May 1976, p 681.
7. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 18 April 1977.
8. A. Schlesinger, "Imperial Presidency," New York, 1974, p 201.
9. "25th CPSU Congress Materials," Moscow 1976 p 33.
10. A. Ulam, "Detente Under Soviet Eyes," FOREIGN POLICY, No 24, 1976, p 147.
11. PRAVDA, 29 September 1977.
12. G. Kennan, Op. cit., p 10.
13. S. Hoffman, "The Uses of American Power," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1977, p 32.
14. G. Kistiakowsky, "Is Paranoia Necessary for Security?" THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 27 November 1977, p 52.
15. FOREIGN POLICY, No 24, 1976, p 157.
16. G. Kennan, Op. cit., pp 9-10.
17. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 24 January 1978.
18. H. Sonnenfeldt, "Russia, America and Detente," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1978, p 293.

19. R. Legvold, "The Nature of Soviet Power," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1977, p 49.
20. See the Congressional Record, 1 October 1976, p H12345.
21. H. Sonnenfeldt, Op. cit, p 291.
22. R. Legvold, Op. cit, pp 59, 71.

CSO: 1803

FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION TO THE BEGINNING OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 54-70

[Conclusion of article by L.A. Gvishiani]

[Text] In assessing the alignment of forces in America at that time, Yu.V. Lomonosov, the Provisional Government's chief representative of the Ministry of Railways in the United States,¹ wrote in his report for June 1917-April 1918 that there had been a sharp division of the American public into two camps in terms of attitudes toward Russia: in the opinion of some, Russia could not be assisted as long as it was controlled by Bolsheviks; moreover, it was necessary to assist the groups headed by Kaledin and Simenov and fighting against the Soviet Government. In the view of the people in this camp, Bolshevism seemed much more dangerous to the bourgeois world than German Junkerism. This same camp was joined by almost all Russian bureaucrats in America, as well as the new immigrants who had escaped from Russia after the revolution. They were frankly saying that it would be senseless to assist Russia and that it was necessary for millions of people to die of hunger there first so that the people themselves would put the old builders of economic life back in power, bow to them and pray to them. According to the other group, which consisted not only of socialists and radicals but also "people of extremely moderate, but nonetheless, quite farsighted views," any kind of intervention in internal Russian affairs on the part of the Allies would give rise to a wave of public indignation and would necessitate the seeking of support from, or even alliance with, the Germans. According to the people in this camp, the Germans were more frightening than the Bolsheviks, and for the sake of combating the Germans, they were prepared to cooperate with the Bolsheviks or to go over their heads and work with "Russian popular economic organizations."²

The attempts made by some American groups to establish relations with the Soviet Government were quite unequivocally condemned by the U.S. Government. "The fight began," writes American historian W. Williams, "when William Boyce Thompson, industrialist and financier, and one of Robins' powerful and influential friends, made a newspaper announcement that Wilson would

strive for some kind of settlement with the Bolsheviks. This statement was immediately and categorically denied by Walling, who knew Wilson's views on Russian affairs. 'It is totally unlikely' that the Bolshevik Government 'will be recognized by America,' he stated, elucidating the President's words."³

At that time, representatives of the imperialist powers in Russia played a waiting game; they displayed no signs of willingness to recognize the Soviet Government but they were in no hurry to leave the nation either. Carefully keeping an eye on events and never losing their hope that the Soviet Government would soon fall, they made use of this time to collect information, to establish contacts with counter-revolutionary forces in Soviet Russia and to encourage these forces in every way possible.

By the time of the October Revolution, the United States was not only represented in Russia by an embassy, but also by missions, including the American Red Cross Commission headed by Colonel R. Robins.⁴ The position occupied by Robins was based on his desire to keep Russia at war with Germany by recognizing the Soviet Government. Robins worked toward more extensive cooperation with Soviet Russia, believing that this would provide opportunities for regulating its relations with the Allies.

Robins began his activity in Soviet Russia with a visit to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on 9 and 10 November 1917 to learn the actual possibilities and avenues for cooperation between the American Red Cross and the Soviet Government. Robins' attempt to reach a mutual understanding with the Soviet Government met with sincere approval; the Soviet side expressed its willingness to assist him in every way possible in his activity.⁵

On 26 December 1917 Robins reported on the steps he had taken to Davison, director of the American Red Cross in the United States. Robins began his report to Davison with the words: "Please urge upon the President the necessity of our continued intercourse with the Bolshevik Government."⁶

A similar line in regard to Soviet Russia was adhered to for some time by General Judson, head of the American Military Mission in Moscow. In November and December 1917 he suggested to the U.S. Government that Soviet Russia should be recognized. On 2 December 1917 Francis wired the secretary of state: "Judson has insisted for some time that Soviet is de facto government and relations therewith should be established."⁷ As we have already mentioned, however, Lansing replied to this on 6 December by categorically prohibiting the maintenance of direct contacts with the Soviet Government.

According to American historian W.A. Williams, there is reason to believe that Ambassador Francis was for some time influenced by the arguments of Colonel Robins, General Judson and those who supported their views.⁸ Between November 1917 and March 1918--that is, until the time when the Entente nations made the decision to begin anti-Soviet intervention,

Francis, as documents testify, displayed a certain degree of caution and restraint in his actions. In an attempt to keep Soviet Russia at war with Germany, he kept up semi-official contacts with the Soviet Government through Robins for the first three months after the October Revolution.

As the proceedings of meetings of a sub-committee of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary indicated,⁹ on 2 January 1918 Francis gave Robins a document which was supposed to be transmitted to the Soviet Government, but which never was sent to the addressee--the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. This document stated that Francis, as U.S. ambassador, promised to recommend that his government assist the Russian people in every way possible in the event that Russia would "repulse the hostilities of Germany and its allies." If the armistice with Germany led to the resumption of hostilities, Francis would insist that his government give extensive aid and assistance to Russia, including provision of the army with food and ammunition, more extensive credit and technical assistance until the final victory over Germany. If the Russian Army would institute hostilities against Germany, Francis would recommend that his government "recognize the de facto existence of the government of People's Commissars."¹⁰

American representatives in Soviet Russia regularly informed their government of all events taking place. And, as documents indicate, they thereby caused the U.S. Government to believe that, under certain conditions, Soviet Russia could agree to remain at war against Germany. It is possible that these American diplomats' predictions were based on consideration for the stand taken by the "leftist communists" during the negotiations on the Brest Peace Treaty.

American historian Schuman writes in his book, "American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917" that Trotsky's statement against a truce with the Germans played a definite role in the assessment of Russia's potential policy by American ruling circles. They decided to turn the possibility of continuing the war into a reality with Trotsky's assistance.¹¹ "At Francis' request, Colonel Robins contacted Trotsky at the end of 1917, met frequently with him and discussed plans for concerted action by Russia and the United States in the war against Germany."¹² These contacts with Trotsky are discussed by B. Lockhart in his book "Memoirs of a British Agent."¹³

On 2 January 1918 Ambassador Francis gave Robins a document setting forth the text of one of the ambassador's letters to the State Department. A notation in the document indicates that this report was compiled with Robins' advice after he had expressed his view, in a conversation with Francis, that peace negotiations with Germany had been broken off and that the Soviet Government had decided to continue its war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Francis reported in this letter to the State Department: "I was informed by reliable sources that the Bolshevik leaders fear the total failure of the peace negotiations due to possible unacceptable demands by Germany. The only alternatives are shameful peace or the continuation of war. The Bolshevik leaders will welcome the news of the assistance it might

expect from our government if the decision is made to remain at war. Assurances of American support in this event could have the most substantial influence on their decision." Further on in the letter, Francis reported that he had felt it necessary to instruct General Judson to unofficially assure the Bolshevik leaders that if the armistice were to be denounced and Russia were to resume hostilities against the central powers, Francis would recommend that the U.S. Government give Russia every possible type of aid and assistance.

Francis, according to his own words, had to make his own decisions and take responsibility for them for a certain period of time under extremely complex conditions. "At the present time the need for unofficial relations is so important that I would have had to be replaced if I had not assumed the responsibility for these actions,"¹⁴ he wrote. In assessing the alignment of forces in the nation, Francis realized that the Soviet Government was becoming a real power, and this motivated his contacts with this government. He tried to avoid, however, any situation in which his actions might be interpreted as "official recognition of the Bolshevik Government."¹⁵

Official Washington reacted negatively to even Francis' attempts to display farsightedness and follow the tactic of maintaining contact with the Soviet Government so that the most expedient political course might be determined on the basis of the actual course of events.

It should be noted, however, that the negative stand taken by official U.S. authorities on Soviet Russia was not shared from the very beginning by a certain, fairly influential group of American capital, which advocated more flexible tactics and proposed the active development of economic ties between the United States and Soviet Russia. R. Robins, who had already established contacts with the Soviet Government by the end of November and the beginning of December 1917 and first met with V.I. Lenin in January 1917, became the proponent of this idea.¹⁶

Just as his predecessor B. Thompson, R. Robins represented the interests of big capital in the United States. Thompson was connected with the Morgan group, which was particularly interested in investing capital in Russia's railroads. As for Robins' political convictions, they can be judged adequately by his close association with the leader of the Republican Party, former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, as well as his adherence to Republican Party policy.

Albert Rhys Williams, American socialist who witnessed the October Revolution and whose views were largely the same as those of John Reed, knew Robins quite well from working with him in Russia and says in his book "Journey Into Revolution" that he was a brilliant and complex individual. He calls him a "man of duty" who could be "an extremely dangerous enemy," adding that "his influence extended a long way ... to the highest levels of the Republican Party." Robins was "a capitalist to the core," but a sober and realistic-minded one, displaying these qualities particularly

cogently in communications with the Soviet Government. "'We must not,' Robins declared, 'act in accordance with what we think they will do, but in accordance with what they actually intended to do, and I am constantly trying to convince Washington of this,'"17 A. Williams recalls his conversations with R. Robins in Petrograd. Robins, according to Williams, played the part of the United States' "undercover ambassador" to Soviet Russia at that time.

It is possible that Robins himself was the prisoner of American propaganda to some extent, as there is reason to assume that he sincerely believed in the possibility of Soviet Russia's recognition by the Wilson administration.

A sober and accurate appraisal of the Wilson administration's true intentions was made by John Reed, outstanding American communist writer who was in Soviet Russia at that time.¹⁸ Although Reed was convinced of the sincerity of Robins' intentions, he did not doubt for a minute that Wilson would not take any steps to establish relations with Soviet Russia. In a talk with A. Williams in January 1918 regarding the possible American position during the period of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, Reed stressed the fact that Robins was virtually unable to assure V.I. Lenin that U.S. policy toward Soviet Russia would change for the better. "Does he really expect," J. Reed said, "to get anything more from Washington than Wilson's pompous phrases about democracy."¹⁹

History corroborated this assumption. President Woodrow Wilson stubbornly took an anti-Soviet stand in all circumstances.

We must unconditionally agree with A. Williams' theory that the October Revolution divided the "world of capital" itself into two camps; one part of this camp saw Soviet Russia as a "nation of fur and coal concessions," a vast geographic region where a "profitable field for capital investments" existed, and a nation "capable of opposing the tremendous armies of the European monarchies." This camp included representatives of American capital, as well as the capital of other countries, who advocated recognition of the Soviet Government. The rest of the capitalists of all nations, including Americans, firmly adhered to the position of nonrecognition and struggle against the first socialist state, as their greatest fear was that "the virus of Bolshevism would spread to Europe, infect the masses and evoke the same kind of outburst as in Russia."²⁰ President Wilson was at the mercy of precisely these feelings.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Government had to keep a particularly close watch on the development of international events and take all new opportunities and areas for the more effective functioning of Soviet diplomacy into account. The struggle against international reactionary forces, the establishment of the Soviet State in international affairs, the institution of diplomatic relations with other states and the development of economic ties with nations expressing an interest in this called for a tremendous amount of work.

The Provisional Government's diplomatic service did everything possible to sabotage the orders of the Soviet Government, hoping to restore the power of the bourgeoisie in the nation.

One of the few official diplomatic representatives of the Provisional Government in the United States who took the side of the Soviet authorities was, as we mentioned above, Professor Yu.V. Lomonosov, prominent expert on railway transport. By 9 November 1917, Yu.V. Lomonosov was already inserting a reminder in one of his orders to the mission that, regardless of how painful the news from Russia might be, "Our duty is to serve her here, with no thought for ourselves, to the end."²¹ Those who wished to be of use to Soviet Russia rallied round Yu.V. Lomonosov. On 29 January 1918 a "conference of representatives of the new Russia concerning purchases in America" was held in New York and Yu.V. Lomonosov was elected its chairman.

The conference was attended by representatives from the former Ministry of Railways, the former Ministry of Food and others. In his speech, Yu.V. Lomonosov summed up the results of their activity in the United States during the period of the Provisional Government. He cited the following figures: on 10 November 1917 Russian orders in the United States totaled around 250 million dollars (this included orders for 2,000 locomotives, 40,000 railway cars and other equipment). Within 3 or 4 weeks after the October Revolution in Russia, the American Government proposed the cancellation of these orders on the grounds that there was no one in the United States who was empowered to assume any kind of financial obligations on behalf of Russia and that the American Congress had allocated credit for railway "aid" to Russia as war loans which could not be used after Russia's withdrawal from the war.²² The conference unanimously recognized the need to take immediate steps to use the orders that had been placed in the interest of Soviet Russia.

Supporting the initiative displayed in this area by Yu.V. Lomonosov, the Soviet Government felt it was possible to appoint him its representative in the United States. In the document entitled "Considerations in Favor of the Adoption of a Decree on Yu.V. Lomonosov's Appointment as Representative of the RSFSR and Representative of the People's Commissariat of Railways in America for Russian Railway Affairs,"²³ Lomonosov's appointment was connected with the possible development of relations between Soviet Russia and the United States. "Peace with the Entente and, consequently, with the United States of America, is possible. It could come as a complete surprise to us." This led to the conclusion that preparations should be made for this turn of events.

The Soviet Railroad Mission in America was charged with great responsibilities and Yu.V. Lomonosov was requested to "continue his struggle to gain control over the existing mission and reorganize it in such a way that it will become a body useful to it (the Soviet Nation--L.G.) under any circumstances. And if this should be impossible, another mission must be formed and must be given an opportunity to become firmly established in

America and become capable of placing our orders at any time and, in general, defending our railroad interests there."²⁴ The intention of Lomonosov and his group of associates to work in the United States in the interest of Soviet Russia met with fierce opposition on the part of the strong anti-Soviet segment of the Russian diplomatic corps and on the part of American ruling circles.

In an attempt to promote relations with the United States, the Soviet Government took another step in this direction by appointing John Reed, American citizen and friend of Soviet Russia, the consul-general of the RSFSR in the United States (in place of former Consul Ustinov of the Provisional Government). On 16 January 1918 the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs advised the American Embassy in Petrograd that the "Russian consul in New York, Ustinov, has been replaced" and that "citizen John Reed has been appointed consul of the Russian Republic in New York." At that same time, the commissariat issued a report of this to the Soviet press.²⁵

Continuing its search for ways of reinforcing the nation's political and economic position, the Soviet Government looked into the possibility of using its natural and economic resources for the development of trade with foreign states, including the United States. In March 1918 the VSNKh [Supreme Council of the National Economy] ordered the Glavzagran [Main Administration for Overseas Procurements], an agency set up by the Provisional Government and responsible for placing government orders overseas, to cancel all military orders overseas and to use advances for the purchase of goods to fill peacetime needs. On 8 March 1918 Glavzagran set up an interdepartmental economic and commercial commission which was to go to the United States to replace the previous members of the procurement committee in order to "restore and promote trade relations with the United States." On 18 March 1918 Glavzagran submitted a report on this matter to the Council of People's Commissars.

On 26 March 1918 Glavzagran Commissar L.G. Gruzit went to see American Ambassador Francis in Vologda and set forth the responsibilities of the mission that was being set up. Francis told the Soviet representative: "If Russia continues to fight against Germany, even illegally, there is no doubt that America will assist Russia in every way." When Gruzit remarked that his interest did not lie in political matters, as he "was not authorized to discuss these," but in specific matters connected with the completion of Russian orders and future trade with the United States, Francis replied that there was no point in even discussing the cancellation of military orders or the delivery of American goods for the satisfaction of peacetime demands instead. As for the economic and commercial commission itself, he, Francis said, "could not precisely discern the purpose of the commission and, for this reason, in his report to his government he would be unable to express any definite views on the desirability" of its arrival in the United States. Francis rejected the Soviet trade and economic proposals and, besides this, accused the commission, without any grounds whatsoever, of planning to engage in agitation rather than trade.

In the very beginning of April 1918, Ambassador Francis had another meeting with Glavzagran Chairman L.G. Gruzit. This time Francis was in a more optimistic mood and said that now "America is willing to enter into new agreements and render assistance to the present Russian Government."²⁶ This statement, however, never went beyond the verbal level and produced no results. The Soviet mission never was allowed to enter the United States because the American Government would not grant the necessary entry visas.

These actions on the part of the U.S. Government proved that it categorically rejected the possibility of recognizing the Soviet Nation and developing political and economic relations with it.

By making completely noncommittal statements, Francis was simply employing meaningless phrases of the "Wilsonian" type to conceal the military campaign against Soviet Russia that had already begun by that time. We can assume that intervention was presupposed in Entente decisions as early as December 1917, when military representatives in the Entente's allied council decreed on 23 December that "All national troops in Russia deciding to continue the war must be supported by all of the means at our disposal."²⁷

Each month the anti-Soviet plans of the imperialist states became increasingly obvious, as the hope of the possible restoration of capitalism in Soviet Russia by internal counter-revolutionary forces alone, a hope entertained by the imperialist powers during the first months after October, was completely dispelled.

Rejecting Soviet proposals concerning the conclusion of a general peace treaty, the Entente powers and the United States embarked upon a course of armed intervention in the affairs of Soviet Russia.

The Entente powers and the United States, however, did not and could not agree on the avenues and methods of armed intervention against Soviet Russia. As soon as the possible division of Russia into spheres of influence was mentioned, inter-imperialist conflicts began to take their toll. They essentially consisted in attempts to prevent any member of the alliance from becoming stronger than any other. The division of Russia could give more power either to France, or to England, or to Japan or to the United States, and each of these was wary of the outcome. In an attempt to establish mutual control over this process, the Entente powers and the United States drew up a number of conventions and agreements, including a secret Anglo-French agreement on the division of Russia into spheres of influence.²⁸

Anglo-Japanese-American conflicts became most evident when anti-Soviet intervention in the Far East was being discussed and planned. Japan wanted to occupy Vladivostok and other Soviet regions independently of the United States and England. Ruling circles in the United States and England did everything possible to prevent this.

The conflicts between the imperialist powers caused some delay in the anti-Soviet intervention and there is no question that this gave Soviet Russia extra time. A telegram sent by Acting U.S. Secretary of State Polk to Morris, U.S. ambassador in Japan, on 20 January 1918 can serve to illustrate the way in which the United States reacted to the issue of avenues of intervention in Soviet Russia; he wired that the State Department felt it was necessary to give consideration to the French proposal concerning a joint military expedition of the Allied powers in Siberia and the Japanese proposal that only Japanese troops be sent to Siberia.²⁹

While the French Government advocated overt anti-Soviet intervention, London, as a memorandum sent by the English ambassador in Washington to the State Department on 28 January 1918 indicates, proposed that assistance be given to counter-revolutionary organizations and forces in various regions of Soviet Russia.³⁰ The English Government proposed a plan of "assistance" to counter-revolutionary forces in Russia as one of the bases for concerted action with the U.S. Government.

The position occupied by the State Department and set forth in a document of 8 February 1918 essentially meant that any military expedition to Siberia, just as the occupation of all or part of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, should be undertaken as an international cooperative venture and not by one power acting on the authority of the rest.

The U.S. line of preventing any of its allies from becoming more powerful during the course of the intervention was consistently followed by Washington on the greatest variety of pretexts. This tendency was particularly apparent in early 1918 when Lansing, in reference to the French and British governments' agreement to Japanese intervention in Siberia, advised American Ambassador Page in Great Britain that, for a number of reasons, including the pretense of concern for the reaction of the Russian people and references to China's position, he felt that Japan's decision to invade Siberia should not be supported.³¹

On 9 February 1918 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State B. Long noted in a private State Department document that "The Japanese Government has requested exclusive authority to occupy the East China and Amur Railroad." In another secret memorandum received by the State Department on 7 February, the English Government supported Japan's intentions and suggested that the U.S. Government "consider the question of allowing the Japanese Army to occupy the entire Trans-Siberian Railroad." In reply, Long declared that he felt it would be "unwise to agree to Japan's demands that the Trans-Siberian Railroad be put under its exclusive control or to agree to Japan's occupation of part of the territory of Siberia or China."³²

The Entente powers and the United States, fearing the rise of their partners as a result of the planned seizure of political and economic positions in Russia, impatiently awaited the fall of the Soviet regime. "What we are now seeing in Russia is the beginning of a great struggle for its immeasurable

resources of raw materials,"³³ ROSSIYA, the journal of the Anglo-Russian financial community, reported in May 1918. The LONDON FINANCIAL NEWS (November 1918) was even more frank: "Events are increasingly taking on a nature attesting to a tendency toward the establishment of an international protectorate over Russia according to the model and appearance of the British plan for Egypt. This turn of events will convert Russian securities into the cream of the world market."

On 21 February 1918 Ambassador Francis wrote to Secretary of State Lansing from Petrograd, setting forth his views on intervention: "I strongly insist on the need to put Vladivostok under our control and to give Great Britain and France control over Murmansk and Arkhangelsk."³⁴ A few days later, on 25 February 1918, A. Williams, official in the State Department's Far East division, noted the following in a memo to Long: "Japan must not be allowed to dominate in China or carry out the intervention in Siberia on its own. It seems to me that allowing this would mean creating another huge military autocracy and sacrificing the only democratically inclined people in the Far East to it."³⁵ The matter, however, did not hinge on the "democratic people": Washington officials felt that Japan's actions could threaten the interests of the United States.

A warning note was also sounded in statements by Admiral Knight, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, in his messages to Secretary of State Lansing and President Wilson regarding the situation in the Far Eastern regions of Soviet Russia in early 1918: Knight denied the rumors of danger from Germany in the Far East. He declared that the destruction of any significant part of the Allies' military stores in Vladivostok would be "impossible," that there was "absolutely no danger" of their seizure by the Germans and, finally, that there was "no evidence" of any serious German influence on the situation in Siberia.³⁶

American ruling circles could not agree at that time on whether the United States should become involved in the anti-Soviet intervention. Some influential figures warned the Wilson Administration against making this kind of decision; Admiral Knight was one of these.

In spite of all arguments, however, ruling circles in the United States and its allied nations were leading their countries directly into involvement in the anti-Soviet intervention. They were moving from words and discussion to practical steps.

On 4 March 1918 the English Embassy in Washington suggested to the U.S. State Department that an American naval ship be sent to Murmansk for the joint Anglo-American occupation of the city. "A British cruiser has been sent and the British Embassy has been instructed to request the Government of the United States to send one of its own naval ships to join the squadron operating in this region as soon as possible, as the rapid course of events here will brook no delay."³⁷

At that time the U.S. State Department was still associating the commencement of intervention with the beginning of a situation in Russia which would cause representatives of counter-revolutionary forces to turn to the American Government "on behalf of the Russian people" with a request that foreign troops be led onto the territory of the Soviet State. This idea was reflected in the weekly report of the State Department's Far East division to the secretary of state of 6 March 1918, which said that the United States would not intervene in Russia's internal affairs unless it was requested to by "competent authorities."³⁸

The U.S. Government again postponed its participation in the intervention for a short period of time, choosing the most convenient moment for this, balancing the interests of its allies in its policy and striving to prevent any of the Allied powers, particularly Japan in the Far East, from becoming more powerful as a result of the possible division of Soviet territory.

In early 1918, the diplomatic activity of the Entente nations and the United States was finally focused on preparations for the anti-Soviet intervention and on the eradication of differences of opinion and the unification of imperialist efforts in the struggle against Soviet Russia.

Soviet diplomacy countered this imperialist course with an active struggle to implement Lenin's principles of peace, exposing the reactionary purpose of the imperialist plot against socialist Russia and taking important foreign policy steps to reinforce the international position of the young Soviet State.

The Soviet Government's efforts began to produce their first results four months after the October Revolution. On 3 March 1918 a peace treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk by Russia on one side and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the other. During the culmination period from 3 through 15 March 1918, the 12 days between the time when the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was signed and the time of its ratification, the Soviet Government made another attempt to convert the demagogic declarations of the United States and its allies concerning the desire for peace into practical steps and to deprive them of the argument of the Soviet Government's imaginary nonobservance of Allied obligations in the war with Germany.

On 5 March 1918, two days after the "excessively forcible, scandalous and extortionate"³⁹ treaty forced on Soviet Russia by German imperialism was signed, the Soviet Government sent a note to the U.S. Government⁴⁰ through Robins, the head of the American Red Cross Commission, which stated: "In case the All-Russian Congress of Soviets will refuse to ratify the peace treaty with Germany, or if the German Government, breaking the peace treaty, will renew the offensive in order to continue its robbers' raid, or if the Soviet Government will be forced by the actions of Germany to renounce the peace treaty--before or after its ratification--and to renew hostilities--in all these cases it is very important for the military and political plans of the Soviet power for replies to be given to the following questions:

"1. Can the Soviet Government rely on the support of the United States, Great Britain and France in its struggle against Germany?

"2. What kind of support could be furnished in the near future, and on what conditions--military equipment, transportation supplies, living necessities?

"3. What kind of support would be furnished particularly and especially by the United States?"

The note also indicated the need to elucidate Japan's plans concerning the Soviet Far East and to take the proper steps to prevent Japanese aggression: "Should Japan, in consequence of an open or tacit understanding with Germany or without such an understanding, attempt to seize Vladivostok and the East Siberian Railway, which would threaten to cut off Russia from the Pacific Ocean and would greatly impede the concentration of Soviet troops toward the East around the Urals--in such a case what steps would be taken by the other allies, particularly and especially by the United States, to prevent a Japanese landing on our Far East and to insure uninterrupted communications with Russia through the Siberian route?"

The Soviet Government asked the U.S. Government what position its ally, Great Britain, would occupy in light of the possible change in circumstances: "In the opinion of the Government of the United States, to what extent, under the abovementioned circumstances, would aid be assured from Great Britain through Murmansk and Arkhangelsk? What steps could the Government of Great Britain undertake in order to assure this aid and thereby to undermine the foundation of the rumors of the hostile plans against Russia on the part of Great Britain in the near future?" The note concluded with the statement that "All these questions are conditioned with the self-understood assumption that the internal and foreign policies of the Soviet Government will continue to be directed in accord with the principles of international socialism and that the Soviet Government retains its complete independence of all non-socialist governments."⁴¹

During the preparations for the anti-Soviet intervention, American diplomacy consistently adhered to the tactic of delaying responses to Soviet proposals and concealing or misrepresenting the actual position of Soviet Russia in international affairs. The same was true of the reply to the note on 5 March 1918.

R. Robins, who tended to believe that the Wilson Administration had serious intention of waging war together with Soviet Russia against Germany and its allies, did everything within his power to ensure that the note of 5 March 1918 reached Washington. As soon as he received the document he turned it over to a military attache in Petrograd for its dispatch to Washington through Vologda, where the entire diplomatic corps, headed by Francis, was located at that time. When he arrived in Vologda on 8 March 1918, however, Robins learned that the document had not been sent. He again gave Francis

the original note of 5 March and quickly returned to Moscow as he intended to attend the Fourth Special All-Russian Congress of Soviets" beginning in Moscow on 14 March.⁴²

The central issue at the Fourth Congress was the ratification of the Brest Treaty. Robins, who attended the congress, most probably hoped that the treaty would not be ratified and the Wilson Administration would make overtures which would win Soviet Russia over to the side of the United States in the war with Germany. This was the culminating point of his activity in Soviet Russia. He did a great deal to "win the trust of Lenin and other Bolsheviks, he was the only person who provided the American Government with objective information about Russia for almost the entire post-October period. For this entire period, however, the American Government and the Allies took a stand which made it appear that the government with which R. Robins was communicating so closely did not actually exist,"⁴³ recalls A.R. Williams.

The Soviet Government's note of 5 March remained unanswered by the American Government. Declining to respond directly to the Soviet proposals, Wilson sent a demagogic message on behalf of the U.S. Government to the Fourth Special Congress of Soviets on 13 March, in which he stressed the danger emanating from Germany and actually tried to use this as a way of exerting pressure on Soviet Russia, although he painstakingly avoided the slightest reference to Soviet Russia and its government. The message spoke of "Russia and the Russian people" and contained assurances that he, Wilson, was completely willing to give Russia "effective support," but that this support was "not presently within the capability" of the U.S. Government.

Each phrase in this message was calculated to produce a propagandistic effect. The American message actually attested to Wilson's desire to promote the further intensification of the internal political struggle in the Soviet State. The tone and form of the message symbolized Wilson's policy on the "Russian question": it was "conciliatory" in form and anti-Soviet in essence.⁴⁴

In his message, President Wilson completely ignored the questions raised by the Soviet Government in its note of 5 March 1918. He did, however, try to prevent the ratification of the peace treaty. Yale University Professor C. Seymour wrote in his notes on the documents he published from the private papers of Colonel House about the purpose of President Wilson's message to the Fourth Special Congress of Soviets: "The Brest-Litovsk Treaty still had to be ratified by the Congress of Soviets, which was meeting at that time in Moscow. The message to the congress, written in a friendly tone and promising support, could promote the congress' refusal to ratify the treaty."⁴⁵

In reply to Wilson's message, the Fourth Special Congress of Soviets sent him the following telegram on 14 March 1918:

"The congress expresses its appreciation to the American people, and in the first instance to the toiling and exploited classes of the United States of North America, for the expression by President Wilson, through the Congress of Soviets, of sympathy for the Russian people in these days when the Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia is undergoing heavy trials.

"The neutral Russian Soviet Republic avails itself of this communication from President Wilson to express to all those peoples perishing and suffering under the horrors of the imperialist war its warm sympathy and its firm confidence that the happy time is not far distant when the toiling masses of all bourgeois countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialist order of society, which alone is capable of assuring a firm and just peace as well as the cultural and material well-being of all the toilers."⁴⁶

The Entente continued to concentrate on the events in Russia even after the Brest Treaty had been signed. On 16 March 1918 a conference of the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the Entente countries met in London. This occurred the day after Soviet Russia ratified its peace treaty with Germany. On 18 March 1918 the conference published a declaration of the nonrecognition of the Brest Treaty. The nations represented at the conference announced: "Our goals are completely different; we are waging a struggle and intend to prolong it." The issue of anti-Soviet intervention was also discussed at the conference.

British Foreign Secretary Balfour, reporting on the decision adopted by the English, French and Italian heads of state, wired the U.S. Government on 16 March 1918: "I have been instructed to inform the President of the United States of America of conference participants' views on the need for Allied intervention in East Russia.... The conference feels that there is only one remedy--Allied intervention. Both from the standpoint of human resources and from the standpoint of transport facilities, Japan can now do much more in Siberia than France, Italy, America and Great Britain can do in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. This is why the conference believes it is necessary to rely on Japan."

All of those who attended the conference concluded, Balfour went on to say, that "No steps in carrying out this program can be taken without the active support of the United States. Without this support it would be useless to issue an appeal to the Japanese Government. And even if the Japanese Government agreed to act on the beliefs of France, Italy and Great Britain, this demonstration would lose half of its moral value without the support of the government of the United States."⁴⁷

In spite of the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, Soviet Russia's international position remained extremely precarious and tense. The peace achieved with Germany was unstable and carried the threat of new military difficulties. By calling the Brest Treaty a "severe trial," G.V. Chicherin

underscored the fact that "The Soviet Government consciously agreed to the severe trials prepared by the Brest Treaty, knowing that the worker and peasant revolution would be stronger than imperialism and that the respite would signal the way to victory."⁴⁸ By concluding a peace with Germany, Soviet Russia withdrew from the imperialist war and gained the extra time needed for the consolidation of the nation's internal and external positions.

At that time the imperialist powers, tsarist Russia's former allies, embarked upon the course of overt anti-Soviet intervention.

The first attempts at direct armed intervention in Russia's internal affairs took place as early as November 1917. For example, on 24 November 1917 the American flagship, the "USS Brooklyn," sailed into Vladivostok harbor with Admiral Knight, commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet, on board. While he was in Vladivostok, Knight worked energetically on the creation of the so-called "Russo-American committee," which was headed by Russian industrialist Rutkovskiy and the American consul in Vladivostok, Caldwell. Counter-revolutionary forces rallied round the committee. This action, however, did not mark the beginning of intervention and ended when the "USS Brooklyn" had to leave the harbor in late 1917 at the request of the Vladivostok Soviet.

Preparations were made for military intervention by the Entente countries and the United States in February and March 1918 in two directions simultaneously: the Far East and Siberia, as well as the north of the nation.

On 1 March 1918 the "USS Brooklyn" returned to Vladivostok,⁴⁹ where the Japanese man-of-war, the "Iwami," and the British cruiser "Suffolk" were already located; they had sailed into Vladivostok harbor in January 1918. In March they were joined by another Japanese--the cruiser "Asahi."⁵⁰

Also in March 1918, the first formations of foreign troops landed in the north of Soviet Russia: on 9 March 1918 a detachment of the interventionists disembarked from the British cruiser "Glory" in Murmansk, and they were followed several days later by troops from the French "Amehal Aube" and the American cruiser "Olympia."

The Soviet Government resolutely protested the actions of the interventionists, repeatedly reminding the governments of the Entente countries, the United States and even Germany of the possible dangerous consequences of the military invasion of the imperialist powers. On 2 April 1918 G.V. Chicherin sent a special note to Lockhart, Great Britain's diplomatic representative, on this matter.⁵¹

Without responding to any of the Soviet Government's warnings or appeals, the Entente countries instituted hostilities. On 5 April 1918 an Anglo-Japanese landing force disembarked in Vladivostok.⁵² A note sent to the English, French and American representatives in Soviet Russia by the Soviet Government on 6 April 1918 underscored the responsibility of the British, French and U.S. governments for the landing of the Anglo-Japanese troops in

Vladivostok and demanded precise and immediate elucidation of the U.S. and Entente governments' views on the events taking place in Vladivostok.⁵³

In a reply to this note, delivered 8 April 1918 through Robins, the head of the American Red Cross Commission, who was still in Russia, American Ambassador Francis tried to justify the landing of the Entente's military units in Vladivostok by calling it only a "precautionary police action," which supposedly had nothing in common with intervention, and by saying that "The landing of Allied troops is not an action agreed upon by the Allies."⁵⁴ The American ambassador's "explanation" was completely inconsistent with the facts, as the landing of the Anglo-Japanese force in Vladivostok actually resulted from the decision of the London conference of the Entente nations in March 1918, at which participants agreed to call upon Japan and proposed that it begin the intervention in the Far East.⁵⁵

The organizers of the anti-Soviet intervention were united by the common desire of all imperialist forces to suppress the new socialist social system. In the process of organizing the intervention, however, the imperialist powers encountered certain difficulties and problems arising from the objectively determined conflicts between them. These did not only consist in tactical differences of opinion on the means of eliminating the chief danger, which they saw in the reinforcement of Soviet rule in Russia; fundamental differences in the interests of the imperialist states also became apparent in their competitive struggle for the partition and repartition of the world. In April 1918 V.I. Lenin wrote: "The only real, not paper, guarantee of peace for us is the friction between the imperialist powers, which has reached its height and has taken the form, on the one hand, of a resumption of the imperialist slaughter of peoples in the West and, on the other, of extremely fierce imperialist rivalry between Japan and America for dominion over the Great Ocean, and its coastline."⁵⁶

The Entente countries and, in particular, the United States encouraged Japan's expansionist plans for Siberia and the Far East in every way possible but simultaneously took steps to retain control over the actions of the Japanese militarists. On 29 April 1918 U.S. Secretary of State Lansing began negotiating with Viscount Ishii, Japanese ambassador to the United States, for the purpose of determining specific ways of organizing intervention in the Far East through the concerted efforts of the Entente nations, the United States, China and Japan. Ishii confirmed the Japanese Government's willingness to take part in collective intervention and announced that Japan could immediately send out an army of 250,000 and later increase the number to 400,000. It is indicative, however, that the preparations for joint Japanese-American intervention in the Far East concluded with the signing of an agreement in mid-1918 which did not resemble the original announcement. This agreement envisaged equal quotas of 10,000 soldiers apiece for the American and Japanese landing forces. As we know, Japan later did increase the number of its troops in the Soviet Far East to 100,000.⁵⁷ The limitation of the size of American-Japanese interventionist troops was obviously the result of sharp American-Japanese conflicts in the Far East.

In describing the position occupied by Japanese militarism in regard to Soviet Russia, V.I. Lenin wrote: "The Japanese desire to attack Russia is being checked, firstly, by the threat of a movement and rebellion in China and, secondly, some antagonism on the part of America, which fears the rise of Japan and hopes to acquire raw materials from Russia more easily in a time of peace.... There may be a clash between the American bourgeoisie and the Japanese, or the Japanese and the Germans."⁵⁸

Amplifying his thesis concerning inter-imperialist conflicts, V.I. Lenin said in a report on foreign policy at a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet on 14 May 1918: "The basic conflicts between the imperialist powers have resulted in such a merciless struggle that, even though they realize that it is hopeless, neither one group nor the other is capable of arbitrarily escaping the iron grip of this war. Two major conflicts have been determined by the war, and they have determined the current international position of the Socialist Soviet Republic. The first is the extremely fierce struggle between Germany and England on the Western Front.

"The second conflict determining the international position of Russia is the rivalry between Japan and America." Lenin went on to focus attention on the development of the U.S. and Japanese economies, which, in his words, gave rise to a "vast amount of combustible material making the desperate skirmish between these powers for domination of the Pacific Ocean and its coastline inevitable. All of the diplomatic and economic history of the Far East leaves absolutely no room for doubt that it will be impossible to avert the growing sharp conflict between Japan and America on capitalist soil. This conflict, which has temporarily been concealed by Japan's and America's alliance against Germany, is delaying Japanese imperialism's attack on Russia.... The campaign begun against the Soviet Republic (the landing force in Vladivostok and the support of Simenov's band) is being delayed because it threatens to turn the latent conflict between Japan and America into open warfare."⁵⁹ At the same time, the different groupings of imperialist powers, the report stressed, could break up at any moment "if this is required by the interests of sacred private property, sacred rights to concessions, etc. And it is possible that the slightest spark would be enough to blow up the current alliance of these powers, and then these conflicts would no longer be able to serve in our defense."⁶⁰

Lenin's brilliant analysis of the international position of Soviet Russia is a model of thorough and realistic appraisal. Even bourgeois historians who are hostile toward the Soviet State have had to admit this.

Just as V.I. Lenin warned, it was precisely at this time that a substantial regrouping of forces began in the imperialist camp. On 2 May 1918 Francis reported to Lansing from Vologda: "The time has come to begin intervention by the Allies. I have still not abandoned the hope that the Soviets will request it and I am cautiously moving in this direction."⁶¹ According to Francis, the intervention was made necessary in May 1918 by the threat of

Japan's invasion of Soviet Russia in the Far East without U.S. participation and of a German invasion in the West.⁶²

Francis' suggestions were taken into consideration by Lansing, but he felt that the time was not yet ripe for an open announcement of the United States' involvement in the intervention.⁶³

In May 1918 one prominent American diplomat after another suggested that Washington publicly announce the United States' participation in the anti-Soviet intervention. After Francis made his proposal on 16 May, the same idea was expressed by Paul Reinsch, American minister in China.⁶⁴ In May 1918 G. Kennan, prominent American figure of that time, told President Wilson that intervention was "not only strategically desirable but also tactically feasible."⁶⁵ On 30 May Reinsch repeated his insistent call for action: Russia "craves order and will follow those who establish it."⁶⁶

The initiative of Francis and Reinsch met with support in the U.S. State Department. On 1 June 1918 Lansing wrote to Francis that the State Department was working on the preparations for a decision to begin intervention in Soviet Russia, stressing the need to act on the basis of well-considered decisions and to calculate consequences as much as possible. "The Bolsheviks must not be given--and, above all, they must not give--the impression that the Americans are taking part in the intervention or are assisting in it, as this will alienate and arouse the suspicions of liberal elements in the Russian population who do not support the Bolsheviks."⁶⁷

During the preparations for the anti-Soviet intervention, American ruling circles began an extensive anti-Soviet campaign, the main theme of which was the thesis of the alleged pro-German orientation of the Soviet Government and of the arming of German prisoners of war in Siberia by this government. The provocative nature of these "accusations" is even attested to by such documents as the special report compiled by Captain Webster, representative of the American Red Cross, and English Captain Hicks, who were sent to Siberia with a special mission and who submitted a report on 26 April 1918 which totally refuted the groundless accusations made against the Soviet State.

The governments of the United States and the Entente countries supported any sufficiently powerful counter-revolutionary groups in Russia for the purpose of justifying military intervention. President Wilson wrote to Lansing on 18 April 1918: "I would find a memorandum containing all of the information we have about these few pockets of self-government... in Siberia extremely useful. I would support the most representative of these with the greatest pleasure if they could form a government and obtain real power." On 18 May 1918 Wilson made another reference to this issue. He wrote to Lansing: "Keep a close watch on Simenov's actions and find out if it is possible to help him."⁶⁸

The final decision to make the anti-Soviet intervention known to the public was made by the White House in mid-1918, when all of the illusions regarding the existence of sufficiently "representative" counter-revolutionary forces in Soviet Russia turned out to have no basis.

It is indicative that the question of intervention was considered by the U.S. President without the participation of Congress. Wilson did not ask for congressional approval and had no intention of asking for it. The preparation of the specific program of action was assigned to Secretary of War Baker, who arranged for the necessary consultations with military experts. It is also indicative that General Peyton March, U.S. chief of staff, soberly assessed the situation and submitted a report to Baker which essentially said that intervention in Siberia, "assessed as a purely military operation," was "neither practical nor feasible and would be a serious military error."⁶⁹

General March's views, however, did not correspond at all to the feelings and plans of Wilson and Lansing. On 6 July 1918 the final decision was made on U.S. involvement in the anti-Soviet intervention at a meeting in the White House.⁷⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. Yu.V. Lomonosov was one of Russia's few representatives abroad who declared their willingness to work in the interest of Soviet Russia in the United States after the October Revolution.
2. "Arkhib vneshney politiki MID SSSR" [Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (hereafter--AVP SSSR), F. 507, Inv. 4, Dr. 1, C. 8, Sh. 26-28.
3. W.A. Williams, "American Intervention in Russia, 1917-1920," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 4, 1964, p 180.
4. The American Red Cross Commission was sent to Russia at the same time as several others, including economic missions, in July 1917. At that time it was headed by prominent American financier and businessman W.B. Thompson, but by the time of the October Revolution it was headed by R. Robins.
5. G.F. Kennan, "Russia Leaves the War," pp 99-100.
6. "Russian-American Relations," p 60.
7. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1918, Russia," Vol 1, p 282. In his book, "Russia Leaves the War," G. Kennan states that General Judson's letters, in which he set forth his view that the United States should recognize Soviet Russia as a government

existing de facto, never reached the State Department; it was only in 1930, when documents were being edited for the FOREIGN RELATIONS publication, that a request was submitted to the War Department, where Judson's letters were discovered.

8. W.A. Williams writes that Francis was also influenced by the American Army officers Cate and Riggs, who felt that the Bolsheviks would remain in power and that the United States should help them resist the Germans (see W.A. Williams, Op. cit., p 181).
9. R. Robins, just as all of the others who had been in Soviet Russia, was interrogated by a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, headed by Senator Overman. The subcommittee was created in September 1918 to investigate German anti-American activity, and on 4 February 1919 the Senate adopted a resolution to extend this subcommittee's sphere of activity to Soviet Russia as well.
10. "Russian-American Relations," p 65.
11. F. Schuman, "American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917," N.Y., 1928, p 74.
12. L.G. Nikol'nikov, "The Outstanding Victory of Lenin's Strategy and Tactics," Moscow, 1968, p 37.
13. B. Lockhart, "Memoirs of a British Agent," London-New York, 1932.
14. "Russian-American Relations," pp 66-67.
15. Ibid.
16. R. Robins, "Impressions as Told to William Hard," in the book: A.R. Williams, "Lenin: The Man and His Work," N.Y., 1919.
17. A.R. Williams, "Journey Into Revolution," Moscow, 1972, p 213.
18. J. Reed, "Ten Days That Shook the World," Moscow, 1957.
19. A.R. Williams, "Journey Into Revolution," p 215.
20. Ibid., pp 211-212.
21. AVP SSSR, F. 507, Inv. 3, Dr. 1, C. 3, Sh. 43.
22. Ibid., F. 129, Inv. 1, Dr. 1, C. 2, Sh. 41-42.
23. The document is not dated. It appears to have been written in November 1917.

24. AVP SSSR, F. 129, Inv. 1, Dr. 1, C. 2, Sh. 41-42.
25. Ibid., F. 129, Inv. 2, C. 11, Sh. 1-2.
26. Quoted in: M.Ye. Sonkin, "Okno vo vneshniy mir. Ekonomicheskiye svyazi Sovetskogo gosudarstva v 1917-1921 goda" [Window on the Outside World. The Soviet State's Economic Ties in 1917-1921], Moscow, 1964, pp 20-30.
27. W. Churchill, "World Crisis," Moscow, 1932, p 50.
28. See "Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939," first series (1919), Vol III, 1949, pp 369-370.
29. "Papers Relating...", Vol II, pp 29-31; see also "Sovetsko-Amerikanskiye otnosheniya. 1919-1933. Sbornik dokumentov po mezhdunarodnoy politike i mezhdunarodnomu pravu" [Soviet-American Relations, 1919-1933. Collected Documents on International Politics and International Law], Moscow, 1934, No 9, p 7.
30. "Papers Relating...", Vol II, pp 35-36; "Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya. 1919-1933," pp 8-9.
31. "Papers Relating...", Vol II, pp 45-46; "Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya. 1919-1933," p 10.
32. IDA, microfilm records.
33. See A.R. Williams, "Lenin and the October Revolution," Moscow, 1960, p 251 (first published in English in the United States in 1921).
34. "Papers Relating...", Vol I, p 384.
35. IDA, microfilm records.
36. See W.A. Williams, Op. cit., pp 185-186.
37. "Papers Relating...", Vol II, p 469.
38. IDA, microfilm records.
39. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 132.
40. A similar note was sent to all of the Entente powers.
41. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR], Vol I, pp 208-209.

42. See A.R. Williams, "Journey Into Revolution," p 270.
43. Ibid., p 280.
44. See "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," Vol I, p 212.
45. "Intimate Paper of Colonel House," Vol III, pp 279-280.
46. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," Vol I, p 211.
47. "Iz istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov" [From the History of the Civil War in the USSR. Collected Documents and Material], Vol I, Moscow, 1960, p 11.
48. G.V. Chicherin, "Stat'i i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoy politiki" [Articles and Speeches on International Political Issues], Moscow, 1961, p 101.
49. See S. Grigortsevich, "Amerikanskaya i yaponskaya interventsia na sovetskom Dal'nem Vostoke i yeye razgrom" [American and Japanese Intervention in the Soviet Far East and Its Defeat], Moscow, 1957, pp 10-11.
50. "Bor'ba za vlast' Sovetov v Primor'ye (1917-1922). Sbornik dokumentov" [The Struggle for Soviet Rule in Primorskiy Kray (1917-1922). Collected Documents], Vladivostok, 1955, pp 4-5, 66-68.
51. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," Vol I, p 222.
52. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR" [The History of Soviet Foreign Policy], Vol I (1917-1945), Moscow, 1966, p 73.
53. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," Vol I, p 231.
54. Ibid., pp 231-232.
55. "Istoriya diplomatii" [The History of Diplomacy], Vol III, Moscow, 1965, p 122.
56. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., Vol 36, p 168.
57. "Istoriya diplomatii," Vol III, p 128.
58. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., Vol 36, p 324.
59. Ibid., pp 329-330.
60. Ibid., p 330.

61. "Papers Relating...", Vol I, p 519.
62. Ibid., pp 520-521.
63. Ibid., p 526.
64. Quoted in: W.A. Williams, Op. cit., p 188.
65. Ibid., p 189.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p 187.
69. Ibid., p 191.
70. Ibid.

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PUBLIC OPINION AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 71-77

[Article by R. Yu. Volkova]

[Text] Public opinion polls in the United States serve as one of the indicators of the feelings of various groups and social strata in society. Poll results testify that it is mainly economic problems that are now the center of attention for most of American society.

The American public's preoccupation with economic and social problems became quite apparent during the election campaign of 1976. The success of the presidential candidates could be predicted by the degree to which their platforms reflected the feelings of the voters who had suffered serious economic misfortunes during the preceding crisis years. And the main aspect of the polls dealing with economic problems became the assessment of the presidential candidates' ability to solve these problems that were bothering the Americans. According to public opinion polls conducted in 1976, most Americans connected their hopes for improvement in the state of the national economy with J. Carter, and this affected the outcome of the election.

The arrival of a new administration evoked a surge of optimism in this regard. While at the beginning of 1976, the last year of the Republican Administration, 70 percent of the Americans surveyed expected the next 12 months to be a heavy burden on the economy, a Gallup poll conducted in December 1976, after the election, indicated a decrease of 16 percent in the number of pessimists. Employment predictions also became slightly more optimistic (at the beginning of 1976, 57 percent predicted that 1976 would be a year of higher unemployment; at the end of 1976 only 37 percent were certain that the rate of unemployment would rise). As time goes on, however, feelings of depression and pessimism begin to prevail more and more in the United States. What are the reasons for the public's negative reaction to the economic policy of the new administration?

We can understand the reasons for this disillusionment if we look back at the Democrats' campaign promises.

The platform of the Democratic Party promised the Americans a great deal: guaranteed fuller employment (particularly for youth), the curbing of inflation, the improvement of the lot of millions of poor people, etc.

"The Democratic Party offers the right to work and to receive wages guaranteeing a standard of living for all adult Americans who have the desire and ability to work"--statements like this won the support of the voters. The intension to cut the rate of unemployment to 3 percent within 4 years was specifically announced. The Democrats also promised to institute government price controls. "We promise to revise the entire existing tax system in such a way that individuals with high incomes will pay high taxes," while "people with low wages and the unemployed will be guaranteed a living," etc. The Americans were so tired of economic disorder that they wanted to believe even in these traditionally vague campaign speeches.

Within a few months after the new administration began its activity, however, the predictions of those Americans and realistic economists who doubted the ability of the new administration to effectively deal with the crises and other contradictions organically inherent in the U.S. economy began to come true. Now they are stating that not one of the acute economic problems facing the nation has been totally solved. The same economic problems which led to G. Ford's defeat in November 1976 are now facing J. Carter. In addition to this, the public has become much more anxious about inflation and the rising cost of living since the new administration took office. For example, while the results of public opinion polls indicated that 3 weeks prior to the election 47 percent of the Americans felt that the high cost of living was the greatest problem facing the nation, by March 1977 the figure had risen to 58 percent for the nation as a whole and 60 percent for the non-white population.

The tendency toward a constant rise in the cost of living still exists. A Harris poll conducted in October 1977 indicated that 74 percent felt that prices had risen more quickly in 1977 than the year before, while 67 percent expected the rate of rise in 1978 to either be quicker or at least equal to the 1977 rate. These expectations coincided with economic forecasts. For example, in November 1977, the WASHINGTON POST quoted a statement by the head of the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and predicted that the American consumer would pay an average of 6 percent more for food in 1978 than in the past. In connection with this tendency, the Americans have had to economize even more: They are using durable goods longer, buying new clothes less frequently and eating less meat and other foods that are constantly going up in price; many (40 percent, according to a Harris poll of October 1977) are so uncertain about the future that they prefer to save money for a "rainy day" even though many of their daily needs remain unsatisfied.

The high cost of living, unemployment, inflation, the pressure of high taxes and other economic problems have combined to make up an intricate tangle from which the average American can find virtually no escape. The latest public opinion polls indicate that the Americans are criticizing the existing tax system more than ever before. For persons with a low income, taxes are excessive. "The taxpayers are angry," declared U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. More than half of the persons surveyed, according to a Harris poll, feel that their families have reached a crucial point in the payment of taxes," and the number of persons expressing this opinion is now 12 percent higher than in 1974--the year when the last economic crisis in the United States reached its height; 70 percent of the persons surveyed feel that taxes are "excessively high." Attitudes toward the current system of taxation can be seen in the following table, compiled on the basis of a Harris poll conducted last year. The table reflects answers to the question: With which of the following typical views do you agree or disagree?

Table 1

In %

Most widespread views	Agree	Disagree	Undecided
The burden of high taxes is borne by the poor			
1977	87	9	4
1974	88	9	3
1969	84	10	6
The current tax system gives real advantages to the rich			
1977	84	10	6
The people in power do not know how much taxes cause people like me to suffer			
1977	73	19	8
1974	64	28	8
1969	67	22	11
I am disturbed by the way the government is spending my money			
1977	73	17	10
1974	71	18	11
1969	67	21	12
High taxes have a devastating effect on my standard of living			
1977	69	25	6
1974	61	33	6
1969	65	28	7

J. Carter talked about tax reform in his campaign speeches. "The current tax structure is a disgrace," he said at that time. "It is simply charity for the rich." According to Carter, more than half of all the tax benefits offered by the government are split up among the richest 14 percent in the nation. The tax program Carter proposed was part of a 2-year comprehensive program of economic recovery; ruling circles planned to overcome crises by means of tax cuts and, consequently, an increase in consumer demand. They underscored the fact that people with low incomes should be given considerable advantages. Naturally, the monopolies were also to receive benefits, but the system of cuts in corporate taxes proposed at that time emphasized the stimulation of small enterprises as well as large ones.

In January 1977 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT printed selected statements by Americans who were asked what they expected from the new President. For example, according to E. Bartoe, a railroad worker from Toledo, J. Carter was supposed to concentrate on the average American who worked hard and was burdened with a family and who, therefore, was supposed to be granted larger tax deductions.

The dissatisfaction of small owners was expressed by E. Huggler, owner of an appliance store in Indianapolis: "Small businessmen feel that they have been deceived. Carter should give us the same tax deductions as the large corporations."

C. Masker, miner from West Virginia, said: "People with an average income are tortured by taxes until they die." In his opinion, the large corporations should pay taxes in amounts that would lighten the burden of the other taxpayers.

If we move away from the objective content of the tax reform promised by President J. Carter (as this is a subject requiring special analysis)¹ and turn to the reaction of the public to this reform, it immediately becomes apparent that many Americans already had serious doubts a year ago as to the possibility of its realization. The April (1977) Harris poll showed that 41 percent of the Americans did not believe that the new President would be able to carry out his promises and revise the tax system and 15 percent were not certain that he could do this. In December 1977 the NEW YORK POST published the following results of a poll conducted by the Harris service: 60 percent of the respondents--the highest number since the polls began--felt that "the people controlling the nation actually do not care what happens to the average American" and 77 percent agreed that "the tax laws were written up to help the rich and not the average citizen."

As we recall, J. Carter was of this opinion himself in 1976, but after he was elected President he shelved his recommendations on tax reform--at least until 1978. Besides this, as the NEW YORK TIMES reported in November 1977, Secretary of the Treasury M. Blumenthal has made it known that even in 1978 the government will confine itself to granting tax benefits for the stimulation of economic activity instead of carrying out the reform about which

1. See the commentary by Yu. K. Bobrakov in No 4 for 1978--Editor's note.

J. Carter had so much to say during his campaign and his first year in the White House. The administration's promise to return 50 dollars to each taxpayer from the sum collected for 1977 has also been "forgotten." And what lies ahead includes, in particular, the threat of a considerable increase in gasoline taxes.

Objections to this kind of juggling with promises have even been heard in the U.S. Congress. Senator E. Muskie, for example, noted that the administration's cancellation of the promised 50-dollar tax cut for the year "will create a credibility gap in government."

Unemployment is still the major socioeconomic problem. While prior to the election of the new President 31 percent of the Americans called unemployment the "major unsolved problem," by March 1977 39 percent of all respondents and 51 percent of the non-white American population regarded this problem as the "scourge of the nation." According to forecasts, however, the rate of unemployment will still be high even with favorable development in market conditions and steady economic recovery.

President J. Carter had good reason to declare that the fight against unemployment would be his primary task in the economic sphere. In a message to Congress in February 1977, the President cited the following figures: "When I took office, I learned that 7.5 million Americans had no jobs, 1.4 million had to work part-time and another million had left the labor force because of their difficulty in finding a job."

The chief difference between Carter's economic program and the steps taken by the previous administration was that his program envisaged the allocation of much more substantial funds for public works and the creation of new jobs. The original estimates of the funds needed for this program, however, were repeatedly cut.

In April 1977, the rate of unemployment was somewhat lower than during previous months; according to statistics this was the lowest level of unemployment in almost 2.5 years. The number of unemployed decreased by 548,000, reaching 90 million. But this did not solve the unemployment problem, as it did not fall below the 7-percent level; millions of able-bodied Americans were left without work. For this reason, a Harris poll conducted the same month indicated that public opinion did not share the optimistic views of some economists and statisticians, since people base their opinions on reality, on their own personal situation, and not on "average" figures. Moreover, 37 percent of the respondents felt that unemployment was even higher than in 1976, 36 percent felt that it had remained the same and only 19 percent believed that positive changes had taken place.

At the beginning of 1977 the President promised to reduce unemployment to a nationwide average of 6 percent by the end of the year. Statistics show, however, that the level of unemployment in December 1977 was the same as it had been in the spring--around 7 percent of the total labor force. As we can see from the table, only its internal structure changed.

Table 2

Level of Unemployment in the United States

Population group	Percentage of labor force in the particular group	
	February 1977	December 1977
White adults	6.7	6.1
Black adults	12.5	15
White minors	18.1	14.8
Black minors	36.1	40

A Harris poll conducted in December 1977 showed that Americans were still extremely worried about the unemployment problem: 41 percent predicted that the level of unemployment would remain the same in 1978, while 29 percent expected a further rise.

As the data of polls testify, the problem of employment is relegating all of the public's other causes for worry to a position of secondary importance. The average worker is much less worried about other problems, even such issues as the energy crisis and other economic difficulties facing the nation. For example, D. Laborde, representative of the carpenters' unions in New Orleans, told newsmen: "We need jobs. Unemployment is a real problem for Americans. Instead of lowering our taxes, it would be better to provide people with work. This would save many more people." This is also the view of J. Moritz, college senior and economist, for whom this problem will soon (just as for other graduates) become particularly crucial: "The unemployment problem has to be solved first, even if this causes a rise in inflation." These and similar statements by average Americans were cited by U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.

The particularly crucial nature of the problem of unemployment for black Americans and youth was referred to in many statements by J. Carter during his campaign. Willard Wirtz, former secretary of labor and expert on labor resources, believes that even if unemployment should be considerably reduced on the whole within the near future, it will remain on just as high a level for teenagers. Many experts on juvenile affairs feel that the presence of 2 million teenagers who are not going to school and do not have jobs is the major cause of crime in the nation and, in addition to this, an unprecedented waste of human resources for which there is no excuse.

The problem of unemployment among youth, incidentally, is nothing new for America. In the 1930's it was partially solved by the creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps, within the framework of which youthful citizens could gain experience in the labor sphere and earn their own money for the first time. A Gallup poll conducted in January 1977 showed that 85 percent of the Americans feel that the federal government should support

the plan for the creation of this kind of youth corps. Experts have confirmed that if J. Carter were to begin implementing this program, the rise in unemployment would be considerably reduced. As yet, however, the fate of unemployed youth is still one of the most acute problems of the day.

In the original program of action he submitted to Congress, J. Carter also made a number of suggestions concerning the improvement of the social security system. At the same time, however, the administration has continued to adhere to the course of higher defense expenditures, submitting a defense budget of 120.3 billion dollars. Naturally, this has caused the American general public to doubt that this would make enough funds available for carrying out the program for the improvement of social security.

The main issue here is pension security. We know that the pension system in the United States is financed mainly through regular contributions to pension funds by workers. In his message to Congress on problems in social security, J. Carter cited data from a report by the Pension Fund Trustee Council and said that the pension system required immediate financial assistance: As a result of the high unemployment level of recent years, contributions to this fund have decreased sharply; for several years now, expenditures have exceeded income, and reserves could be depleted soon. The President, however, did not propose any significant reform of the pension system.²

The results of a TIME magazine survey conducted in June 1977 show that 75 percent of the respondents were worried that there would be no money left in the social security fund by the time they retired; 85 agreed that "Congress will still be discussing the issue" 5-10 years from now.

How do the Americans assess the first year of the new administration's activity in the economic sphere in general?

Despite the wave of optimism that accompanied Carter's inauguration, his economic program has not been popular with a large part of the population since the very first days of the Democratic Administration: when it was first announced, only 49 percent supported it while 30 percent were against it. There was already a noticeable change in the public mood after the first few months of the new administration's activity: In the summer of 1977, as the NEW YORK POST reported, 48 percent were opposed to the program. In October 1977 the proportion of those dissatisfied with the government's economic policy had grown, according to a Harris poll, to 66 percent. As for specific sections of this program, such as "Lowering the Cost of Living" and "Reducing the Rate of Unemployment," the proportion of respondents expressing dissatisfaction reached 76 and 74 percent respectively.

2. For a more detailed discussion, see Ye. P. Kassirova's comments in issue No 5 of our journal--Editor's note.

G. Shultz, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, said in an interview published by TIME magazine in November 1977: "The latest results in the economic development of the United States in many respects are the object of envy for some industrial nations. Judging by all indications, however, there is less faith in the future health of the American economy in America than abroad." A Harris poll conducted in October 1977 showed that 54 percent felt that the nation was still experiencing an economic recession--a view which is not shared by economists but attests to the scales of public alarm.

The reduced support for the Carter Administration in the economic sphere could have serious consequences for the Democrats. In June 1977 the NEW YORK POST reported: "It is possible that the most severe ordeal for the Democratic President in the White House will be the public's continued negative reaction to what Carter is doing in the economic sphere." The President's problem is made more difficult by the fact that up to now most of his support has come from population groups with average and low incomes. It is precisely this part of the population, however, that is now most disturbed by the state of the economy, as it is most severely affected by rising prices and the still high level of unemployment.

Moreover, an increasingly large part of the average American public has recently began to believe that "privileged groups receive more from the government than the people" (according to a Harris poll conducted in December 1977, 76 percent agreed with this opinion). The deeply entrenched belief of the existence of different criteria for privileged and unprivileged Americans became even stronger as a result of the matter involving B. Lance.³

Dissatisfaction with the degree to which the present administration is acting inconsistently and forgetting its promises is growing, not only in the general public, but also in ruling circles, and this does not depend on the party affiliation of politicians and public figures in the United States. Senator G. McGovern, himself a Democrat, made the following somewhat sarcastic comment on this matter: "When you analyze U.S. economic policy, you sometimes forget who won last fall's election." A Republican leader--Chairman B. Brock of the national committee of this party--made an even more cutting remark in November 1977: "Now that the rate of inflation is reaching the two-figure mark and unemployment continues to stay at almost 7 percent, it is becoming increasingly obvious to the American people that the Carter Administration is not capable of managing the nation's economy effectively."

The inability of the new administration to totally solve America's pressing socioeconomic problems will continue to engender pessimistic feelings in the nation.

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3. See the article by I. I. Petrov in No 1 for 1978--Editor's note.

THE INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION: HOW THE 'CIA CASE' WAS CLOSED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 77-81

[Article by V. A. Linnik]

[Text] The details of the sensational story about the improper activities of the Central Intelligence Agency have occupied a permanent place on the pages of the world press for several years now. The public has learned about the almost 900 "paramilitary" CIA operations conducted overseas to "destabilize" regimes displeasing the U.S. Government, about the CIA's organization and execution of attempted assassinations of foreign political figures, about its experiments in the use of chemical and radioactive substances on people, about its violation of the confidential nature of the postal correspondence of Americans, about its surveillance of the anti-war movement.... The list of the CIA's "transgressions," which have become a matter of public knowledge, has turned out to be quite long and eloquent.

The investigation of these abuses, which dragged on for almost 2 years, the public criticism of the intelligence agency, which has always been "above suspicion," the game of "leap-frog" in its upper echelon (in 5 years, 5 directors came and went!) and, finally, the CIA's loss of prestige--all of these evoked extremely serious worries in official U.S. circles.

Finally, President J. Carter announced a reorganization of the U.S. intelligence services -- the second such reorganization in the last two and a half years.

This move had a double purpose: in the first place, to close the last page on the "CIA case" and thereby end the period of prolonged political scandals, which have been the noisiest in U.S. history (this "CIA case" occupied one of the central positions among the scandals) and, in the second place, to try to regain the past prestige and increase the effectiveness of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. "The activities of our intelligence must be adapted to the new times and its operations must be modernized"--this, according to Admiral S. Turner, current CIA director, constitutes the essence of the changes. What practical form did they take?

First of all, J. Carter's plan envisages the preservation of the organizational structure of the intelligence service, which took shape as a result of President Ford's reorganization of February 1976. Let us recall that after the last reorganization the Committee on Foreign Intelligence became the Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council, and the Operations Advisory Group which replaced the "40 Committee" by Ford's decision was named the Special Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council.

Now, just as during the Republican Administration, the intelligence activities of the Policy Review Committee are supervised by the director of central intelligence (he is also director of the CIA). This committee is made up of the vice-president, the secretaries of state, the treasury and defense, the President's national security adviser and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee is responsible for determining the sequence in which intelligence tasks will be carried out, guaranteeing financing for intelligence within the framework of the budget and evaluating the results of intelligence data analysis.

Just as before, the Special Coordinating Committee, which is headed by the President's national security adviser, will continue to study and submit to the President recommendations on the most important, from the standpoint of "security interests," intelligence operations and, when necessary, recommendations on activities connected with the collection of intelligence. This committee will consist of members of the National Security Council, as well as other specially chosen high-level officials. The committee will coordinate all counterintelligence operations, which have been carried out to date by many separate organizations, including the CIA, the Department of the Treasury, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Two new interdepartmental administrative units were created in 1976 to set the specific operational duties of each of the intelligence agencies. These two units will remain in existence after the current reorganization. These are the National Intelligence Tasking Center, which functions in peacetime under the supervision of the director of central intelligence or the secretary of defense and is responsible for coordinating and overseeing the implementation of "nationwide" programs for the collection of intelligence, and a national council concerned with the foreign aspects of intelligence activity, which is made up of representatives of the head agencies of intelligence organizations. It serves the director of central intelligence as an advisory agency.

From now on, the powers of the CIA director (he is also the director of central intelligence) will be much broader. For the first time he will have the right to make up a single budget for all U.S. intelligence agencies. This is quite important, as the budget of the CIA alone constitutes slightly more than 10 percent of all federal allocations for intelligence activity, amounting to approximately 7 billion dollars a year. Admiral S. Turner will also have the right to assign jobs to all U.S. intelligence agencies and

make appointments in them. But the operational and practical activities of these services will still be supervised by their former heads, and this is probably the only factor that, as the American press has pointed out, has kept Turner from becoming the "tsar of intelligence."

The reorganizers had to give consideration to the political climate in the nation after the investigation of the CIA's abuse of power, the post-Watergate mood of the public and their own declarations in favor of a new type of "open" government.

For this reason, approximately a third of the President's executive order on the reorganization is devoted to the list of widely publicized "restrictions" which will be imposed from now on on the activities of intelligence activities in connection with confidential operations, the electronic surveillance of American citizens and so forth. In actuality, however, all of these restrictions are accompanied by stipulations which nullify them, and S. Turner's public interpretation of the premises of the new law on the mass media proved once again that these changes are only of a formal nature. For example, the new order categorically prohibits the planning and execution of assassinations. But..."in some extreme situation," the CIA director commented on this statement, "when it is probable that the assassination of a person could be justified in the name of good, we could most likely convince the President to make an exception." The agency does not plan to give up its paramilitary operations either: It is simply that the CIA's "intervention" in the affairs of other countries, as Admiral Turner states, will now occupy a "more modest place."

The reorganization presupposes augmentation of the role of the attorney general, who is supposed to approve each specific case of electronic or other surveillance sanctioned by the President. According to experts, this requirement is hardly feasible. The President's order does not impose any restrictions on the CIA's sharply criticized practice of using journalists, students and the clergy in the capacity of "unofficial" or official agents. The only new requirement is that CIA personnel must disclose their connection with the intelligence agency when they establish contacts with potential "sources of information."

During the loud debates over CIA activities, much was said about the need for stronger control by the legislative branch over intelligence agencies. The official explanation of the CIA's abuses consisted precisely in arguments concerning the absence or ineffectiveness of this kind of control in the past. In his book, "The Accountability of Power," W. Mondale, the current vice-president of the United States, called for the reinforcement of Congress' role in ensuring the "legitimacy of the activities of intelligence agencies" and improving the quality of the legislators' "constant supervision" of these activities.

Nonetheless, the latest reorganization has added little to the previous--and extremely insignificant--opportunities and methods for accomplishing this kind of supervision. In the first place, effective control by Congress

over the activities of intelligence agencies, according to the legislators themselves, would require that they regularly familiarize themselves with the basic working documents of the "intelligence community." The actual possibility of gaining access to these secret documents, however, is, as observers have noted, unlikely. Moreover, even if this kind of access were granted to a concerned legislator, he would still have to pay the price of silence for this. This means that the members of Congress lose their most important trump card--the possibility of making this information public and appealing to public opinion for the purpose of preventing potential abuses. And this is not all. From now on, the group of legislators invested with the right to control the activities of intelligence agencies will become even smaller. Whereas in the past (when congressional control left, according to general opinion, "much to be desired") there were six "oversight" committees, this function has now actually been assigned to only two select Senate and House committees.

The purpose of the reorganization boils down to the more centralized administration of intelligence: This was precisely the goal of the last and current presidents' reforms. Placing the intelligence services directly under the jurisdiction of the President, according to the plans of the reorganizers, was supposed to prevent the heads of the services from "taking the law into their own hands." The "arbitrariness" of the former intelligence chiefs served, incidentally, as one of the most widespread official explanations of the misuse of intelligence: The heads of these services were supposedly working against the official line of the White House. But how close is this version to the truth?

As the Pike Commission Report noted, the CIA, in particular, "did not act arbitrarily at all and responded quite quickly to the instructions of the President." The Senate commission made a similar statement, that the intelligence agencies "frequently abused their power at the urging of top-level representatives of the executive branch and Congress" and only "sometimes (!) initiated illegal actions on their own, later concealing them" (from these "top-level leaders"). We know, for example, that the CIA-organized invasion of Cuba in 1961 was sanctioned by D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy, that L. Johnson personally approved Operation Phoenix, during the course of which around 20,000 supporters of the National Liberation Front were killed in South Vietnam, and so forth.

For this reason, the stronger centralization of the administration of the "intelligence community" does not in itself, naturally, guarantee that these abuses will not reoccur. On the other hand, this will give Admiral Turner more authority than any of his predecessors in the post of CIA director--enough authority, in principle, to promote the development of the tendency in question toward "arbitrariness."

Finally, there is one other point that deserves consideration. This is the very manner in which the "CIA case" was handled.

It has been noted that the administration has various ways of escaping embarrassing situations: These include, for example, silence or prevarication. Washington's favorite methods have recently also included "public confession." From now on, no one will say as much about any particular abuse or say it as eloquently as the representatives of the official machine themselves; in doing this, however, they will be pursuing their own, far from unselfish goals. In these "revealing" statements, volume gets in the way of meaning, and this makes it all the more difficult to keep an eye on the truth in the flow of information with which the public is deluged. During the course of investigations, empty bustle is represented as unprecedented energy on the part of "guardians of the public interest," insignificant reorganizations are passed off as reforms of profound significance, and political noise is called sincerity in the "communication between the authorities and the public." As a result, the public mind is lulled to sleep.

Getting down to basics, the ruling class has displayed enviable unanimity in its attitude toward the CIA. For example, during the course of the investigations which gave rise to the reorganization in question, the "concerned" legislators frankly underscored their desire to "restore the credibility, good name and effectiveness of the intelligence services so that they might serve the nation better in the future."

At present, the President's executive order on reorganization is in Congress, where it is expected to acquire the force of law after negligible changes have been made.

The preamble to the report of the Church Commission on the activities of the intelligence services contains a noteworthy warning: "Merely making the facts of what has occurred in the past known to the public will not prevent reoccurrences (of the same--V. L.) in the future." Nonetheless, the case essentially ended with just "making the facts known to the public" and, moreover, in regard to the CIA, only a small part of the agency's activity was disclosed. The President's proposed reorganization of the structure of control over intelligence agencies demonstrated the cosmetic nature of all of this noisily staged operation to "eliminate abuses."

The matter ultimately boiled down to the dismissal of a few persons who had compromised themselves the most, to a change in the emphasis on some aspects of public propaganda on the activities of the agency, and to attempts to renovate the somewhat tarnished halo of the American "intelligence community."

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PROFESSOR WINTON SOLBERG LECTURING IN MOSCOW

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[Interview with Professor Winton Solberg, instructor at the University of Illinois, by V. A. Voyna, correspondent]

[Text] Professor Winton Solberg teaches at the University of Illinois. He is famous for his works on U.S. history. On the day when our correspondent, V. A. Voyna, interviewed him, Professor Solberg, who came to our nation in accordance with an agreement on scientific cooperation between our two countries, had read half of a special course on the history of political parties in the United States to students at the Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov.

Question: How did it happen, Professor, that you left Illinois to teach in Moscow? Did this come as a surprise to you?

Answer: Oh, no. I had dreamed about this trip for many years. When I was still a student at Harvard, I enjoyed Russian history, but this is not all. It is not good for a historian to only know the complete history of his own country. He takes the risk of remaining an expert in only one field. Besides this, his lectures prepare future generations of historians, so this kind of onesidedness is dangerous. For this reason, I try to travel a great deal and once taught students from different countries in Italy, at a branch of the American Johns Hopkins University in Bologna. But coming to your country was my secret desire. The statements I heard about this exchange program were superlative: Everyone said that this was first-class work for an instructor and that the students were well prepared and well read. And I started working on becoming part of the program. It was not easy to arrange for another instructor to replace me temporarily, all of my affairs had to be postponed for half a year, and the trip had to be organized in such a way that my children came with me and my wife joined us later; all of this has been expensive and "inconvenient," as I am taking a cut in pay, but I cannot complain: The invaluable opportunity to supplement my education and my knowledge about the world has completely made up for this.

Question: How is your course organized?

Answer: The course is called "The History of American Political Parties, 1790-1865." Some other American participant in the exchange program can later continue the course up to the present day. My job only consists in discussing the causes of the political struggle of the parties and analyzing events in party history from this standpoint up to the end of the Civil War. In addition to the lecture course, I meet with small groups of three or four for individual consultations once a week. Judging by all indications, they are learning the material quite well, and the exam will, hopefully, corroborate this. Each student can select a particular topic in advance for in-depth study; during the exam, I will concentrate on this topic in the questions I ask him. More than 20 students studying U.S. history signed up for my classes, but approximately 65 to 70 have attended the lectures. Excellent contact has been established and my audience is attentive and grateful to the instructor. The students know English so there is no language barrier.

Question: How would you describe our students?

Answer: First of all, I have found that they know a great deal about the United States, our culture, our literature and even our sports. Our students cannot boast of the same kind of knowledge of the USSR.

Your young people (just as, incidentally, everyone else I meet) are quite friendly and warm, they are not afraid to show their feelings and they are glad to offer their services and assistance to a guest.

My job is easy. I do not have to teach an introductory course. I talk to a well-prepared and serious audience which is also creatively inclined: It is precisely this creative and discerning spirit that stimulates me as a teacher.

Question: You remarked that you are engaging in "self-education" in Moscow.

Answer: To begin with, I am studying the Russian language here. Naturally, I am drawn to the museums, exhibits, theaters and the abundance of culture and art. I have to spend a great deal of time in libraries; they, incidentally, contain a vast amount of literature on U.S. history. I get a great deal out of meetings with my colleagues. But probably the most important thing is the material I am collecting on the organization of higher education and scientific research in the USSR, on the policy of your government and society in this sphere and on the specific role played by universities and your scientific research institutes (in our country, as you probably know, this work is mainly done by the universities). There are significant differences here, and I am interested in learning about them. Higher education is one of the constant areas of my scientific interests; incidentally, I wrote a work on the history of the University of Illinois.

I would like to add that I am preparing to present a number of other lectures in Moscow (in particular, at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies) and at Leningrad University.

Question: What are your other areas of interest as a scholar?

Answer: Above all, these are the history of sociopolitical thought, religion, culture, science, beginning with 17th-century Puritanism, the Age of Enlightenment and the period during which the American Government took form--these are the subjects of my books. Incidentally, "The Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union of the United States," which I edited and supplied with a foreword, is known to my students in Moscow. This was a pleasant surprise!

In brief, I am interested in the American intellectual tradition--throughout U.S. history, but particularly in the earliest period.

Question: You fought in the war.

Answer: Yes, I served in the Army from the beginning of 1943 to the summer of 1946. As an infantry officer I was involved in battles on the Western Front and I celebrated the end of the war on the bank of the Elbe, just across from a formation of Russian troops. I was in Nuremberg during the trials of the chief war criminals. After the war I taught at the West Point Military Academy and then at Yale, in the famous Macalester College. Since 1961 I have been working at the University of Illinois.

Question: How do you evaluate the cooperation between scholars in the USSR and the United States?

Answer: Scholars must understand one another and speak the same language, one that is easily understood by all. This calls for trips, personal contacts and a free atmosphere of cooperation. All of this leads to a great deal of mutual understanding between people and countries. I am glad that I am contributing to the growing cooperation between the historians of our two nations and that I am involved in a program which serves precisely this purpose.

Moscow State University Professor N. V. Sivachev was present when our correspondent talked with Professor Solberg. The students in the School of History, he said, are quite interested in Professor Solberg's lectures. Besides the fact that these lectures are informative and entertaining, they provide opportunities for discussion and the lively exchange of opinions: It is understandable that the views of Soviet and American historians differ in many respects, but an exchange of opinions is extremely useful, and this is probably one of the reasons for the great popularity of the course in the history of American political parties. The teaching of courses of this kind at Moscow University is no longer an innovation; they now constitute a regular part of the curriculum.

THE STORY OF THE FEDERAL PROGRAM INFORMATION BILL

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pp 84-88

[Article by A. A. Voronkov and G. B. Kochetkov]

[Text] The efficient use of federal budget funds is one of the main problems over which a fierce internal political struggle is developing in the United States. Questions about where the taxpayers' money goes and what the real "return" on federal programs and measures is arise constantly. And the degree to which Washington's official representatives answer these questions largely demonstrates the degree to which the American Government is actually "open"--that is, accessible to each American, as propaganda would have it. In this sense, the story of the Federal Program Information Act of 1977 is characteristic for the United States.

The fact is that a group of senators in the U.S. Congress has been fighting for around 10 years now for the passage of a bill which would give the public and representatives of local government easier access to information on the distribution of funds categorized as "financial aid," as well as on the impact of their use. The matter concerns no less than 71 billion dollars earmarked for this purpose in the federal budget for fiscal year 1978 alone. The proposal was initiated by Senator William Roth, Jr. from Delaware. He was later joined by E. Kennedy, E. Muskie, C. Percy and L. Chiles. The discussion of the bill in various committees and subcommittees on Capitol Hill revealed the exceptional importance of the measures proposed. Nonetheless, Congress shelved each successive variant of the bill.

Why is the highest legislative body in the United States so stubbornly opposing measures which could, according to experts, lead only to obvious advantages by guaranteeing the "efficient and regularly acquisition of complete, precise and timely information on federal assistance programs"? Before we answer this question, we must look at the content and basic purpose of the bill and the existing mechanism for the distribution of these funds.¹

In the latest variant of the bill (1977), the term "federal assistance program" is used to signify any function of a federal agency involving the transfer of property, the offer of financial resources or the rendering of services to various organizations (including states, counties, cities, communities and so forth) and private individuals.² Most federal subsidies are used for construction, transportation, trade, the efficient use of

natural resources, the financing of the socioeconomic measures of local governments and so forth. In recent years, the number of programs of this kind has risen, exceeding 1,100 in the 1977 fiscal year.³

These programs are executed by 52 federal departments and "independent" agencies, each of which is guided by its own rules and instructions concerning the granting of funds, the forms of their use, etc. The many attempts to establish a single mechanism for the administration of these programs within the framework of the widely publicized systems of "planning-programming-budgeting," "goal-oriented management" and others have not led to any significant improvement in the process of administration. The United States' achievements in the field of information technology have not been used to a sufficient degree here either.

Debates concerning innovations in public administration never cease in Congress. The supporters of these proposals are attempting to combat confusion and chaos in program administration and are striving to increase the effectiveness of federal spending. These problems are of a general nature, but there are also specific ones connected with federal subsidy programs, the essence of which is the following. Each of the programs of this type has a complex internal structure stipulated by corresponding legislation. The "applicants" for federal assistance (these are usually the governments of states, counties, cities, etc.) can receive funds to finance the same undertaking from various programs executed by different agencies. The classification of these programs (the number of which, as we have already noted, exceeds 1,100) would be extremely difficult. Without special knowledge and a great deal of experience in government work, this task is virtually impracticable. Another problem arising for local government employees is due to the complexity of the procedure for requesting assistance, the conditions of eligibility and the inadequacy of information about the sequence in which the matter is handled by all of the necessary agents. Quite frequently, the mayor of a small town knows virtually nothing about the fate of his application until the time when the final decision is made. The excessive complexity of the mechanism for granting federal assistance creates favorable conditions for various types of mismanagement, favoritism in the distribution of budget funds, political and financial maneuvers, etc.

The expansion of assistance programs and, consequently, the increasing dependence of local governments on federal subsidies on the one hand and the increasing difficulty involved in the acquisition of funds on the other have led to a situation in which the number of different lobbies in Washington increased rapidly in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Their distinctive feature is the fact that, in this case, the lobbyist working in government agencies is also representing government agencies, but on a lower level. This type of lobbying, just as "business" lobbying, is organizationally accomplished through representation in the capital and through various associations. In 1977 more than 20 states and 50 cities in the United States already had their own representatives in Washington, who were supposed to maintain contact with federal agency personnel and congressmen and provide their patrons with information on new assistance programs, changes

in existing programs, the size of the administration's allocations for assistance and new tendencies in economic policy and the administration of federal programs.⁴

Not all local governments, however, could allow themselves the luxury of supporting a highly paid specialist in Washington. To help many municipal governments over this financial barrier, one influential lobby, the National Urban League, a confederation of U.S. mayors, set up a special office in 1966 to offer its services in pushing through the federal assistance applications of small cities. At this same time, another lobbyist organization, the National Association of County Governments, created its own specialized agency--a council of intergovernmental coordinators made up of local government employees responsible for the coordination and supervision of all federal and state programs implemented on the county level. The council's chief task consists in arranging for the mutual exchange of information on opportunities for federal budget assistance.⁵ This entire complex and ramified system constitutes a kind of filter of the information passing from the federal government to the consumer and does not aid in clarifying the total picture but even works in the opposite direction, introducing even more confusion. "It is hard to believe that the public and local government employees cannot find out what types of federal assistance are available to them," Senator W. Roth, one of the authors of the bill, had to admit, "but this is actually the case."⁶

The difficulty of acquiring information on these programs, its complicated nature, the lengthy decision-making process and the virtual absence of coordination and instructions on execution make the realization of any federal initiative excessively troublesome. The National Conference of State Governors, the leading lobby of government officials, had to admit in 1976 that many heads of local governments do not even try to apply for federal subsidies because they do not have enough time and resources to compete on an equal level with "professional applicants for subsidies." At the same time, the U.S. Congress, which has a powerful instrument of influence and control (the allocation of funds for government programs), has still not passed any kind of significant legislation to change the current state of affairs.

The general opinion is that there are two fundamental approaches to putting the administration of assistance programs in order. The first approach--with the goal of eliminating shortcomings of an administrative nature--is reflected in proposals concerning the improvement of coordination and contacts between federal and local agencies, the simplification of the system of programs by combining similar measures and eliminating duplicate functions, and so forth. According to American experts, much can be done in this field. For example, the "public health" section of the 1976 catalog lists 302 different programs supervised by 11 federal agencies. The same is true of other sections. The data of many studies conducted by the General Accounting Office attest to the poor coordination or even related programs executed by the same agency.

The extensive use of the new information technology is seen as another way of crossing bureaucratic barriers. According to experts, the United States now has every opportunity to completely solve the problem of providing local government with the data they require and establishing thorough control over the execution of programs. The efforts of the group of senators headed by W. Roth are aimed precisely at making use of these opportunities. Their bill is supposed to give government employees (particularly on the state and local levels) and the public broader access to information on federal assistance programs. In its latest form (1977), the bill contains the following proposals. First of all, it envisages the creation of a center for information on federal programs within the framework of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This center will be responsible for collecting, storing and processing information on federal assistance programs and providing interested parties with all of the information they need. In particular, this information will include the identification data of each program (its name, status of implementation, controlling agency and assigned number); a description of the program, including its goals and the types of activity financed within its framework; a description of the eligibility requirements for "applicants" for federal assistance, as well as the conditions of its acquisition; financial data on each program; a list of programs providing the same types of assistance.

The bill then proposes the creation of a centralized information-retrieval system, which is intended to give the public and the employees of state and local government easier access to all necessary data on federal assistance programs. The prototype and first step in the creation of this kind of system is to be the automated federal assistance program retrieval system now functioning within the U.S. Department of Agriculture and constructed on the basis of the dialog principle. It provides all interested parties with standard information on programs through a system of terminals (situated in 200 geographic locations in the United States) and by telephone. The system has proved to be useful and effective: On the average, it processes 300 requests each month, and the cost of each is only 2-3 dollars.⁸

In addition, the considerable future expansion of the capabilities of the retrieval system has been proposed. For example, some additional work on the system could permit the integration of program information on all decisions of a financial nature made in each federal agency. By keeping an eye on federal spending, the system could issue regular reports on the distribution of program allocations in terms of items, on the number and amounts of legitimate applications for assistance, on completed expenditures and on the distribution of federal assistance funds among individual cities, counties, regions and states. This kind of information, periodically renewed and corrected, would be useful, according to the bill's supporters, to program administrators, the personnel of federal budget offices, local government officials and congressmen. As a result, the legislative and executive branches would have more detailed and more timely information on "how and where program funds are spent."⁹ In this way, the system would make it possible to oversee the submission and approval of applications for financial assistance.

The information base of the system should be the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, published by the OMB. This catalog, which is published at the beginning of each fiscal year,¹⁰ is the basic official reference containing information on the purpose, goals, resources and limitations of programs included in the category of "federal domestic assistance." Because of the importance attached to the catalog in the bill, it would be wise to briefly discuss those features of the catalog which, according to experts, need improvement. Here we must note the fact, however, that the U.S. Congress has still not approved a single one of the bills aimed at putting the procedure of catalog compilation in order and at requiring the standardization of its form and content or obligating federal agencies to provide the OMB with all of the necessary information on programs in time for it to be included in the catalog.

At present, it represents an exceedingly important instrument for state and local government employees who are trying to receive federal assistance. The information on the program (particularly financial data), however, is frequently outdated by the time the employee tries to use it for the needs of his state or county; employees spend many hours studying the catalog index, the eligibility requirements and the descriptions of programs. If a suitable program is found, it takes a great deal of time to prepare detailed justification for the acquisition of federal funds. By the time the application is finally submitted, program funds may already be depleted and there may be no cash available. Senator W. Roth has noted that the American taxpayer has to pay twice for the same project:¹¹ first through federal taxes to finance the programs and, secondly, through state and local taxes to pay for the time spent by officials searching for the corresponding federal funds and filling out applications.¹²

Other shortcomings of the catalog include its incomplete index; inadequate scope (the catalog does not include all federal assistance programs, which is due to the reluctance of the heads of some government agencies to let the public know about some programs); the inaccuracy of information; the absence of standardized descriptions, rules and application procedures. The demand that these shortcomings be eliminated has also been entered in the documents of Senate hearings on the bill.

These are the basic features of the proposals submitted so many times by Senator W. Roth and his colleagues for examination by the highest legislative body of the United States. In spite of the obvious benefits to be gained from creating an information system and putting data on federal assistance programs in order, the bill still has a long way to go through various congressional committees, unless it suffers the fate of previous bills with a similar content. Each time, one of the official excuses has been the well-intentioned desire to "improve" the bill and perfect it. But forces with a direct interest in the failure of the bill are obviously behind the congressmen who are trying to delay its passage. At present, the system for financing federal assistance programs has become a "big feeding trough" for many smart operators. In turn, these smart operators are backed up not only

by local politicians (with their intrigues and desire to win re-election at any cost), but also representatives of big business, whose briefcases are the depository for contracts for the execution of programs, signifying the acquisition of guaranteed profits. Combining to make up a single bureaucratic system permeating all levels of American society, these circles are willing to sacrifice the national interest for the sake of their own greedy goals of higher profits or a cozy spot in government. For this reason, it is hardly likely that radical changes will take place even if the bill is approved.

Another group of reasons for the delays in the bill's passage is connected with definite opposition on the part of executive agencies in government. This is not so much due to the traditional inertia of the U.S. machinery of state, the representatives of which, as many examples have shown, are opposed to any significant innovations. The reluctance of administrators on various levels to inform the public about the actual state of affairs in the subdivisions entrusted to them, the dread of discovering errors in program administration and the desire to conceal their own incompetence and, sometimes, their crimes--these are the real motives compelling them to "not open" all of the information on federal assistance programs. As we know, similar problems have been experienced for a number of years by "program evaluation"--the mechanism for ensuring a reciprocal connection between the decisions made on planned federal measures and the course of their implementation.¹³ Therefore, the political realities of the contemporary capitalist society set strict limits on the "introduction of efficiency" into the procedures and methods of public administration.

FOOTNOTES

1. Here and further on, this refers to programs of federal domestic assistance.
2. "Federal Program Information Act of 1977," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, 1977, pp 42-43.
3. Ibid., p 15.
4. "Improving Information on Federal Programs," Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, 1976, p 2.
5. Ibid., p 19.
6. "Federal Program Information Act of 1977," p 2.
7. "Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976," Report of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, Washington, 1976, p 25.

8. "Federal Program Information Act of 1977," p 23.
9. Ibid., p 24.
10. The fiscal year in the United States does not coincide with the calendar year and is designated with the number of the year in which it ends. Until recently, the fiscal year began on 1 July and ended on 30 June; from fiscal year 1977 it will begin on 1 October and end on 30 September.
11. In the American practice of public administration, the project frequently signifies program execution on the local level; this means that the federal program can be regarded as a group of projects, on the level of which resources are actually used and the direct results of the program are derived.
12. "Federal Program Information Act of 1977," p 3.
13. "Program evaluation" was discussed in detail in issue No 10 of our journal for 1977, pp 108-117--Editor's note.

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CSO: 1803

FOCUS ON WESTERN EUROPE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 89-92

[Article by T. V. Oberemko]

[Text] The United States' relations with Western Europe as a whole and with individual countries in this region are examined in the November 1977 issue of the American journal CURRENT HISTORY. What do the authors see in Washington's current Western European policy that is new and what recommendations and recipes do they offer?

The economic difficulties of the Western European countries, tension in relations due to inter-imperialist rivalry in a number of spheres, primarily power engineering (nuclear, in particular), sociopolitical instability and the growing influence of leftist forces, the intensification of the internal political struggle and the state of affairs in NATO—all of these issues obviously worry the authors of this article, historians and experts on international relations who are famous in the United States.

A survey of these issues is presented in the article by Professor John Starrels from George Washington University.¹ He notes that European policy is an important element of the White House's foreign policy agenda. Tactfully describing the state of affairs in U.S.-Western European relations as a period of "creative tension," the author writes that "the old assumptions about the Atlantic Alliance no longer hold," as radical political and economic changes have taken place in the world, particularly in West Europe. The author does not exclude the possibility of changes within the alliance itself. He suggests careful study of tendencies toward this on both sides of the Atlantic.

Under present conditions, the major emphasis in the United States' relations with its allies, in Starrels' opinion, should not be on military factors, but on political and economic aspects, such as ways of overcoming the consequences of the global, in the author's words, economic crisis, control over the sale of arms, questions of nuclear technology and power engineering in general, East-West relations and the "rationalization" of the oil

dialog with the OPEC countries. The list of important political and economic problems requiring joint resolution (a "functional approach"), he feels, is constantly growing.

Inflation and unemployment are still the number-one problem. The rates of these are excessively high in the United States and West Europe. Starrel objects to the creation of any kind of transnational agencies to combat these, believing that it would be more effective to hold conferences where agreements can be reached "within the limits and possibilities of the interdependence" of three "centers"--the United States, West Europe and Japan. The author not only focuses attention on the growing economic "interdependence," but also underscores the importance of the ideological factor. In his opinion, "psychological interdependence" lay at the basis of the United States' alliance with the West European countries, strengthen this alliance and only its "revitalization" can save the alliance at a time when increasingly complex trade, financial and other economic problems are giving rise to acute conflicts between these two regions of the capitalist world.

Starrel says that one of the most complex problems involves the United States' position on nuclear technology. According to the author, the noisy disagreement between the United States and the FRG concerning the sale of nuclear enrichment facilities to Brazil by Bonn is related to more general and deep-seated disagreements on energy problems. Washington should work out a more flexible line toward its West European partners, who, in contrast to the United States, are energy poor. "Until the United States is able to reconcile its own positions on energy, and especially the transport of nuclear technology, with long-term European resource vulnerability," he writes, "energy could become the issue on which the Atlantic Alliance falters, as it did temporarily in late 1973 on the occasion of the Arab oil embargo."²

One problem which has evoked particular anxiety on the part of bourgeois researchers is the increased influence of leftist forces in Western Europe. Judging by all indications, Starrel shares the views of bourgeois liberal circles in the United States. Expressing a principally negative attitude toward the reinforcement of the positions of leftist forces in a number of West European countries, he simultaneously warns against the overt "exertion of pressure" by Washington. Otherwise, the author feels, the tactic of "international jaw-boning" could be counterproductive, reinforcing the anti-American feelings "that have always played a part in the American-European relationship." He insists that the present state of affairs in West Europe must be fully taken into account and, on this basis, must be adapted to more skillfully, so that nothing will be lost and certain dividends will be gained from the situation. "The United States should adopt a highly elastic and dynamic policy of accommodation,"³ he remarks. Starrel feels that economic assistance is an extremely effective way of counteracting leftist forces (mainly through the IMF) in "an attempt to save regimes which are experiencing economic difficulties and sociopolitical changes" (he is referring to Portugal, Spain and Italy).

In reference to international problems, which require the "immediate" and constant attention of the United States and its allies, the author underscores the need for more effective control over the manufacture of arms and the sale of weapons in other nations, but he does not examine this matter in detail. He speaks in greater detail on problems of East-West relations, the policy of the West European countries in this area and its influence on inter-Atlantic relations.

Western Europe, which has an interest in maintaining and developing normal relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, J. Starrel says, is extremely suspicious about the propaganda campaigns of Washington, which is trying to establish the United States' "moral leadership" in the world, and it does not intend to sacrifice the benefits of detente and commercial and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union for the sake of the noisy fireworks set off by J. Carter around the far-fetched issue of the "violation of human rights" in the socialist countries. The United States' stand has evoked "general feelings of fear and anxiety in Western Europe," he writes. Statements by French President Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Schmidt are based on the fear that "the fruits of detente will be endangered by what is perceived to be a provocative stand by a U.S. administration" and that "a general stiffening of tensions between the two blocs in European and world politics may follow," and this will benefit no one.⁴

In the articles discussing individual West European countries, the authors do not conceal the fact that they assign preference to a process of internal development which would guarantee the preservation of the existing socioeconomic order, particularly in Italy, Portugal and Spain, by means of various combinations of right-wing social democratic or centrist groups.

The articles on Portugal and Spain place considerable emphasis on the role of economic and military assistance from Washington for the stabilization of the current regimes there. "Complementary needs," writes Professor G. Grayson, "have drawn Portugal and the United States closer together: the former desperately requires economic assistance; the latter wants to promote order along the Western flank of the Mediterranean."⁵ He notes in the article that during fiscal year 1977 the U.S. Government made available to Portugal 300 million dollars in temporary credits, 60 million in development grants and loans and 32.25 million in military assistance (for fiscal year 1978, J. Carter has supported legislation to provide Portugal with 300 million dollars in economic aid and 25 million in military aid). For its part, he points out in the article, Lisbon has assured the Americans that they can continue to use the Lages Base in the Azores and that Portugal will increase its participation in NATO.

"Like their neighbors in Lisbon," remarks Professor Stanley Payne from the University of Wisconsin, "the current Spanish leaders are expecting further major assistance from the United States and possibly from the European Community (especially the FRG) to see them through their current economic

difficulties." Spain states that comparatively few Spaniards now seek drastic change, but many want an improvement of their deteriorating economic condition. In his opinion, it is precisely this problem that will "provide the immediate battleground for Spanish politics during the next few years."⁶

The major thesis of the article on France is that, despite the noticeable leanings toward the "Atlantic Community" during the last few years, Paris' foreign policy is still relatively independent. According to the author of the article, Professor Edward Fox from Cornell University, in the broadest sense Giscard d'Estaing's "conduct of foreign policy has not deviated greatly from the Gaullist line." To emphasize this, he has been "lacing his public statements with assurances that France will continue on her independent path."⁷ Fox singles out the problem of the export of nuclear technology as one of the issues causing the greatest disagreements in American-French relations.

The article on England, written by Arthur Cyr, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations program director, does not touch directly on American-English relations but investigates aspects of its domestic political and economic life and its position in the EEC.⁸ This is apparently due to England's diminished role in the spectrum of Washington's relations with its chief West European allies--London, Paris and Bonn.

It is indicative that the United States' disagreements with its allies on such important issues as ways of overcoming the consequences of the economic crisis and nuclear energy policy have recently been particularly fierce in the case of America's most stable and privileged, but also strongest ally--the FRG. The author of the article on West Germany, Professor Gerard Braunthal from the University of Massachusetts, examines these matters in detail.⁹

Braunthal states that the economic position of the FRG is much better than that of the other West European countries. The rate of inflation here was 4 percent in 1976 (almost the lowest level in Western Europe) and exports continue to develop at a high rate. Bonn kept a large, though reduced, balance-of-payments surplus amounting to 3 billion dollars, and the mark became the strongest currency in Europe. Because of Bonn's relatively strong position in this area, American economists are using the FRG as a point of departure in their calculations for the improvement of the general economic situation in the West to "prevent a new damaging recession." It was precisely these calculations that gave rise to sharp differences of opinion between the United States and the FRG, which, as the author of the article states, "cooled relations" between them.

The author notes that the FRG has assigned priority to the curbing of inflation and has not agreed to stimulate its economy to the degree hoped for by Washington. Bonn "politely rejected the prodding" from the United States.

G. Braunthal discusses the rivalry between the United States and the FRG in the export of nuclear technology, believing that this might undermine their "particularly close ties."

As the author points out, although J. Carter and H. Schmidt agreed in April 1977 that "an international solution is required to supply necessary nuclear energy to countries in need of it," the earlier transaction between the FRG and Brazil nonetheless remained in force.

On the whole, it is striking that the authors of the November issue of CURRENT HISTORY are working with a vast amount of factual material but avoid any in-depth analysis of the events and factors characterizing the state of U.S.-European relations. They mention the emergence of a few new areas of emphasis in Washington's Atlantic policy, particularly the great emphasis on tripartite cooperation by the United States, Western Europe and Japan, on "interdependence" and on a joint ("functional") approach to world problems affecting the common interests of the West. The authors raise pragmatic questions, but do not try to find answers to them or make any recommendations concerning their solution. In essence, they confine themselves to the statement that objective realities will not permit the Carter Administration to "dramatically change the basic direction and content of United States policy toward Europe."¹⁰ It would seem that their only recommendation concerns the need to reach a compromise on issues giving rise to particularly sharp differences of opinion between the United States and West Europe.

Experience has shown, however, that from the very first collisions and difficulties, each side begins to protect primarily its own imperialist gains, working against the interests of the other side. And when centripetal tendencies seem to prevail in the relations between the United States and the countries of the Western European region in the face of common difficulties in the capitalist world, the attempts of American ruling circles to enforce the resolution of debatable issues primarily in their own interest gives rise to fierce opposition from their main European partner-rivals.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Starrel, "The United States and West Europe," CURRENT HISTORY, November 1977, pp 145-148, 181.
2. Ibid., p 147.
3. Ibid., p 181.
4. Ibid., p 147.
5. G. Grayson, "Portugal's Crisis," Ibid., pp 169-173, 179, 180.

6. S. Payne, "The Political Transformation of Spain," Ibid., pp 165-168, 178, 179.
7. E. Fox, "Political Uncertainty in France," Ibid., pp 149-152, 178.
8. A. Cyr, "British Politics in 1977," Ibid., pp 153-155, 182.
9. G. Braunthal, "West Germany: A Balance Sheet," Ibid., pp 156-159, 182, 183.
10. Ibid., p 145.

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HANS MORGENTHAU: NO ALTERNATIVE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 92-93

[Article by V. S. Guseva]

[Text] The journal WORLD ISSUES¹ has printed almost the entire statement made by H. Morgenthau, famous American expert on international relations and founder of the school of "political realism," as part of the debate on U.S. foreign policy conducted by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara. Although his primary concern was the significance of detente and disarmament in the nuclear age, H. Morgenthau also touched upon the chief factors which, in his opinion, are having a considerable effect on U.S. foreign policy.²

The author expresses the opinion that many of those participating in the debate on detente (which, as we know, has been quite intensive for more than a year in the United States) have departed from reality and are expounding far from realistic theories. For example, he writes, they speak of detente as a policy which can be rejected or replaced by "some kind of other policy, as if we have a choice between detente--that is, the reduction if not the complete elimination of tension--and some other type of policy aimed at the cultivation of tension or not pursuing the goal of the reduction or complete elimination of tension. In actuality, it would be simply impossible to conduct any other policy than the policy of detente in the nuclear age." "Detente," H. Morgenthau says, "is an essential condition for the survival of the United States and Russia.... And the fate of the world still depends on the state of relations between the United States and the USSR" as the largest nuclear powers.

This is the reason, the author stresses, for the exceptional importance of disarmament, a problem that has been facing the world for a long time but could not be solved as long as the matter concerned conventional weapons, as "the competition between states in the race for conventional arms was only one aspect of their rivalry for strength and power." In the case of nuclear weapons, however, "disarmament," he states, "is made completely possible precisely by the enormous destructive force of these weapons.... The accumulation of nuclear weapons is becoming the highest form of insanity."

After admitting the possibility of solving the problem of nuclear arms limitation, however, he immediately adds: "I have a pessimistic view of genuine disarmament or even genuine arms control due to the problem of inspection," which "is becoming extremely difficult if not insoluble."

Morgenthau feels that the attitude toward "arms control and disarmament" has become the feature which has split American experts on international affairs into two schools of political thought: one attempts to apply traditional theories and categories developed prior to the appearance of the nuclear weapons to today's realities; the second is working out new formulas corresponding to the nuclear age.

To the first school H. Morgenthau relegates theoreticians from the Pentagon, retired generals and public figures like P. Nitze or Senator H. Jackson, for whom "there is no qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons." They are still using the outdated concepts and categories (for example, "victory and defeat," "defense and attack") which "are becoming meaningless in the nuclear age." It is essential that these concepts used "since the beginning of time" be discarded, particularly in the area of military thought. The supporters of this school feel that "the Russians wish to achieve the proper nuclear supremacy and destroy the United States." But "those who believe this," he notes, "should be concerned about their loss of common sense."

Morgenthau associates himself with the second school--those who support arms control and disarmament and resolutely advocate the rejection of concepts of the past in the approach to today's realities. They have not only become outdated, he stresses, but also "make it difficult to form the correct opinion of current issues, particularly those connected with nuclear strength."

The fact that many American experts, who are involved in policy-making and implementation in the international arena, think and speak in terms of old categories that are inapplicable to the nuclear age is interpreted by H. Morgenthau as one of the symptoms of the "pathology of American power." Other symptoms are "the failure to understand realities" (particularly, the allegation that there is an alternative to detente) and the view that the problem of North-South dynamics is more important to the United States than relations with the USSR. "The belief that the North-South problem has replaced the East-West problem signifies disregard for real issues. It may be that the popularity of this thesis is due to the opportunity it affords for ignoring the traditional confrontation between the USSR and the United States," he remarks.

He also sees the administration's campaign concerning "moral problems" as the same kind of "failure to understand realities." Statements of this kind "let the speaker look good; and his listeners also feel good. But nothing really changes." "This cannot be a basis for policy;³ this is not policy at all, but only a declaration."

This statement by H. Morgenthau, this prominent authority on American bourgeois political science, in the debate on U.S. foreign policy is quite noteworthy primarily because he, basing his deductions on a sober analysis of the realities of today's world, admits the need to curb the arms race, to promote the limitation and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and to adhere to a course of international detente, and recognizes the primary importance of Soviet-American relations for the United States. And he does not only realize this himself, but also calls upon those who make and implement U.S. foreign policy to realize it also.

FOOTNOTES

1. WORLD ISSUES is published five times a year by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara (California)--Editor's note.
2. "Morgenthau On Foreign Policy," WORLD ISSUES, December 1977-January 1978, p 10-16.
3. Here the author disagrees with Z. Brzezinski, who has declared that the issue of "human rights" should become the "basis of U.S. foreign policy."

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CSO: 1803

POWER, INC.

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 94-102

[Continuation of Russian translation of chapters from the book "Power, Inc."
by Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen, 1976, Viking Press]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN UNDERWATER VEHICLES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 103-115

[Article by I.B. Ikonnikov and G.P. Lisov]

[Text] The history of truly active exploration of the marine depths spans only two decades. And this is not amazing, as only the latest achievements of the scientific and technical revolution have given engineers the possibility of developing technical means capable of withstanding the exceptionally harsh properties of the underwater medium. For a number of economic, political and military-strategic reasons, the United States leads the other capitalist countries in the study and exploration of the ocean depths. A decisive role was played by the underwater vehicles of the "first generation," which appeared in the 1960's. These were essentially miniature submarines with two or three people on board and with impressive technical and operational capability for that time. A typical representative of the first generation of American underwater vehicles is the "Alvin," which is still being used.

The biography of the "Alvin," which was named after its creator--specialist Allen Vine from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, is extremely interesting. This vehicle has been involved in every significant American deep-sea expedition since the time it was built in 1965. The "Alvin" has proved its high degree of reliability in more than 500 deep-sea submersions. Its durability, uncommon for an underwater technical vehicle, is due to its unique construction, the main features of which anticipated the design of modern underwater vehicles.

In October 1968 the "Alvin" underwent a particularly severe test: a wave washed it off the deck of its support vehicle and it sank (fortunately, without any people on board) to a depth exceeding 1,500 meters. After lying on the ocean floor for around 11 months, however, the "Alvin" was not only not seriously damaged, but also gave scientists a unique opportunity to witness the preserving effects of the marine depths. The fact is that after it was successfully raised (with the aid of the "aluminaut" deep-sea vessel), salami sandwiches, apples and boullion in thermoses

without the slightest trace of decomposition were found in the "Alvin's" mess. When these were later put into a laboratory refrigerator, where the temperature was maintained at the same level as on the ocean floor (around 3° C), this food soon spoiled. Scientists later established that organic substances take approximately 100 times longer to decompose in the marine depths than in ordinary conditions due to the tremendous hydrostatic pressure.¹




Photo of "Alvin" Underwater Vehicle Taken by an Automatic Camera at a Depth of 1,800 Meters

After it was raised, the "Alvin" underwent a second birth. The new tasks set for the vehicle required an increase in its submersion depth. For this purpose, the steel sphere, in which the crew is situated, was replaced with a titanium structure. The operational depth of the vehicle almost doubled and reached 3,600 meters. In this new capacity, the "Alvin" was used in the study of the mid-Atlantic groove. In June-September 1974 the "Alvin" submerged into the groove zone 17 times as part of a French-American oceanographic expedition and spent a total of more than 80 hours under water. The vehicle made its last record submersion in January 1976, to a depth of 3,650 meters in the Cayman trench between Cuba and Honduras.²

The Underwater Vehicles of the U.S. Navy

Although the "Alvin" belongs to a civilian establishment--the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute--it is frequently leased out to the U.S. Navy and is used in naval marine research programs. It was no coincidence that the latest modernization of the vehicle took place at the naval shipyard on Mare Island (California), and it underwent tests after repairs at the naval testing ground in the Bahamas.³

The interest of military experts in the "Alvin" dates back to the unfortunate memory of the search for the hydrogen bomb lost by an American bomber off the coast of Spain in 1966. It was precisely the "Alvin" that found this fatal object at a depth of 700 meters at that time.


This example is not the only one in the experience of the U.S. Navy, which always uses "civilian" underwater vehicles in its own interest. For example, other vehicles leased in recent years include the Lockheed Company's "Deep Quest" vehicle with an operational submersion depth of 2,400 meters, used for the purpose of testing new and compact sources of energy--so-called fuel elements (electrochemical current generators) operating on oxygen and hydrogen.⁴

The "Daub" vehicle of the Southwest Research Institute, Perry Oceanographic's "PC-1402" and other vehicles are used for military purposes. In addition, the navy has its own vehicles which combine to make up a separate small fleet with a base in San Diego, California.⁵ This fleet was created in 1967 for the improvement of various types of deep-sea equipment and the training of personnel to perform maintenance work on underwater technical compact equipment. In addition to underwater vehicles (the "Trieste-II," "Seacliff," "Turtle" and others), the fleet also includes such underwater vessels with a unique design as the "Dolphin" with a displacement of 950 tons and a submersion depth of 660 meters and the "NR-I" with a displacement of 400 tons, a compact nuclear reactor and a submersion depth of 1,050 meters. Incidentally, the experiment in developing a small nuclear reactor for the "NR-I" has apparently been successful. This is confirmed by press reports on the intentions of the U.S. Naval Command to begin working on a second vessel of this kind--the "NR-II"--with an even greater submersion depth. But the incredibly high cost of this project--over 300 million dollars--is causing delays (the cost of the "NR-I" was 99.2 million dollars).⁶

An important role in American programs for the development of underwater vehicles and other underwater technical equipment for the navy is played by the so-called Naval Undersea Center with its abovementioned base in San Diego. The center has branches in Pasadena, Long Beach, Hawaii and even Alaska (Prince of Wales Cape).

The most intriguing underwater vehicles developed at the center in recent years are the "Deep View" and "Makakai." They are mainly distinguished by

the use of transparent materials for strong hulls. The bow of the "Deep View" is glass and the entire spherical hull of the "Makakai" is transparent. There is no need to speak of how important it is for the crew to have a good view of everything around them during submersions. Ordinary portholes do not make this possible. For this reason, the prospect of using glass and other transparent materials for the hulls of underwater vehicles has attracted the attention of specialists for a long time.



The "Trieste-II" Bathyscaphe

The "Makakai" also has another important innovation: most of the scientific equipment, instruments and devices have been moved outside the vessel and the commands to turn them on and off are transmitted by a modulated electric eye from inside the sphere. This has made it possible to dramatically reduce


the number of apertures in the hull and, consequently, to increase the reliability and safety of the vehicle. The submersion depth of the "Deep View" and "Makakai" are 450 and 180 meters respectively.

The Hawaiian laboratory of the Naval Undersea Center is working on a new and extremely exotic area of underwater research, which is connected with the training of marine animals--dolphins, sea lions and even whales. These animals can learn to wear a special harness and automatic clamp quite quickly--within 2 or 3 weeks--for raising submerged torpedoes or any other items. In training exercises, sea lions have located lost torpedoes with the aid of acoustic signals within just a few minutes. Whales have successfully performed the same operation at much greater depths. The Hawaiian laboratory conducted an extensive program of research with two Bagridae whales. One of them, nicknamed Morgan, weighed 600 kilograms, and the other, Ahab, weighed more than 2.5 tons. Morgan dove to a depth of 500 meters (this was three times farther than the sea lions could dive), located a submerged torpedo with the aid of acoustic signals and affixed a clamp with a rubber balloon to it. After this, the balloon automatically filled with gas and raised the torpedo to the surface. These systems are intended to raise objects weighing 300 kilograms from a depth of 300 meters or those weighing 150 kilograms from a depth of 600 meters.⁷


Underwater vehicles with a crew on board (experts call them manned vehicles) are extremely costly. Depending on the submersion depth, their cost ranges from 250,000 dollars for a depth of 360 meters to 1 million for a depth of 900 meters. Operational costs, calculated according to the data of 400 submersions, range from 7,000 dollars for each submersion to a depth of 600 meters to 16,000 for a dive of 3,600 meters. This is due to the enormous expenditures involved in preparations for the submersion of manned vehicles, their complex life support systems, their large dimensions which must be sufficient to accomodate people and the high cost of surface support equipment. At the same time, the scientific productivity of the use of these vehicles in relation to the expansion of the scales of underwater research has ceased to satisfy specialists, as these vehicles must surface fairly often for a change of crew.

It is precisely these factors which are associated with a quite dramatic period in the development of American underwater vehicles, which threaten to delay the exploration of the depths of the ocean for a long time. This is how this period, which covered approximately the early 1970's, was described in the weekly UNDERWATER LETTER: "The only aluminum submarine in the world, the "Aluminaut," with a potential submersion depth of 4.5 kilometers, is kept in Green Cove Springs (Florida). Around 240 miles away, the famous "Ben Franklin," which completed a 30-day underwater drift in the Gulf Stream in 1969, is gathering dust in a West Palm Beach warehouse. The "Beaver" underwater vehicle with a submersion depth of 600 meters is in a hangar in Seal Beach (California), while the "Deep Star-4000," capable of diving 1,000 meters, is lying in an abandoned blimp hangar with its batteries removed.... 'We are now experiencing a depression,' says John Kelley,

director of Westinghouse's research division. The same could be said by the administrators of at least a dozen firms and companies which spent 50 million dollars on underwater vehicles between 1964 and 1971."⁸



"Makakai" Vehicle With a Transparent Hull



Sea Lion Lifting a Submerged Torpedo

Of the three "Star" underwater vehicles built by General Dynamics, one is in a museum, another has been leased by a rescue firm in Hawaii and a third is in drydock at the Scripps Oceanographic Institute.

Many of these vehicles only came back to life in the mid-1970's, which marked the beginning of rapid development in a new and extremely promising area of engineering--the working and industrial development of offshore oil and gas deposits.

Due to the high cost of building and operating manned underwater vehicles, attempts were made long ago to replace them with unmanned vehicles whenever possible. These unmanned vehicles are generally connected to a surface ship with a cable and are therefore called attached vehicles. They can either be towed or self-propelled. The former move under water only as a result of the pulling force created by the surface ship, while the latter have their own propellers with electric motors and are supplied with electric power through the cable from the surface ship. They can initiate their own vertical or horizontal movements, but naturally only within the limits of the length of their tow cable.

Towed and self-propelled unmanned vehicles have television systems, sonar, oceanographic instruments and even manipulators ("mechanical hands") on board. They can stay underwater much longer than the manned vehicles and can go farther, deeper and faster. A matter of extreme importance is the much lower cost of these vehicles, including the cost of their operation and maintenance. According to some estimates, the cost of these is only one-tenth as high!⁹ The absence of their own sources of energy permits unmanned vehicles to be of small dimensions, and this, in turn, reduces the probability of their separation from the tow cable and, consequently, of their irretrievable loss, particularly if they are operating at much lower depths.

The U.S. Navy has a great deal of experience in developing and using unmanned underwater vehicles. The Naval Underwater Center in San Diego, for example, worked for more than 10 years on the "Curve" series of attached self-propelled vehicles. The "Curve-I" with a submersion depth of 600 meters assisted in raising the hydrogen bomb off the coast of Spain in 1966 (now it is no longer in use). The "Curve-II" with a working submersion depth of 750 meters and the "Curve-III" with a depth of 3,000 meters are used in research projects at the Naval Undersea Center. The latest vehicle of this type, the "Ruvs," was developed by the Hawaiian laboratory of the Naval Undersea Center. The choice of a submersion depth of 6,000 meters for this vehicle was not arbitrary. It is precisely this that will make almost the entire world ocean accessible to the vehicle--only 2 percent of the entire area is deeper.

The tow cable of this last vehicle is more than 6 kilometers long. The use of special synthetic elements stronger than steel has given it an acceptable mass of 8 tons.¹⁰ The weight of the vehicle itself is around

2.5 tons and its dimensions are 3.3 X 1.35 X 1.4 meters. It has a television camera, an ultrasonic direction finder, underwater searchlights, a movie camera and two manipulators on board. The operator at the control panel on the surface ship wears a special helmet with a miniature television screen at eye level. By turning his head, he changes the position of the television camera on the vehicle. This creates the impression of the operator's "presence" in the research site. Before the vehicle was submerged in the ocean, it underwent tests on shore in a so-called hyperbaric chamber, where pressure of 600 atmospheres, equal to the pressure at a depth of 6,000 meters, was created.



"RCV" Unmanned Vehicle With Highly Sensitive Television Camera

Unmanned vehicles have recently been adapted for specific utilitarian operations on the ocean floor. They are fitted out with a hollow metallic "harness" with an additional television camera, a set of working instruments, three manipulators, an electrohydraulic energy source and powerful underwater lamps. This harness can also be carried by the manned "Alvin," "Turtle" and "Seacliff" vehicles.¹¹ During one test, the unmanned "Curve-III" vehicle, equipped with a harness, approached a submerged aircraft, opened the body of the plane with its manipulators and extracted a "black box" (with taped conversations with earth). Then the vehicle attached a balloon to this item, the balloon automatically filled with gas and the cargo floated to the surface, where it was retrieved by the surface ship.¹²

Another way of increasing the effectiveness of underwater complexes lies in the simultaneous use of manned and unmanned vehicles. One such combined system consists of the "Point Loma" transport ship, the "Trieste-II" bathyscaphe accommodated in the ship and the towed unmanned "Fish" vehicle with a submersion depth of 6,000 meters. The towed vehicle must locate submerged objects and the bathyscaphe must surface them.¹³

Most of the towed and self-propelled manned vehicles belonging to the U.S. Navy are designed for great submersion depths. This has only been made possible by the latest achievements of cable technology, which have led to the production of extremely strong, elastic but nonetheless lightweight tow cables.

Improvement in the methods for transmitting information, television images and control commands through hydroacoustic channels has made it possible to begin the development of completely autonomous unmanned vehicles--that is, those unconnected to surface ships by cable. U.S. Naval experts are also devoting a great deal of attention to this field of research. In particular, since 1972 they have been working on the design for the Arctic "Wars" autonomous vehicle, intended for the study of the underwater surface of the Arctic ice cover. The vehicle has been designed in the form of a torpedo with a length of 3 meters and a diameter of 0.5 meters. It weighs 410 kilograms and has a working submersion depth of 450 meters. Powered by its own silver and zinc electrical storage cells, it can move under water according to an assigned program at a speed of 3.7 knots for 10 hours.¹⁴ No surface support ship is required: the vehicle is lowered into the water directly from the ice pack. Acoustic signals provide for communications with the vehicle, control and the transmission of scientific data. This has called for the creation of special small-scale transmitter-receiver-hydroacoustical systems.

The design for the unmanned autonomous "Smart" vehicle, worked out by the Naval Research Laboratory, is of particular interest. It is intended to search for underwater objects according to a previously assigned program or with the aid of "artificial intellect." This means that the vehicle must be able to adapt somewhat to the environment--underwater currents, the topography of the ocean floor, etc.--that is, it must be able to automatically restructure programs in accordance with specific conditions in the research zone. The vehicle will be shaped like a torpedo with a length of 5.5 meters and a diameter of slightly more than 1 meter. After submerging to a depth of 500 meters, it should be propelled by its own sources of energy at a speed of 5 knots. The navigation system is quite original: the vehicle will surface periodically to adjust its course with the aid of signals from the "Omega" global radio navigation system.¹⁵

Working Underwater Vehicles

The current rapid appearance and development of offshore oil and gas deposits are having a tremendous effect on the development of all types of underwater

technical equipment, particularly vehicles. The North Sea has become the site of an unprecedented oil boom. Offshore drilling goes on around the clock, and floating rigs are moving farther and farther from shore. Offshore oil deposits are now being exploited at depths measured in hundreds of meters--that is, in places where the work of professional divers becomes particularly difficult or even possible.

Under these conditions, manned underwater vehicles have again attracted the attention of experts as a possible replacement for teams of professional divers. In contrast to the previous vehicles of this type which were mainly used for scientific research, however, they are to have special working instruments controlled from inside, they will have more powerful sources of energy on board, they will reach a high level of guaranteed safety, etc. The latest technical and technological achievements have made it possible to solve all of these problems and, for this reason, the field of the development of commercial underwater vehicles, which are now called the "workhorses" of the marine depths, is now truly flourishing.

The world's largest suppliers of commercial vehicles are Perry Oceanographics (Riviera Beach, Florida), which produces the "PC" series of vehicles, and the Canadian International Hydronamics Firm in Vancouver which produces the famous "Pisces" vehicles.¹⁶

Perry Oceanographics was founded in 1956. It began with the production of pleasure and sports undersea vessels, but in recent years the company has almost completely gone over to the manufacture of working manned vehicles. By 1974, eight of Perry Oceanographics' vehicles were being used in the North Sea; these eight represented almost half of the company's entire production volume during the 17 years of its existence. Taking rising demand into consideration, the company doubled its productivity and even started up a flowline for the production of commercial vehicles with an operational depth of up to 900 meters.¹⁷ In terms of design, the vehicles of this firm are characterized by a transparent bow, airlocks through which divers exit and come back on board, decompression facilities for these divers which link up with shipboard complexes and, finally, a modular (sectional) hull, which makes it possible to use different modules depending on the specific purpose of the submersion.

According to B. Gilman, vice president of Perry Oceanographics, "Today's commercial vehicles have the obvious advantage of being able to perform difficult operations on the ocean floor and carry solid cargo there.... They can work in the midst of strong underwater currents, and for a fairly long time, and they carry film and photographic equipment, video tape facilities, powerful projectors and attachments for taking various samples under water on board.... With the aid of hydraulic excavators, they dig trenches in the sea bed for underwater pipelines and cable much more accurately and quickly than divers can."¹⁸

In the middle of 1977 Perry Oceanographics sent two of its latest "PC-18" vehicles, ordered by the English Intersub Limited Company, to the North Sea. These vehicles were 6.6 meters long with a weight of 10 tons and a working submersion depth of 300 meters. An airlock permits divers to emerge into the sea and climb back on board of depths of up to 200 meters. The vehicles have propellers with electric motors of 10 horsepower and propellers of smaller diameter in their vertical and lateral shafts (so-called steering facilities) for lateral and vertical movement. A tubular "harness" with two manipulators and a set of working instruments, such as drills, wrenches, circular grinders, etc., is mounted on the hull. With one manipulator the vehicle attaches itself to some part of the underwater structure to fix its position, while the second is used for the performance of various operations.¹⁹

The abovementioned research underwater vessels, the "aluminaut" with an aluminum alloy hull and the "Ben Franklin," are now being completely modernized to be used in offshore oil and gas drilling.

As the scales of offshore oil and gas drilling grow, it becomes increasingly necessary to reduce the cost of the technical equipment used, particularly working underwater vehicles. In connection with this, experts have again considered the idea of replacing manned vehicles with unmanned vehicles whenever possible, as the latter are less expensive. For this purpose, a group of American companies analyzed the possibilities of existing unmanned vehicles in 1975 with an eye to using them in offshore drilling.

The analysis showed that these vehicles could completely cope with many of the tasks performed by vehicles with a crew on board. Since the rapid repair of underwater telephone cables is of particular importance at present, as well as the laying, inspection and repair of underwater oil and gas pipelines (by 1980, 1,500 miles of pipe must be laid just in the British section of the North Sea)²⁰ the first commercial unmanned vehicles will be adapted to precisely these operations.

The "Deep Drown" (now being used by the Naval Rescue Service), the "Douse-6000," the "Scarab," the "Recon" series and the "RCV" are typical of the new commercial family of cable-controlled unmanned vehicles in the United States. The first three were built during the 1975-1977 period by the Ametech Company (California), which had previously manufactured various types of equipment for manned vehicles. The "Scarab," built for the Trans-Pacific Corporation, is the most intriguing. It is an all-purpose vehicle, intended for search and rescue operations, underwater geological prospecting, the repair of cable and oil and gas lines, and the inspection and even the raising of structures on the ocean floor. It can bury cable in the groundsoil at a depth of 0.5 meters with a speed of 150 meters per hour. For this purpose, it has a hydraulic excavator, two manipulators and a hydraulic grapple. The dimensions of the vehicle are 3.3 X 1.8 meters, it weighs 2,265 kilograms and its operational submersion depth is 1,830 meters. Two models of this vehicle cost 5.8 million dollars to build.²¹

The "Recon" series, built by the abovementioned Perry Oceanographics Company, consists of four models. The "Recon-II" and "Recon-III" are intended for a submersion depth of 450 meters and the "Recon-IV" has an operational depth of 1,830 meters. The latter model has one interesting design feature which is winning the support of more and more experts. The "Recon-IV" represents a kind of double system: a so-called garage and the actual vehicle housed in the garage. The entire complex is submerged to the operational depth, after which the vehicle emerges from the garage and travels within a radius of 120 meters from the garage on a secondary cable transmitting electric power and control commands. The heavy garage secures the main cable with its weight and suppresses all movement caused by surface turbulence. This ensures the more precise control of the performing part of the complex.²²

The same principle serves as the basis of the design of the "RCV" series produced by a California company, Hydro Products. Their main element is a television camera with a special lens which can receive images with almost no light from a distance of up to 9 meters.²³ Manipulators with detachable working instruments allow for the performance of various practical operations. The vehicles are produced in several models, but all of them are intended to work at a depth of almost 2 kilometers. It is not surprising that the "RCV" is greatly in demand and is being used in almost all of the largest offshore drilling sites.

According to official data presented at the Interocean-76 International Conference in Dusseldorf (FRG), the world fleet of underwater vehicles (those in use and those being built) consisted of approximately 150 vehicles in 1976, one-third of which were unmanned.²⁴ The United States accounted for around 50, half of them unmanned. The American experience is having a considerable effect on world tendencies in this field. For example, the first rules for the design, construction and operation of underwater vehicles were put in force by the American Shipping Bureau by 1968. Other classifying societies (the Lloyd Register, the German Lloyd, the Norwegian Veritas Bureau and others) instituted rules of this kind much later. The need for such rules arises from the desire to increase the safety of submersions, as eight serious accidents involving manned vehicles have taken place during the last eight years, leading to the death of five people.²⁵

Canada's Underwater Vehicles

Canada, which borders on the world's most tempestuous bodies of water--the Arctic Ocean, the North Atlantic and the North Pacific--is energetically working on the development of offshore mineral deposits. The continental shelf of this nation (almost 3.8 million square kilometers) is the second largest in the world in terms of area.²⁶ Vast gas-bearing strata have been discovered, particularly along the coast of Labrador, at a depth of 180 meters. Studies have proved the economic expediency of the industrial working of these deposits, and many Canadian companies are now trying to develop the proper mining equipment.²⁷

Underwater vehicles have been assigned an important role in Canada's national plans to explore marine resources. As we have already mentioned, a Canadian company, Vancouver's International Hydrodynamics, has become one of the world's largest producers and suppliers of commercial underwater vehicles in recent years. It has specialized in the production of this new type of equipment since 1966. The company mainly builds vehicles of the "Pisces" type, which have been supplemented by the "Aquarius" and "Taurus" series. The planned depth of the Pisces models IV, V, VI, VII, IX and XI is 2,000 meters. In all, the company has built and delivered 12 vehicles of this type to clients. These have included the "Pisces-VII" and "Pisces-XI" which were purchased by the USSR Academy of Sciences and completely proved their worth in the summer of 1977 in the Baykal research project, as well as the "SDL" rescue vehicle ordered by the Canadian Navy, and the "Leo" with airlocks to provide divers with an exit underwater. The company now has orders for small vehicles of the "Aquarius" type and the larger "Taurus."²⁸

All of the vehicles of International Hydrodynamics have been designed with a view to high safety requirements. They are equipped with facilities for the emergency jettisoning of ballast, the manipulator and even the motors and propellers. The possibility of installing a drill for taking rock soil samples and hydraulic excavators for digging underwater cable trenches has been envisaged. Besides this, the "Taurus" has attachments for linking up with underwater structures or vessels, permitting people to cross from one to the other. Most of this firm's vehicles have been ordered and built for English companies using them in the North Sea.

According to the unanimous opinion of experts, the future of underwater vehicles is connected with the prospects for the further exploration of marine resources, primarily the development of offshore oil and gas drilling. This will have a decisive effect on the design of the vehicles and, mainly, on their provision with the proper working instruments, manipulators and other devices for practical operations on the ocean floor. The abovementioned Perry Oceanographics (United States) has been perfecting the manipulators for its vehicles for a long time. One of the latest systems was made of anodized aluminum. A hydraulic linkage system transmits enough energy to the manipulator to lift items weighing up to 50 kilograms. A telescoping device extends the grappling element. The rotary motion of this element has also been envisaged.

Naturally, this does not mean that research or experimental vehicles will not be built in the future to test new designs, new materials or sources of energy under water. Evidently, however, the development of these vehicles will be of an episodic nature.

FOOTNOTES

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27. For a more detailed discussion, see V.D. Pisarev, "Canada: The Development of World Ocean Resources," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1977--editor's note.
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BOOK REVIEWS

Washington's Budget Policy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 115-118

[Review by Ye.F. Zhukov of the book "Federal Budget Policy" by David J. Ott and Attiat F. Ott, 3d edition, the Brookings Institution, 1977, 178 pages]

[Text] Federal budget policy, which is examined in this book by American economists, is one of the complex and interesting aspects of modern economic regulation by the state. It quite frequently attracts the attention of many prominent American economists, as state finances, particularly the federal budget, represent an important lever for the indirect regulation of the American economy. In the absence of nationalized branches in the United States (in contrast to Western Europe), the federal budget is becoming more and more of a unique instrument of "capitalist planning and programming" within the framework of bourgeois society with its growing socio-economic conflicts. The interest in budget policy is also aroused by the growing complexity of the mechanism governing the function of state-monopoly capitalism and the relatively limited means at the disposal of the state for influencing the economy.

This study can be divided into two parts: the organization and management of the federal budget on the level of the executive and legislative branches and the effect of budget policy proper on the economy and its individual spheres. The authors begin their monograph with an analysis of the advantages and shortcomings of various theories about the federal budget. At this point, it should be pointed out immediately that the origination of various theories on budgetary economic regulation has been related to the impossibility of finding a simple method for a long time due to the intensification of conflict in the capitalist society. Theories current in the United States concerning the structure and organization of the federal budget represent an attempt to adapt the mechanism governing state finances to the present requirements of state-monopoly capitalism, as well as a search for palliatives to diminish the conflicts arising in the system of economic regulation. The so-called administrative budget existed until the 1930's,

when the need for more complete control over all federal financial operations resulted in a consolidated cash budget; in the 1960's, the idea of "budgeting within a system of national accounts" enjoyed great popularity; this kind of budget includes federal government operations related to the day-to-day production of goods and services. The simultaneous use of various budgeting theories gave rise to great difficulties in the work of government agencies. For this reason, a decision was made to establish a single budget format--the unified budget--from 1967 on. It contains detailed information on the government's financial operations, including total new allocations approved for the current year, as well as the remainder of allocations from past years; data on federal loans to local governments and foreign borrowers, ways of covering budget deficits (changing the treasury cash balance, government loans) and many other types of information.

In the monograph, the authors devote a great deal of space to the so-called budgeting process--the process by which decisions are made on budget policy and by which they progress through various levels of the legislative and executive branches. The authors have been able to demonstrate that the compilation and approval of the budget constitute a complex political process. They do not, however, disclose the real reasons for this. It is essentially in the budget process that the growing antagonism between the main classes in contemporary American society becomes apparent. Through its lobbyists and the administration and congress, the monopolistic bourgeoisie strives to make use of the federal budget to maintain its high level of profit. Naturally, this policy is resisted by the organized labor movement, farmers, the colored population and progressive organizations demanding broader social programs and the confiscation and redistribution of part of the income of the richest population strata. The authors have also been able to clearly describe the life cycle of the budget, consisting of three stages: the drafting of the budget, which is the responsibility of the President and is actually accomplished by the staff of his economic offices; the examination and approval of the budget in Congress; the execution of the budget. Despite the fact that several measures have been taken in recent years to simplify budgeting procedure--in particular, a coordinating committee on the budget has been created in Congress--it is still awkward and archaic. Monopolistic capital, however, sees an advantage in this, as the present budgeting procedure allows it to push through any decisions it needs.

In this work, the authors are mainly concerned with the effect of the federal budget and budget policy on the economy, but they also demonstrate the reciprocal connections: the effect of economic problems and changes in market conditions on the form and structure of the budget. Pointing out the unprecedented increase in federal spending during the two centuries since the nation was founded, the authors associate this tendency primarily with the United States' involvement in various wars. But the total increase in federal expenditures, which rose from 7 million dollars in 1794 to 400 billion in 1977--that is, to a figure 60,000 times greater (pp 53-54)--

has not only been due to brief spurts of military spending, but also to the growth of national wealth, the expansion of the economy and the growing complexity of the processes occurring in it. The federal budget has essentially become a kind of mirror, reflecting economic growth as well as the changes taking place in the economy over a long period of time.

The increase in budget expenditures, according to the authors' correct admission, has been stimulated by substantial changes in the tax system. A shift was made from indirect taxation, constituting 90-95 percent of all budget revenues, to the collection of individual income taxes. The authors interpret this exclusively in terms of military considerations, although another reason for the growth of the expenditure portion of the federal budget can be seen in the expansion of American capitalism in breadth and depth and the increased intervention by the state in the economy. Therefore, the expansion of the state's economic functions and the gradual militarization of the economy could no longer be based on the limited foundation of indirect taxes and necessitated the institution of income tax.

The authors provide an excessively simplified description of some types of military expenditures without indicating the real reasons for their growth. Expenditures on social needs, however, are described by them as the result of nothing more than the effects of cyclical economic development. The increase in this kind of spending in times of recession and crisis, however, is also the result of pressure exerted by organized labor, the working masses and the colored population. For monopolistic capital and the bourgeois state, these expenditures are nothing more than concessions they have been forced to make.

In subsequent sections of their monograph, the authors examine the effects of the federal budget on various spheres of economic activity. They point out the fact that the budget began to perform a stimulating and regulating role in the 1930's, after a ruinous crisis. With the aid of many examples and analytical computations, the American economists demonstrate that the establishment of a particular level of federal spending can effect the private and government sectors, consumer spending, price levels and the state of the balance of trade and payments. This means that the budget, its expenditure and income portions, now has quite a broad range of influence and affects all active economic subjects. The mechanism of the budget's influence, which is examined by the authors, is used extensively in economic policy-making by the White House and other government offices.

For a long time Americans believed that cuts in federal spending tended to reduce production output and employment, that an increase in this spending would have the opposite effect and that a change in tax rates could also have a dual effect on the state of the economy. Further on in the work, however, the authors are forced to admit that many budgetary controls have turned out to be ineffective now that inflation and a high rate of unemployment are existing side by side, as it is not clear which policy the government should choose: to stimulate growth or restrict it. Some members of

the administration believe that unemployment is a more serious threat, while others, to the contrary, feel that inflation is more dangerous. In essence, the authors indirectly admit the contradictory nature of the current system for state regulation of the American economy. This was quite apparent, for example, in the economic policy of the Carter Administration, which decided on a program of stimulation (in early 1977), but was soon forced to make cuts in it for fear of intensifying inflationary processes.

In the concluding part of the work, the authors analyze the process of fiscal policy-making, as well as the role of the national debt and its economic consequences. In particular, they state that the effect of the growing deficit on the economy can be interpreted in various ways. The federal budget sometimes grows not as a result of increased spending, but as a result of reduction in the GNP, as this limits the taxes that might be collected. In other cases, the deficit caused by rising expenditures promote an increase in the GNP. Although the authors try to prove that a budget deficit has a temporary positive effect within the framework of the capitalist order, it is a well-known fact that it always leads to severe negative economic consequences over the long range: it disrupts monetary circulation, causes inflation and undermines the credit superstructure. The negative features of the constantly growing deficits became extremely apparent in the 1970's and were one of the causes of the most severe and prolonged crises (1973-1975) of the entire postwar period.

The authors note that the negligible effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies is due to the fact that they do not keep up with economic events, and they feel that these should be forecasted by the government. As we know, however, the extensive use of forecasts in American practice has still not produced the desired results, mainly because they have not been capable of anticipating socio-economic cataclysms.

The authors analyze the problem of the rising national debt in great detail, define it, describe its structure and discuss its connection with fiscal policy. In order to emphasize the serious nature of the problem of the growing national debt, they cite a statement by A. Okun, prominent economist and former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors to the President, who said that "The most disturbing of our national economic problems today is the problem of deficit financing"--that is, the growing national debt (p 107). Its tendency to progressively increase is corroborated by the following data: between 1915 and 1971 it rose from 1 billion dollars to 700 billion, but between 1965 and 1975 the debt doubled while it only rose by 37 percent between 1944 and 1964 (pp 111, 113).

The negative side of the deficit and the rising debt, the authors stress with some justification, is related to the undermining of the money market and the transfer and expenditure of tremendous credit resources in the private sector (which could be used for the development of industry and other branches of the economy) to finance the majority of federal expenditures unconnected with production. It should be added, however, that the

growth of the debt is constantly stimulated by the policy of economic militarization, a policy implemented as a result of pressure exerted by the military-industrial complex and causing a constant increase in peacetime military expenditures. And what is even more important--the entire policy of state-monopolistic regulation is based on the Keynesian theory which regards budget spending, the deficit and the debt as a cure for crises, recessions, excessively high rates of unemployment and other ills of the capitalist system.

Despite the fact that these American writers have interpreted major problems from the traditional standpoint of bourgeois economic science, this study is broader than most other works by American authors in its description of the contemporary mechanisms governing Washington's budget policy and its discussion of the entire system of federal economic regulation in the United States.

Revenue Sharing as a Means of Decentralization

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA IN Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 118-120

[Review by Ye.P. Ionova of the book "Revenue Sharing: The Second Round" by Richard P. Nathan and Charles F. Adams, Washington, the Brookings Institution, 1977, XIV + 268 pages]

[Text] The policy of "new federalism" proclaimed by President R. Nixon gave rise to new developments in the interrelations between three levels of government--federal, state and local; it also had a certain effect on the entire area of socio-political relations in the nation. The most important element of this policy was the program for the "sharing" of federal revenues by state and local governments which was approved by Congress in 1972. At first, federal financial assistance was offered to all elements of the public administration structure, both on the state and the local level, without any restrictions or instructions on spending procedure. This was the fundamental difference between the 1972 program and such traditional federal assistance programs as the special grant program. These grants, the significance of which became particularly great in the 1960's in connection with the development of bourgeois reformism, were awarded to certain state and local executive agencies to finance specific programs and were governed by detailed federal instructions. By using the system of grants as a means of financial pressure, the federal government acquired extensive opportunities to conduct and oversee its own policies on the state and local levels. The revenue sharing program deprived the federal government of its ability to control the spending of federal funds. In 1976 Congress extended the program through September 1980. Nonetheless, this program is still the cause of a political struggle and the subject of fierce debate.

Due to the importance of the tasks assigned to the revenue sharing program, its implementation has attracted the attention of the scientific community in the United States, including researchers from the Brookings Institution.

The institution has completed a comprehensive study of the workings and consequences of this program in the economic and political spheres. The work being reviewed is the second of three studies. Data collected by the Brookings Institution during the 1975-1977 period in 65 state and local government subdivisions served as the research material. Data on the socio-economic and, to a lesser degree, the political aspects of the 1972 program's functioning were collected and classified, particularly information on the spending of federal funds, the effect of federal assistance on the financial position of urban centers, the process by which the funds received by state and local governments were distributed and the involvement of various political forces in this process.

As the authors point out, the first responses in Congress to the bill proposing the extension of the 1972 Act (drawn up in 1974) were mostly unfavorable. Liberal representatives of the Democratic Party, opposing the very idea of federal revenue sharing, were particularly dissatisfied with the bill. Some of the supporters of this idea were also disillusioned.

The formula for the distribution of federal funds, which did not take the differences between "rich" and "poor" states into account, was most harshly criticized. Outside of Congress, the most active opponents of this bill were various civil rights organizations; they were afraid that pro-racist reactionary authorities on the state and local levels would ignore the needs of the ethnic minorities and would even use these funds to reinforce discriminatory practices.

In their analysis of the socio-economic impact of the program, the authors examine the ways and means of distributing federal funds in states, counties and cities in detail. Their comparative analysis of federal funds allocated to state and local governments for the needs of the public and private sectors is extremely interesting and indicative. The program has had a more substantial effect on the public sector. For example, in the seven states where material was gathered, up to 60 percent of the funds received through this program were used to augment capital investments in highway construction and, to a lesser degree, the expansion of public health and education services. An even greater portion of federal funds--up to 70 percent--was used for social needs in the cities. At the same time, in government subdivisions experiencing serious financial difficulties, federal assistance was used to stabilize or reduce taxes, which the authors see as support for the private sector.

State and local authorities largely failed to even consider the possibility, as the authors testify, of using federal financial assistance to increase the income of the working population through a direct rise in wages. For example, federal assistance was used to increase the income of some categories of workers, and only in negligible amounts, in 4 of the 65 state and local government subdivisions analyzed. For example, the wages of state employees in North Carolina only rose by 2 percent as a result of the use of federal funds. The authors conclude that big cities are experiencing

financial crisis and the problems involved in resolving this crisis are so complex, acute and contradictory that the federal revenue sharing program in its present form is incapable of alleviating their difficulty to any degree whatsoever.

In describing the exceedingly contradictory nature of the program's effect on the financial status of cities, the authors do not even come close to disclosing the complex socio-economic conflicts lying at the basis of the "urban crisis."

The political aspects of the 1972 reform are not completely elucidated in the work being reviewed, although it was precisely these that caused it to become the method used by the Republican administration for redistributing power on these three levels--federal, state and local. The 1972 law substantially increased the significance of political leadership on the state and local levels and simultaneously diminished the influence of the federal bureaucratic establishment. According to the 1972 law, which was then extended by the law of 1976, specialized administrative agencies on the state and local levels--for example, agencies concerned with urban development, public health and education, etc.--must address their requests for funds directly to the political leadership--the governors of states and the mayors of cities. This has reinforced the position of the latter. Political leaders on the state and local levels were also pleased by the fact that they would have control over the federal funds and that the possibility of federal control over spending was excluded by law.

The authors note that the program has not aided at all in changing the archaic structure of local government. To substantiate this view, they remark that "Thousands of small subdivisions of the power structure which previously did not receive any kind of federal assistance now have the right to receive sums constituting a large part of their budgets. As their viability and very existence depend on their financial security, federal assistance has increased their ability to resist liquidation (p 134).

Despite the fact that the work being reviewed suffers from the shortcomings typical of contemporary bourgeois empirical studies, it is of interest as a documented analysis of new developments in federal relations. One of these is the greater role that has been played by state and local governments in the 1970's in the regulation of internal processes in the United States. The sharp increase in the intervention of the federal government in various spheres of life in the bourgeois society, which was characteristic of the 1960's, complicated the process of regulation, increased the influence of the federal bureaucratic establishment and intensified conflicts in the very mechanism of regulation. The program for sharing federal revenues with state and local governments is an attempt to transfer some of the burden of domestic administration to the state and local governments, which has meant the substitution of local priorities for national ones in this sphere. As a program aimed not only at the alleviation of the financial difficulties of state and local governments, but also at the augmentation

of the significance of political authorities on the state and local levels, the 1972 reform was part of the Republic administration's course to "decentralize" government and, in fact, to give the local bourgeoisie more power. The program of "sharing" gave local bourgeois groups, the influence of which is immeasurably greater on the state level than on the national scale, additional opportunities to exert pressure on the power structure in state and local governments for the purpose of promoting a course benefitting them.

Human Rights in America

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 120-121

[Review by V.A. Savel'yev of the book "Look Homeward Jimmy Carter: The State of Human Rights, USA," publication of the Communist Party of the United States of America, translated from the English, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, 95 pages]

[Text] In connection with the provocative campaign launched in the United States "in defense of human rights" in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, American communists have published a book entitled, "Look Homeward Jimmy Carter: The State of Human Rights, USA." The foreword is by Henry Winston, national chairman of the Communist Party of the United States of America, and Gus Hall, secretary general of the Party.

Many examples presented in the work summarize and demonstrate the ways in which elementary human rights are trampled upon in a nation where the ruling class has presumed to "teach morals" to the socialist states.

Although the United States is the richest country in the capitalist world, the right to work and to freely choose a job is an impossible dream for 10-15 million chronically unemployed persons (according to the statistics of labor unions), for the 4.3 million workers who have not been eligible for unemployment compensation since 1976, and for their families (p 32). The employment situation is particularly difficult for the non-white minorities and youth.

Many young Americans who are still in school already know that they have no chance of getting a job in the future. Young workers are the first to be laid off when economic conditions take a turn for the worse. It is precisely the young people who are frequently hired for jobs that do not match their skills and professional training. The rate of unemployment for black youth has reached 52.3 percent and has never dropped below 25 percent in the last decade. If the current tendency continues for another 5 years, more than half of all young blacks will never have a job (p 43).

The situation is no better in the area of public health and education, where Americans with high incomes have all the advantages.

From early childhood, the Americans are assured that the United States supposedly guarantees "liberty and justice for all." But this "just" system actually takes brutal action against those who oppose oppression, exploitation and war. The criminal courts, the police force and the penal system are permeated with the ideology and practice of racism, the authors write. The system of "law enforcement" in the United States is directed against the workers--black, colored and white. This is why most of the prisoners in American jails are blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, American Indians and Asian-Americans. Although black Americans constitute only one-eighth of the population, almost half of all prisoners are black.

The authors cite data on the methods and consequences of police brutality, including the brutal actions used to break up peaceful demonstrations for civil rights. In 1976 alone, American policemen killed 300 young workers, mostly black, and wounded 3,000 persons (pp 60, 62).

The authors of the book show what "free elections" mean in the United States. In particular, they point out the fact that former President L. Johnson's rise to power began with a swindle. He actually suffered a defeat in his first "successful" election to the Senate from the state of Texas. His "victory" was ensured by 200 fake ballots. This means that nothing other than political corruption gave L. Johnson national fame and ultimately rewarded him with the title of 35th President of the United States (p 37).

Many strictly documented facts in the American Communists' publication clearly and cogently disclose exceedingly gross violations of the declared rights of citizens to freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association and to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.

As the authors point out, even a select Senate committee for overseeing the actions of intelligence agencies had to admit the existence of such violations.

The materials collected in the work graphically demonstrate that U.S. ruling circles, which boast about the American "way of life" and try to force it on others, have no moral right to preach at anyone, particularly the socialist countries, where, in contrast to the capitalist world, the socio-economic, political and personal rights of the individual are not only declared but also actually guaranteed.

Racial Tension--Past and Present

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 121-122

[Review by I.A. Geyevskiy of the book "Chernyye pasynki Ameriki" (America's Black Stepsons) by R. Ivanov, Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1978, 192 pages]

[Text] After searching in various archives, black writer Alex Haley was able to trace the history of his family back through many generations of his

dark-skinned ancestors, all the way back to those who were taken from Africa to the "promised land" in chains. Using one family as an example, Haley tried to convey the extremely tragic history of the black Americans over several centuries. The far-reaching and immediate repercussions of his novel "Roots" in the United States (as well as the serialized television program of the same name) demonstrated how closely today's Negro problem is connected with the past and how important it is to know the history of this problem for an understanding of its present status. For this reason, R.F. Ivanov's work is of great interest.

The history of the black population in the United States is traced over four and a half centuries: the first black slaves were brought to North America by the Spanish in 1526, a century before the arrival of the Virginia settlers considered to be the first colonists of the territory now occupied by the United States. The author asks logical questions: Why is the Negro problem in the United States so tenacious that it has survived the storms of two social revolutions and still exists today? Where do the roots of America's tradition of racial discrimination lie? Why are black Americans still being subjected to the effects of discrimination in various spheres of life today, in spite of the widespread protest movement against racism? Why has the United States been unable to find at least a compromise solution to this problem?

The author conclusively shows that the Negro problem has had its basis in the sphere of economics throughout the United States' history. The specific forms of black oppression have changed, but the black slaves and the officially free blacks after emancipation have both been the object of super-exploitation by the dominant classes. Even today, monopolistic capital is striving to preserve the foundations of racism, which brings them additional multibillion-dollar dividends. The author also indicates the important role played by ideological and political factors motivating the dominant class to preserve discrimination: the desire to keep the white masses prisoners of racial prejudice, to break up the working class on the grounds of racial characteristics and to undermine the class and general democratic struggle.

The author feels that the "Negro problem in the United States has not to any degree been confined to purely racial aspects" (p 190) and that it "represents a concentration of all of the most crucial problems of the 'sick society'" (p 7). At the same time, as R. F. Ivanov correctly stresses, "The history of the negroes is not only a sad tale of 200 years of slavery and racial discrimination. This is also the history of a never-ending struggle for freedom and human dignity" (p 9). Ivanov arrives at the historically sound conclusion that the struggle of the blacks against slavery and racial discrimination added many glorious pages to the history of democratic movements and contributed much to the revolutionary traditions of the American people. He cogently exposes the actual motives of the attempt made by U.S. ruling circles to pass themselves off as true friends of the black Americans and opponents of racism.

"The past history and present struggle of the Afro-Americans," the author concludes, "teach us that only the white workers, farmers and working intelligentsia can be the real allies of the blacks.... Participants in the Negro movement in the United States and many of its leaders are actively promoting the establishment of an effective alliance made up of all opponents of racism. Progressive segments of the American white population are becoming increasingly insistent in their advocacy of a united front of white and black workers against the monopolies. This is the only way in which further progress can be made in the resolution of the most complex problems in interracial relations in the United States of America today" (p 191).

Western Capital Investments and Return on Capital

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 122-123

[Review by Ya. A. Ioffe of the book "Urovni i tendentsii razvitiya glavnykh kapitalisticheskikh stran: ekonomicheskiye sopostavleniya" (The Developmental Levels and Tendencies of the Major Capitalist Countries: Economic Comparisons) by a group of authors supervised by V.M. Gudrov, Moscow, Nauka, 1977, 278 pages]

[Text] The Soviet reader is well acquainted with English economist A. Maddison's book "Economic Growth in the West," which was translated into Russian and published in our nation in 1968. It contains an analysis of the most important historical tendencies in the economic development of the major capitalist countries from the standpoint of the bourgeois scholar.

The subject of this review, a monograph by Soviet writers--researchers at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences--presents the Marxist view of the tendencies and levels of economic development in the major capitalist countries during the postwar period. On the basis of a single set of procedures, the authors have studied a vast amount of statistical material and other information, from census data to intersectoral balance sheets, which made it possible to determine a number of exceptionally important tendencies and logical trends in the economic development of the leading capitalist countries.

The first problem examined in the book involves a comparison of indicators of the economic strength and developmental levels of the United States, Japan, the FRG, England and France. The comparison of all cost indicators (the final social product, investments, fixed capital, labor productivity and the return on capital) for these nations is not based on official currency exchange rates, which, as we know, distort the ratio in the United States' favor, but on the basis of a large number of parities of the real purchasing power of currencies, taken either from a special UN study of this issue or calculated by the authors themselves.

The authors' analysis shows that significant equalization of the levels of economic development took place in the major capitalist countries during the 1950-1974 period, and this was not due to the lowering of the absolute U.S. level, but more probably to the practice of "pooling" other nations up to the higher American level. For example, the final per capita social product in Japan and Western Europe ranged from 22 to 62 percent of the U.S. level in 1950, while the figures for 1974 ranged from 55 to 79 percent; the respective figures for national economic labor productivity were 17-44 and 48-81 (pp 21, 23). At the same time, the authors stress the fact that the distinctive effect of the law of unequal economic development at a time of scientific and technical revolution can be seen, in particular, in the fact that a second, more or less latent side of the actual balance of power among nations represents levels of scientific and technical development. Here it becomes clear that the United States not only has no plans of giving up its positions, but, to the contrary, is even enlarging the so-called "technological gap" in its own favor in some areas. The disclosure of this dual nature in the dynamics of the balance of power among the major capitalist countries is an important service performed by the group of authors.

The second problem was to determine the features of the process by which national production is intensified in the major capitalist countries. The authors summarized a vast amount of specific statistical material and used this as a basis to demonstrate that the United States is ahead of its rivals in terms of its degree of production intensification. Capital requirements have been increasing in Japan since the 1960's and the impact of accumulations began to decrease in the 1970's. In Japan, in contrast to the United States, the number of employed individuals rose quite quickly during the entire postwar period, particularly in the sphere of physical production. As for the Western European countries, they would seem to be occupying a position somewhere between those of the United States and Japan in terms of the production intensification levels.

The third topic of research was the structural changes that had been made in the economies of these nations, determined through comparison with the aid of intersectorial balance sheets. On the basis of levels of production intensification, the authors singled out three types of economic structures--American, Japanese and Western European. The structural types were determined through multidimensional classification with the use of such indicators as the final social product, total consumption, the per capita consumption of energy and news print, the percentage accounted for by food expenditures in the consumer budget, the percentage accounted for by agricultural jobs in the total employment figure, the rate of acceleration in the growth rates of electric power, metallurgy, etc.

Naturally, it would be impossible to agree unconditionally with all of the authors' proposals and conclusions. For example, their use of the return on capital as an indicator of production efficiency could arouse the most serious objections.

In the economic sense, the return on capital is an extremely treacherous indicator. It can provide some idea of the efficiency with which fixed assets are used on one condition--if the fixed assets in two countries are equal in scale. For example, the agricultural product in India is approximately 30-40 percent lower than that of the United States, but the value of fixed assets in Indian agriculture is only a fraction of what it is in the United States. And since the return on capital is measured by determining the relationship between the product (the numerator) and assets (the denominator), paradoxical as it may seem, the return on capital in India is much higher than in the United States, although this does not signify in any sense that assets are used more efficiently in India.

The authors propose that the relationship between accumulation norms and the rate of increase in the gross national product be used to measure the impact of capital investments (p 119). We could agree with this if the economic content of such indicators as capital requirements and impact coincided. But this has not been observed. It would probably be more efficient to calculate the total industrial product over 10-15 years and to calculate total capital investments in industry for the same period and, thereby, determine the proper volume of capital that should be invested in a number of nations in order to obtain a certain quantity of products. This method would exclude the problem of the lag--that is, the interval between capital expenditures and the gross of the GNP signifying their results. As for structural changes (technological, reproductive and sectorial) over a long period of time, these have generally been the same for all of the developed capitalist countries.

These isolated comments, however, do not reduce the value of the tremendous amount of scientific and practical work represented by the monograph.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 78
pp 124-127

[Text] March 1978

1 -- Speaking in Washington, the President's National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski made an unequivocal attempt to "trade" the conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms for a change in the USSR's stand on the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

2 -- At a press conference in the National Press Club, President J. Carter discussed American-Soviet relations.

3 -- In connection with the discussion of the State Department's report on the observance of the 1972 Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreements in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senators J. Sparkman, C. Pell and R. Clark noted that the data in the report completely refute the allegations that the USSR is violating these agreements.

4 -- The Soviet-American agreement on air travel for the period between 1 April 1978 and 31 March 1979 went into effect.

5 -- In an interview in the Yugoslav BOR'BA newspaper, President J. Carter noted the "indisputable importance" of Soviet-American relations from the standpoint of the prospects for world peace.

9 -- The USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the CSSR submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons to the Geneva Disarmament Committee for examination.

10 -- In an interview in the Yugoslav NIN weekly, President J. Carter touched upon the issue of Soviet-American relations, including the course of Soviet-American talks on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT printed an interview with P. Warnke, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and P. Nitze, former Pentagon adviser, who expressed opposing views on the prospects of SALT.

A letter to U.S. President J. Carter, in which Soviet scientists request him to cancel the production of the neutron bomb, was printed in PRAVDA.

13--Senator G. McGovern presented a report entitled "Detente and the New American Administration" in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in which he questioned the "nightmarish," as he put it, descriptions of the Soviet Union's military potential and intentions which are making the rounds in some American circles.

16--At a meeting of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, representatives of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain made a joint statement on the course of the trilateral talks for the purpose of drafting an agreement on a total and universal nuclear test ban.

A regular meeting of the Soviet and U.S. SALT delegations took place.

A report published by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress states that Western Europe is rejecting the United States' policy of restricted trade with the USSR and considers the idea of using trade as a means of pressure on the USSR to be naive and unrealistic.

17--Speaking at a university in Wake Forest (North Carolina), President J. Carter announced an "important reassessment" of U.S. military policy by the administration.

19--The Soviet Union launched a magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) device with an American superconducting magnetic system.

24--Secretary of State C. Vance announced at a press conference that "a precarious stage" in Soviet-American relations had begun.

25-31--The USSR was visited by a group of American congressmen--members of the House Committee on the Armed Services, headed by Committee Chairman M. Price. They visited the USSR Supreme Soviet and were received by Marshall of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, deputy minister of defense and chief of staff of the Air Force, and G. M. Korniyenko, first deputy minister of foreign affairs; a meeting took place in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

28--PRAVDA printed an article by Academician G. A. Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, entitled "A Time of Crucial Decisions," in which the present status and future prospects of Soviet-American relations are analyzed.

31--The American Simon and Schuster publishing firm published the book "Leonid Brezhnev. Pages from His Life." The foreword, "To the American Reader," was written by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev.

April 1978

4--The head of the U.S. SALT delegation, P. Warnke, discussed the course of these talks in a speech at Columbia University.

5--The Permanent Soviet Mission to the United Nations issued a formal protest to American officials in connection with the hostile demonstrations constantly organized by Zionists and other reactionary organizations in the building of the Soviet mission in New York, which impede the normal operations of the mission.

7--During his tour of Siberia and the Far East, L. I. Brezhnev presented a speech on the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin," discussing issues connected with the consolidation of peace and the de-escalation of the arms race. In this connection, L. I. Brezhnev spoke in detail on SALT.

The fifth session of the joint Soviet-American commission for cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy, created in accordance with the Soviet-American agreement of 21 June 1973, came to an end in Washington.

The White House published the text of a statement by President J. Carter, announcing that the United States would postpone the final decision on the production of the neutron bomb.

President J. Carter granted an interview to the editors of small-town papers, in which he discussed SALT.

10--Secretary of State C. Vance discussed the state of affairs in the sphere of Soviet-American relations in a speech at the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

12, 14--Regular meetings of the Soviet and U.S. SALT delegations took place in Geneva.

14--Debates began in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress on the production of the neutron bomb. Congressmen J. Seiberling, R. Drinan, T. Weiss, J. Conyers, E. Holtzman and A. Moffett protested the campaign whipped up in the American press over the imaginary "Soviet threat." E. Holtzman noted that more than 100 congressmen had already expressed their opposition to the neutron bomb.

At a press conference in Bonn, U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown announced that the question of the production and deployment of the neutron bomb could not be included in the SALT agenda and was not subject to investigation at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe.

15--PRAVDA printed a document of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers

entitled "On the Results of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev's Visit to the Siberian and Far Eastern Regions." The document points out the fact, in particular, that a tremendous step toward real disarmament "would be the conclusion of a long-range agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms by the USSR and the United States on the basis of the principle of the equality and equivalent security of the sides.... The USSR repeats its proposal concerning the mutual cancellation of the production of neutron weapons, which would save mankind from being drawn into a new round of the arms race."

16--Commenting on General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev's speech in Vladivostok, M. Shulman, U.S. secretary of state's special adviser, said that "this was an extremely sober appraisal of the importance of SALT."

18--In a TIME magazine interview, U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance said that "if we (the USSR and the United States--Ed.) are able to reach an agreement on arms control, and I feel that this is possible, this will begin to change the entire nature of these relations and everything will begin to go well once again." C. Vance admitted that he and the President's National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski had differences of opinion concerning the American approach in dealing with the Soviet Union.

19-23--United States Secretary of State C. Vance was in Moscow. He was received by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev, who stressed the importance of making energetic efforts on both sides at the SALT talks to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems on which no agreement or only partial agreement has been reached. Vance had several meetings with A. A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs. They exchanged views on key issues in Soviet-American relations and some international problems of mutual interest. A joint statement on the talks was published.

22--In the U.S. Congress, Senator P. Domenici and Congressman R. Dornan introduced a bill concerning the granting of "permanent asylum in the United States" to the Brazinskis criminals.

24--General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev received R. Maxwell, president of the Anglo-American Pergamon Press in the Kremlin. During the course of their discussion, L. I. Brezhnev approved of the firm's desire to publish more English editions of books by Soviet authors. Maxwell signed a contract in Moscow for the publishing rights to the English version of L. I. Brezhnev's memoirs "Malaya zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth]. He also said that his firm would publish a book in November 1978, "Peace--A Priceless Human Possession," which will contain articles and speeches by L. I. Brezhnev on the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State.

25--In his speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress, L. I. Brezhnev announced that the USSR was taking a number of sizeable steps for the purpose of reducing the danger of a new world war and the mass destruction of people with the aid of nuclear weapons. One of these is SALT. The head of the Soviet State expressed his certainty that "mutual effort will make it possible to come to a final agreement, on the basis of reasonable and realistic compromise, which will justly take the security interests of both powers into account. This will de-escalate the arms race appreciably and, consequently, will aid in the consolidation of peace."

A session of the Soviet-American standing advisory commission in Geneva came to an end; its purpose is to aid in the implementation of the goals and premises of the treaty on the limitation of antimissile defense systems and the provisional agreement on some steps to limit strategic offensive weapons, as well as the agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war of 30 September 1971.

26--A regular meeting of the Soviet and U.S. SALT delegations took place in Geneva.

May 1978

3--Republican senators made an announcement criticizing the policy of the Carter Administration in the area of national security and U.S. foreign policy. They accused the administration of being "incapable" of acting in opposition to Soviet foreign policy.

4--Talks were resumed in Geneva by delegations from the USSR, the United States and Great Britain on the draft treaty on a total and universal nuclear test ban.

4-8--Delegations from the Soviet Union and the United States held consultations in Helsinki on the limitation of international sales and deliveries of conventional arms. The Soviet delegation was headed by Ambassador L. I. Mendelevich and the American delegation was headed by L. Gelb, director of the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

The meeting of delegations from the USSR and the United States, which began on 6 February and was held to discuss a ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, in this context, a ban on radiological weapons, came to an end in Geneva.

7--At a press conference in Portland, U.S. President J. Carter stressed that, just as in the past, the United States must conclude new agreements with the USSR on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The President also noted that there would be a possibility of a summit meeting during the concluding stage of working out the new agreement.

Famous progressive American commentator Arthur Shields was decorated with the "Friendship of People" Order and was awarded the Prize imeni V. V. Vorovskiy of the USSR Union of Journalists.

9--At a plenary session of the Disarmament Committee, USSR representative V. I. Likhachev read a joint statement on behalf of the USSR and the United States concerning the course of Soviet-American talks on matters related to their common initiative regarding a ban on chemical weapons. It was noted that fundamental agreement had been reached on most of the aspects of the convention drawn up in this area.

9-16--An American delegation headed by U.S. Secretary of Agriculture R. Bergland visited the Soviet Union. The American secretary was received by Chairman A. N. Kosygin of the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Agriculture V. K. Mesyats, USSR Minister of Procurement G. S. Zolotukhin and USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev.

10--A regular meeting of the Soviet and U.S. SALT delegations was held in Geneva.

13--The head of the U.S. SALT delegation, P. Warnke, speaking at a State Department conference, said that the new agreement was "95-percent ready."

14--In an interview granted to a group of editors of Spanish-language American newspapers, J. Carter again tried to connect the development of the process of detente with the policy of the USSR and Cuba in Africa.

20--Senators H. Baker, H. Bellmon, C. Curtis, J. Danforth, P. Domenici, J. Garn, R. Lugar, R. Morgan and E. Zorinsky sent the President a letter in which they announced that they will take an "extremely negative" stand on the ratification of a new strategic arms limitation agreement if the Soviet Union continues its "unilateral actions."

22--The WASHINGTON POST printed the results of a Harris poll which indicated that recent reports in the American press on the Americans' loss of interest in detente and the consolidation of relations with the USSR are actually totally groundless.

23--A special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, attended by representatives of 149 countries, was called to order in New York.

24--Vice-President W. Mondale, head of the American delegation, spoke at the special UN session.

A regular meeting of the Soviet and U.S. SALT delegations took place in Geneva.

25--Armand Hammer, head of Occidental Petroleum, was awarded the "Friendship of Peoples" Order. At Hammer's request, he was received by USSR Minister of Finance V. F. Garbuzov.

26--The head of the Soviet delegation, A. A. Gromyko, presented the USSR's proposals on practical ways of stopping the arms race at the special UN session on disarmament.

27--American President J. Carter met with A. A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs, in the White House. Others attending the meeting were: on the Soviet side--G. M. Korniyenko, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, V. G. Komplektov, member of the board of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and V. G. Makarov, assistant to the USSR minister of foreign affairs; on the American side--Secretary of State C. Vance, Secretary of Defense H. Brown, National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency P. Warnke, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR M. Toone and other officials on both sides. Most of the time was spent discussing the projected Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

28--In Washington, A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance continued to exchange views on a number of aspects of Soviet-American relations.

29--On the television program "Meet the Press," Z. Brzezinski made statements which presented a distorted picture of the process of international detente and Soviet foreign policy.

30--Senator G. McGovern, the Democratic Party's candidate for the presidency in 1972, sharply criticized Z. Brzezinski's anti-Soviet remarks. The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR printed an editorial calling Brzezinski's anti-Soviet statements the "screams of a hawk."

31--Speaking at a festive meeting in Prague, L. I. Brezhnev again requested the Western powers to "earnestly work toward disarmament."

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